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ABSTRACT
The Learning and Knowledge Creating School: Case of the Finnish
National Defence College
Keywords: organizational learning, knowledge creation, change
laboratory, knowledge vision, teachers’ on-the-job
education
This research focuses on the Finnish National Defence College at the times
when the claimed “learning organization-likeness” appeared in the social
landscape of the Finnish knowledge society. Being managed by the methods
of management by objectives and total quality management and being
involved in continuous educational planning and “transformation” processes,
the Finnish National Defence College has to be introduced to the synthetized
instructional-pedagogical perspective in these issues.
In the Finnish Defence Forces it is currently stressed how the development
of the training and education system forms the basis for competence
development. This kind of statement leads us to ask what kinds of facts and
principles form the basis for the development of the training and education
system of the internationalizing Finnish Defence Forces.
The progressive inquiry learning process starts from the social scientific
knowledge base of the Finnish National Defence College. When the main
theories and theoretical interpretations are analyzed, some of them are
destabilized while the knowledge base of the Finnish Defence Forces is
expanded.
The knowledge-creating theories of Ikujiro Nonaka introduce the readers
to the evolving field of knowledge management and innovation studies. A
synthetized framework for organizational learners and knowledge creators is
presented in this study. It has been made by analyzing chosen research
programmes and the emerging cognitive trails made by them.
The meaningfulness of systemic thinking becomes apparent in the study,
and the social system is conceptualized in the form of the activity system. The
key principles of the cultural-historical activity theory are critically analyzed
and put into practice in Development Laboratory meetings and in thematic
interviews of the managers of the Finnish National Defence College.
The results show that an instructional-pedagogical perspective is needed in
the Finnish Defence Forces and Finnish National Defence College when aiming
at aligned transformations and increase of the “learning organization likeness”
in the Finnish Defence Forces and in the Armed Forces in general.
vi
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Developing the Finnish military
educational system
Since the beginning of the 1990s the researcher has witnessed how
the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) have started to apply methods of
management by objectives (MBO), and since 2000 how total quality
management (TQM1; cf. business process reengineering (BPR)) have
been put into practice. In the midst of these experiences a question
emerged: what will be the next management approach for us and
could it be probed and analyzed beforehand and if not, at least as it is
applied?
Since 2000 the researcher has served at the Finnish National Defence
College (FNDC) firstly as a planning officer2 at the headquarters and
since September 2004 in the Department of Education. The researcher
has been involved in two planning processes aiming to develop the
Finnish officer education (the first one in 2000–2001, and the second
one from 2003 onwards) and lately more precisely the development
of on-the-job-training (education) of military teachers. Hence, the
practices of MBO, TQM and the development of educational practices
have been merged together at the FNDC, causing unidentified
consequences.
On the basis of his experiences at the FDF and FNDC the researcher
recognized inadequacies in the current educational planning methods.
Through informal discussions he came into the conclusion that such
feelings were shared among his colleagues and also by some of the
superiors. Further on, these kinds of opinions seemed to be emerging
also in the Finnish Higher Evaluation Council (FINHEEC), which in its
report of the FNDC asked what kinds of constructivist principles these
educational “transformations” were based on (FINHEEC 2001, 10). Later,
in the newest competence development strategy of the FDF, the
question of the main principles came to the fore in the following form:
1 From 1999 to 2001 the researcher was an assessor in the Quality Competition of the FDF, and
in 2001 an assessor in the Finnish Quality Competition, being relatively experienced in the
quality field.
2 At that time the researcher was a part-time teacher at the FNDC, as will become obvious
during the description.
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“The development of the training and education system forms the
basis for the competence development”3. But what kinds of facts and
principles form the basis for the development of the training and
education system, which is nowadays a part of the Finnish and at the
same time the European higher educational system? Could we finally
use social scientific research as a tool for the developmental purposes
of the military educational institution?
Despite these shared informal feelings and formal opinions the
researcher met the attitude that these inadequacies are just a matter
of “the way things are”. According to this kind of attitude the military
organizations are what they always have been and will be also in the
future. And if somehow the organization will be developed, it is the
undivided duty of the commander to do so. But what are the principles
according to which the commanders are and will be developing our
military educational system for the future and what will be the role of
the teachers in these developmental activities?
Additionally, when facing the overriding technological determinism,
our main task seems to be reduced to the choosing of one technological
devise from many available ones. In other words we could claim that
web-based education will solve the challenges of our current
educational practices. But actually it will not and the forthcoming
answer will not be as simple as this.
Then the researcher made the conclusion that some other
perspective was needed – a scientific perspective by which to take a
critical look at the current educational practices at the FNDC. He turned
towards social sciences. Maybe they could offer a reasonable
alternative to challenge the felt inadequacies and give answers to the
fundamental questions. He started to scan the social reality, trying to
identify some emerging themes and topics in our current society. At
the same time the sphere of interest started to expand and the
researcher recognized that also the Finnish society is called a
“knowledge society”4. Also a strong claim was identified; knowledge
was claimed to be the resource of our current reality and potentially
essential also for the FNDC.
Instead of choosing a specific paradigm the researcher acted in
another way. He concluded and hypothesized that he would have to
try to “stand on the shoulders of the giants” (i.e. the best researchers
of the field), identifying them in the field and studying chronologically
3 Competence development strategy; i.e. Competence Development of Salaried Personnel in
the Finnish Defence Forces (2004, the English version, 5).
4 Some others tend to claim that this is not true; instead we are living in an information society
and we have to be prepared for information warfare in order to gain crucial information
superiority, but where does the difference between information and knowledge lie?
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how their studies have been evolving during past decades. During
this process “interparadigmatic” debate and criticism was identified
and some additional researchers were added to the ones to be closely
scrutinized.
Even in our Finnish knowledge society it was impossible to be
unaware of the well known person in knowledge studies – Ikujiro
Nonaka. He and his colleagues are the reasons for finding contacts in
Japan, inspiring the researcher to know more about these issues.
Already in the beginning of the process the researcher felt that
somehow he would have to balance the uncritical importation of
international theories5. It is almost needless to say, but in the very
beginning he had to get familiar with the knowledge base of the FNDC
(i.e. military pedagogy; leadership, currently in the form of Deep
Leadership at the FDF) extending this by the principles of some chosen
Finnish civilian social scientists. Hence, Yrjö Engeström was selected
and later, for various reasons, also Carl Bereiter and Kai Hakkarainen.
Already at these times the FDF started to claim how it will develop
itself as a learning organization. Even by superficial reading one will
recognize that the theories of Nonaka strongly criticize the Sengean
learning organization theories. But how to solve the confrontation
justifiably and could it be possible that learning and knowledge
creation are intertwined?
The present social scientific research could be located at the
intersection of the military sciences and “civilian sciences”, between
“national” and international social sciences but also between the
working practices at the FNDC and the social scientific perspective.
The audience of the present study varies, but basically the study has
been made to meet international academic requirements6 without
loosing sight of Finnish military practitioners.
5 In Finland (but the fact seems to be true also in other nations) we rather often tend to import
uncritically several kinds of practices and theories from abroad. In our military culture we tend
to import American ones and in some spheres of life for example Japanese. In chapter 2 the
critical stance will be justified as being a fundamental feature of sciences and social sciences.
6 More specifically, this study has been made to meet the epistemic standards of the Japan
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.
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1.2. A brief introduction to the case
organization – the Finnish National
Defence College7
The Finnish National Defence College8, founded in January 19939,
provides the training required for commissioned officer’s positions in
the FDF and the Finnish Border Guard (FBG)10. The FNDC is a profit
centre of the Defence Staff supervised by the Chief of the Defence
Staff with the assistance of the Chief of Personnel. The studies leading
to an officer’s degree are carried out in the Military Academy (formerly
the First Degree Division). The students of the Postgraduate Degree
Division aim at taking a senior staff officer’s or a general staff officer’s
degree. The Continuing Education and Development Centre11 provides
continuing training and education for different personnel groups of
the FDF with a university degree or for other personnel eligible for
studies. Also doctoral studies in military sciences are possible at the
FNDC12. Instruction and research are conducted in the seven
departments13 of the FNDC14. Since 2001 the FNDC has supervised
officer studies also in the service and branch schools situated in various
locations in Finland. During this analysis it will be shown what has
happened and emerged due to the decisions made and in what kind
of state the current social reality of the FNDC seems to be.
1.3. Research questions
The following research questions have guided this study from the
beginning of the research process,
– Who are the subjects of learning and knowledge activities?
7 For additional information about the FNDC see www.mil.fi; for additional information about
the FDF see www.mil.fi; for additional information about the FBG see www.rvl.fi.
8 Located mainly in Helsinki, the capital of Finland.
9 Then the traditional Military Academy, the Combat School, and the War College were
administratively joined together in the form of FNDC, which got a university status.
10 Also the number of civilian and international students educated at the FNDC has been
increasing during the past years.
11 On the 1st of January 2006 the Defence Forces Education Development Centre joined the
FNDC and the Continuing Training Division was renamed as the Continuing Education and
Development Centre.
12 Since 2002 the researcher has studied also in the doctoral program of the FNDC.
13 The Department of Tactics and Operations Art; the Department of Management and Leadership;
the Department of Education; the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies; the Department
of Technology; the Department of War History; the Department of Behavioural Sciences.
Hence, the disciplines of the FNDC vary along the dimension between sciences and social
sciences, extending even to the arts.
14 Also the Central Library, the Military Archives, the Military Museum, and the National Defence
Courses are combined to the matrix organization of the FNDC.
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– What do they learn?
– How do they learn and participate in the knowledge activities?
According to Yrjö Engeström (2001a) any theory of organizational
learning must address at least these fundamental questions. Here the
idea has been cross-appropriated15 (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus 1997, 4)
to the field of knowledge management.
During the research process a fourth question emerged, namely
– How do we guide the transformation of the educational institution
or is this a totally autopoietic issue?
At the moment the question of the “controllability” of the
organizational development process seems to be irrelevant, but later
on some supporting facts for its relevancy will be presented. In other
words a challenge has been given: Are we ready to shift our thinking
and face our current social reality from a more knowledgeable and
pedagogically oriented angle?
1.4. Structure of the study
Chapter 2 shows the social scientific position of the researcher and
justifies the decision to conduct a “multiparadigmatic” and
interdisciplinary study. The researcher offers a broad view beyond
“paradigms” towards research programmes and the meaning of socially
navigated cognitive trails, diving into the debate on the
metatheoretical and philosophical level, but without loosing touch of
the theoretical and practical levels. The occasional metatheoretical
stance is needed for constructive criticism of the chosen research
programmes, and thus self-reflection of the metatheoretical
assumptions will be enabled.
In Chapter 3 a short introduction of the field of educational reform
studies is presented. The main point is to identify the main dimensions
and primary lessons of the studies done by prestigious experts in the
field of educational reform studies.
In Chapter 4 the analysis starts by criticizing the current “learning
organization” interpretations at the FDF. This is made for a start by
going through the main principles of the Sengean learning
organization. After this the basics of the first generation knowledge
management studies and a critical analysis of Nonaka’s theories are
15 Cross-appropriation means bringing practices into contexts that cannot generate them, but
in which they are useful.
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introduced, and the reasonability of understanding social systems
begins to emerge. Then the trail goes to the main principles of cultural-
activity theories, and the social system model of this study is introduced.
Chapter 5 explains how the idea of using the Development
Laboratory method and semi-structured thematic interviews in this
study came into being. The narrative allows the researcher to continue
his reflections into the research process and its influential context.
In Chapter 6 the data gathered in the Development Laboratory
meetings is analyzed in the form of a narrative. In Chapter 7 the data
obtained from thematic interviews is analyzed. Some key problems
and paradoxes are identified in the case of the FNDC, and they are
put into a solvable form.
Chapter 8 challenges some deep-seated basic assumptions (such as
the nature of learning, human being and knowledge) identified in the
FNDC and playing a pivotal role in the forthcoming real transformations
of the Finnish military educational system.
Chapter 9 answers the research questions and reflects on the
research process as a whole.
20
16 By eclecticism the researcher means the theory and practice of selecting what appears to be
the “best” in various paradigms, lacking rigorous reflection on the metatheoretical assumptions.
Cf. e.g. Miettinen (2000a).
Chapter Two
METHODOLOGICAL
CONSIDERATIONS AND
METATHEORETICAL
ASSUMPTIONS
2.1. Tracing the essence of social sciences
We rather often tend to take for granted many fundamental issues
influencing our scientific research. Here the purpose is to present some
fundamental questions concerning the essence of science and social
scientific research. Traditionally the epistemic authority of science has
been a priori assumed and not just episodically won by the unique,
necessary, and universal elements of its practice – behaviors,
dispositions, methods, rules, tools, and languages that simply work
best to make truth (Gieryn 1999, 25).
The present analysis is an even more crucial one in the “post-
modern” era, where our traditional (i.e. “modern”) ways of thinking
have been forcefully challenged. In our “post-modern” era we seem
to confront a plurality of heterogeneous claims to knowledge, and
science does not have a privileged place (Giddens 1990a, 2). The only
legitimate methodological principle seems to be the Feyerabendian
“anything goes”, favoring eclecticism18.
But what really makes science and what is meant by the word
“science”, and what do these questions mean to social scientific
research? For philosopher Karl Popper (1902–1994), science was unique
among knowledge systems in requiring, instead of the “verifiability”
criterion of logical positivists, its assertions to be falsifiable by some
justified methods (Popper 1959: 2002; 1972: 1979). For the sociologist
Robert Merton (1910–2003), science was distinguished by its
21
17 According to Merton (1942) the ethos of science comprises universalism, communism,
disinterestedness, and organized scepticism. Cf. Mitroff (1974) for the “counter-norms” of
these. The researcher agrees with Mulkay (1991) that these norms are understood in a varied
ways among scientists, and with Gieryn (1999) that the boundaries of science on cultural maps
are elastic but limited by some shared standards and features shown or not in continuous local
boundary-work. According to Miettinen (2004, 113) the awareness that the results of the
research will be evaluated by the scientific community encourages researchers to maintain a
respectful social scientific position. For sociological analysis of the roots of science see Zilsel
(1942: 2000). According to Zilsel (935–937) the rise of science was imbedded in the advance of
early capitalist society, which weakened collective-mindedness, magical thinking, and belief
in authority and which furthered worldly, causal, critical, rational, and quantitative thinking.
18 Gieryn (1999, 26) introduces Kuhn as a historian, although Kuhn received a Ph.D. in psychics
at Harvard University in 1949 and remained there as an assistant professor of general education
and history of science. In 1956 Kuhn accepted a post at the University of California, Berkeley,
where in 1961 he became a full professor of history of science. Therefore, originally Kuhn was
a scientist and not a social scientist. Consequently, Kuhn does not give much room for
explanations concerning the social sciences focusing mainly on the science.
institutionalized norms (i.e. ethos of science)17 and for him the word
“science” denoted
- A set of characteristic methods by means of which knowledge is
certified.
- A stock of accumulated knowledge stemming from the application
of these methods.
- A set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed
scientific. (Merton 1942, 267; italics added)
For the historian18 Thomas Kuhn (1922–1966), science distinctively
moved in an oscillation between paradigmatic calm and occasional
revolutions that turn upside down until a new but incommensurable
paradigm emerges (Gieryn 1999, 26). Rationality seems to have gone
out of fashion and ever since the main task of the individual researcher
has been said to be to choose one among incommensurable paradigms
(Kuhn 1962: 1970; Burrell & Morgan 1979).
As noticed, the specialty of science and social sciences has been
challenged, but why and to what extent the criticism seems to be
justifiable needs to be discussed. The analysis also gives a useful
opportunity to reflect on the metatheoretical assumptions related to
ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology (Burrell &
Morgan 1979; Cohen, Manion & Morrison 2000).
2.2. Extended Kuhnian approach to science
and the present state of social sciences
Ahistoricality has been a widely shared feature of the standard
analyses of the Kuhnian approach. Ahistoricality means overemphasis
on the analysis of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
22
19 Referring to the analysis of Margaret Masterman (1964) Thomas Kuhn admitted (1962: 1970,
174) the ambiguous use (at least twenty-two different ways) of the concept of paradigm. But
not even the Kuhnian elaborated disciplinary matrix or Lakatos’ concept of the program of
research (cf. Wartofsky 1979, 133) or even the research programme necessarily show a straight
way out of this ambiguousness.
20 The sense and meaning of paradigms readable also in Kuhn (1962: 1970) are highly different
than in current social sciences. The time frame of Kuhn should be recognized when trying to
understand the essence of paradigms. Kuhn’s  time frame varies from decades to many centuries
when real incommensurability seems to be a justifiable alternative between e.g. “Ptolemaic”
and “Copernican astronomy” or “Aristotelian” and “Newtonian” dynamics. Hence we could
talk about Kuhnian paradigms and “paradigms”.
(1962: 1970) and especially the concept of the paradigm. Consequently,
a broader view of the scientific landscape has been lost from sight
and mind. Here it is stressed that the main question is not to change
the unit of analysis but to get a broader view19.
To get a broader Kuhnian perspective, the distinction between
periods of pre-paradigm, paradigm (normal science) and post-paradigm
of science needs to be remembered. Kuhn means that scientific
research without “incommensurable” paradigms could be possible
especially in the pre-paradigm stage of the scientific progress. To Kuhn
the pre-paradigm period is characterized by interschool (pre-paradigm
schools) debate on the fundamentals.
For the social scientists the positioning of the social sciences on the
broader map of Kuhn is crucial because it reminds of an open question:
What parts of social science have so far acquired such paradigms20
(Kuhn 1962: 1970, 15; cf. Thagard 1992; Turner 2001; Bereiter 2002)
and how could we as social scientists proceed towards the stage of
normal science, or should we? Where do we find the Kuhnian debate
on fundamentals (i.e. about metatheoretical assumptions) done by
social scientists themselves?
The Kuhnian approach seems to fit well to our “post-modern” era,
as he explains some potential reasons for the lack of scientific progress.
Presently, the fundamental question is claimed to be Which of the
“paradigms” do you choose (cf. Burrell & Morgan 1979)? The question
is challenging, when remembering that the Kuhnian scientist has been
traditionally understood to be an irrational one lacking a higher set
of commitments or metaparadigmatic criteria. The offered proposal
is also problematic when looked at from the perspective of the social
scientific progress: are we focusing just on the choosing and taking
for granted the “unavoidable” communication problem?
By the communication problem the present researcher means the
possibilities and limitations of communication between different
“paradigms” or pre-paradigm schools. One reason for the
communication problems is the path-dependency of the
understanding. Kuhn refers to this issue when explaining that the
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21 A master’s thesis made in Finnish, supervised by Yrjö Engeström.
meaning of a theory depends upon what courses the researcher has
had, what texts he has read, and which journals he studies (Kuhn 1962:
1970, 50).
When emphasizing, as the present tendency seems to be, the
interparadigmatic communication difficulties one needs to identify
the paths followed by the scientists in the field in question. It is argued
that sociological theory and social scientific theories have been
profoundly affected by the use of metaphors, especially spatial
metaphors, which still remain a rather implicit and underutilized
feature of contemporary social scientific thinking (Silber 1995; cf.
Gieryn 1999). The rather implicit use of spatial metaphors is obvious
also among the chosen research programmes (cf. e.g. Hutchins 1995,
169; Engeström 2001b; Engeström 2004c, 444; Rainio 200321;
Hakkarainen, Lonka & Lipponen 2004, 145–146), needing to be
recognized and put into an extended use by those navigating in a
cultural environment.
The second reason for the communication difficulties is said to be
the lack of shared language. Kuhn has clarified his incommensurable-
thesis by saying that “the claim that two theories are incommensurable
is then the claim that there is no language, neutral or otherwise, into
which both theories, conceived as set of sentences, can be translated
without residue or loss” (Kuhn 1983, 670). Comparing this statement
to the identified set of research programmes will be useful. Do the
chosen social scientists share some sort of language and to what extent
do they seem to understand the other “paradigms”?
Before entering this kind of analysis, we should pay attention to
Trevor Pinch (1982: 1997), who claims that two distinct interpretations
of Kuhn’s ideas have emerged among the sociologists of science. One
is a “conservative” and the other a “radical” interpretation. Within
the “radical” interpretation incommensurability has been taken to
refer to the impossibility of finding rules of scientific rationality by
reference to which it is possible to read off the progress of one
“paradigm” over another. This interpretation has led to an explicit
embrace of the epistemological relativism with regard to scientific
knowledge. If one “paradigm” (pre-paradigm school) cannot be said
to be an advance of another in terms of criteria of scientific rationality
then all “paradigms” are equally valid. Let us see whether the
conservative interpretation is justified in the present analysis.
One of the most prominent critics of the Kuhnian approach was
Imre Lakatos (1922–1974) who was restoring the rationality of the
scientific progress. He insisted that the history of science has been
and should be a history of competing research programmes, but it
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22 The same idea seems to be applicable also for social scientists due to the fact that “paradigms”
or research programmes should be compared with the social reality.
23 Kuhn’s case highlights illustratively how an individual scientist can also learn. The general
tendency seems to be neglecting this fact and instead of following paths and trails “walked”
by the scientist and offering a panoramic view of the field some snapshots are offered. Some
examples may confirm the fact; cf. e.g. Sarason (2002); Neisser (1994).
has not been and must not become a succession of periods of normal
science: the sooner the competition starts, the better for the scientific
progress. (cf. Lakatos & Musgrave eds. 1970; Lakatos 1978)
To restore the rationality of science Lakatos emphasized
competition and required continuous progress. Compared to Kuhn,
Lakatos did not offer us a period of “normal science” where the
scientists of the “paradigm” could rest on their laurels avoiding
interprogram debate on the fundamentals and lacking any higher sets
of commitments (Kuhn 1962: 1970) or super-paradigmatic (meta-
paradigmatic) standards (Lakatos in Lakatos & Musgrave eds. 1970).
According to Kuhn the decision to reject one paradigm is always
simultaneously a decision to accept another, and the judgment leading
to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with
nature22 and with the other (Kuhn 1962: 1970, 77). But is the choice
totally irrational or did also Kuhn admit the existence of some kind of
“selection criteria”?
Actually also in the original edition of Kuhn’s Scientific Revolutions
(1962: 1970) he admits that scientists do share some rules, value
systems, higher sets of commitments and essential characteristics
among themselves. According to Kuhn the relative importance of these
features is raised during the period of pre-paradigm and in crises before
scientific revolution, but we should not forget these mores even in
the period of “normal” science.
In his postscript (1962: 1970, 185) Kuhn gives some examples of the
shared values to be used when choosing theories (simplicity, self-
consistency, plausibility, and compatibility) but later after learning23 a
little bit more he gave more attention to them, as can be seen below:
– Accuracy: Within its domain a theory should be in demonstrated
agreement with the results of existing experiments and
observations.
– Consistency: A theory should be consistent, not only internally, but
also with other currently accepted theories applicable to related
aspects of nature.
– Broad scope: A theory’s consequences should extend far beyond
the particular observations, laws, or subtheories it was initially
designed to explain.
– Simplicity: A theory should bring order to phenomena that in its
absence would be initially isolated.
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– Fruitfulness: A theory should be fruitful of new research findings
by disclosing new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships
among those already known. (Kuhn 1977, 321–322)
Although tacitness and the need to continuously reflect on “shared
values and mores” are the most important aspects, also the explicitness
of these features should not be forgotten while we maintain the
boundary between science and other public spheres. Two of the criteria
mentioned above need to be highlighted: consistency and accuracy.
For social scientists consistency means both internal and external
consistency with other currently accepted theories in a chosen field
(i.e. organizational learning and knowledge management). The
practical meaning of accuracy could be said to be a “fit” between a
theory and the social reality in question. For social scientists accuracy
means a continuous need to collaborate with “lay people”. This issue
will be discussed later in this analysis.
2.3. Change of scientific activity in
contemporary societies
Is it possible that the values, mores and principles of scientists are
only historical relics that are changing in our contemporary global
societies? A multinational research group, led by Michael Gibbons
(Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott & Trow 1994) 24,
offers a view on how the scientific field seems to be changing.  They
explain that a new form of knowledge production (Mode 2) is emerging
alongside the traditional (Mode 1), familiar one. Mode 1 operates
within a hierarchical disciplinary framework controlling the diffusion
of the Newtonian model (empirical, positivistic) to more and more
fields of enquiry. Mode 2 is transdisciplinary25, involving the close
interaction of actors from various spheres of life throughout the
process of knowledge production.
Being discipline-based, Mode 1 is said to carry a distinction between
what is fundamental and what is applied. This implies an operational
distinction between a theoretical core and other areas of knowledge
such as the engineering sciences, where theoretical insights are
translated into applications. By contrast, Mode 2 is characterized by a
constant flow back and forth between the fundamental and the
applied, between the theoretical and the practical. Researchers of
24 Cf. also Nowotny, Scott, Gibbons (2001).
25 Transdisciplinarity means research involving researchers from two or more disciplines and
also practitioners. Here interdisciplinarity, in turn, means a research involving two or more
scientific disciplines, being a form of transdisciplinarity.
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Mode 2 do not tend to search for fundamental principles but are
oriented towards contextualized results. (cf. Gibbons et al. 1994, 19)
Consequently, Mode 2 makes use of a wider range of criteria in judging
quality control.
Why is the shift from Mode 1 to Mode 2 happening and what is the
driving force behind the claimed progress? The emergence arises out
of the existing dysfunctionalities and breakdowns of disciplinary
modes of paradigmatic problem-solving (Gibbons et al. 1994, 29). The
main problems of the practitioners may not be locatable on the
prevailing disciplinary map, but on the other hand the emergence can
be explained as resulting from wider societal and cognitive pressures.
For example, if Mode 2 is said to be an example of a constant flow
between the theoretical and the practical, why is this feature said to
be missing from Mode 1, especially if Mode 1 has tried to keep practical
ends in mind while gaining a better understanding of the physical
and social world?
According to Gibbonsians the shift from Mode 1 to Mode 2 could
be explained also by some endogenous factors. One of these has been
mentioned already – cognitive pressures of the individuals and
research collectives in cases when wider societal needs are recognized
to be unmet. The other is the need to balance competition (science
wars) by increasing cooperation.
Gibbons, with his colleagues, has emphasized that the density of
communication between scientists is an important factor in accelerating
knowledge production. Referring to Becher (1989) they compare the
“urban mode” of communication, which is seen as characteristic of
hard sciences, with a “rural mode”, which is characteristic of soft
sciences (social sciences) (Gibbons et al. 1994, 40). In the “rural mode”
problems considered worth working on are much more numerous and
widespread. If then transdisciplinarity is arising, common theoretical
understanding and mutual interpretation of disciplinary
epistemologies or even all kinds of metatheoretical assumptions need
to be discussed on each field of research, and not just nationally but
also internationally, because ultimately science and social sciences are
global activities (cf. Merton 1942; Zilsel 1942: 2000; Gibbons, Limoges,
Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott & Trow, 1994, 40; cf. also the claimed
diversity of epistemic cultures, Knorr-Cetina 1999).
The importance of discourse to scientific progress was brought out
strongly by Karl Popper and further developed by Imre Lakatos. As
mentioned above, its importance arises from the recognition that
scientific theories cannot be verified, as logical positivists insisted;
theories can at most be falsified. Therefore, scientific progress either
arises or not from continual criticism and efforts to overcome criticisms
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by modifying or replacing theories. Carl Bereiter has explained that a
progressive scientific discourse has some main moral commitments:
– To work toward common understanding satisfactory to all (the
mutual understanding commitment).
– To frame questions and propositions in ways that allow evidence
to be brought to bear on them (the empirical testability
commitment).
– To expand the body of collectively valid propositions (the expansion
commitment).
– To allow any belief to be subjected to criticism if it will advance the
discourse (the openness commitment) (Bereiter 1994, cf. Bereiter
2002; Gieryn 199926).
If then Mode 2 uses a wider range of criteria in judging quality
control, does it abandon the norms of Mode 1? Not necessarily.
Although the differences between Mode 1 and 2 have been
highlighted, this does not mean that scientists of Mode 2 are or should
be forgetting the norms of scientific methods. Instead, the emergence
of Mode 2 means that some additional criteria27 need to be put in use.
2.4. Walking along the cognitive trails and
paths of social sciences
As mentioned above, paths were the preferred metaphor for both
Kuhn and Lakatos when explaining the essence of scientific research.
According to Kuhn the path could be identified by following the texts
the scientist has read and the journals he has studied. It is justifiable
to add that it needs to be asked with whom and in what kind of context
he has done his research, not only on individual but also on collective
(“paradigm” or research programme) level.
It was explained above that social sciences are currently immersed
by the use of spatial metaphors and that we tend to be unaware of
this fact. It was also emphasized that by using these kinds of resources
more consciously we could better understand how we conduct our
research processes, “moving” in our cultural environment. Now it
seems to be appropriate to turn the attention to the path metaphor.
26 Gieryn (1999) suggests the possibility of a win-win game instead of the traditional zero-sum
game in case of science wars (“incommensurability crisis”).
27 Gibbons et al. (1994, 18, 33) name efficiency and usefulness as additional criteria, which are
defined in terms of the contributions the work has made to the overall solution of
transdisciplinary problems.
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Adrian Cussins’ theory of cognitive trails is a philosophical critique
of and alternative to various forms of conceptualism (Engeström 2001b,
4) and tries to answer the fundamental question: What are the
distinctive ways in which the world is made available for us (cf. Cussins
2003, 149)? Cussins’ theory of cognitive trails (Cussins 1992, 1993, 2003)
is an analytical tool to make sense when we are “walking through our
reality and world”. For a start it is useful to recognize the stabilized
meanings in our cultural-historical global society (i.e. cultural
environment). During our history scientists and practitioners alike have
looked at phenomena that have been in a flux; they have drawn “lines”
(“built boxes”, “black boxes”; they have conceptualized the reality)
around phenomena, so that the phenomena have entered cognition
in a single act of reference (cf. e.g. Bowker & Star 1999). In other words
they have made cognitive trails to be followed in order to reach our
goals and develop our competences. Consequently, in our society there
exist hierarchical networks of trails and intersections (e.g. landmarks).
Before continuing, the concept of cognitive trails needs to be
explained. According to Cussins trails are
both person made and world-made, and what makes persons and
worlds. Trails are in the environment, certainly, but they are also
cognitive objects. A trail isn’t just an indentation in a physical
surface, but a marking of the environment; a signposting for
coordinating sensation and movement, an experiential line of force.
Hence the marking is both experiential and environmental ...
perhaps trails are the first tools.” (Cussins 1992, 673–674)
Cognitive trails simultaneously guide those who follow them, and
in the very act of guidance are themselves shaped (by destabilizing
acts, but this issue will be discussed below). This means that trails are
both individually and/or collectively followed. Trails exist in
ontologically distinct kinds of regions: on the ground certainly, but
also in social, theoretical, linguistic, biological, psychological, and
historical regions. Hence, trails can be global, yet they are built and
maintained locally in a fully distributed manner. (cf. Cussins 2003, 157)
Trails are followed to increase the likelihood of getting jobs done
effectively, because by doing so the individual can extend his
competence (degree of perspective-dependence (PD-ratio)) (Cussins
1992). In case of strong perspective-dependency the PD-ratio is close
to zero and when perspective-independency increases the PD-ratio
comes closer to one. Ultimately, when the PD-ratio is one, the zone of
competence has spread to fill the whole territory (i.e. our cultural
environment). In these cases there are no privileged positions, wherever
the goal is located. There are many ways in which the system can
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maximize its PD-ratio. The system could follow many possible routes
to the goal by mastering many landmarks (e.g. intersections) being
equipped with certain search skills (i.e. skills for progressive inquiries).
 Cussins explains that renegotiation of meaning (destabilization)
may be required and it is possible to do so. The destabilization may be
required by a new social setting (cf. cultural evolution), or because of
the changing demands of the language user’s project (e.g. the research
questions needing to be answered), or otherwise because the concept
eventually breaks down (Cussins 1992, 680).
Cussins’ individual could be normatively guided by two kinds of
guidance (Cussins 2003, 156–157). At least he is guided by the mundane
norms of the activity-space around him. The mundane norms tell him
what is right and what is wrong, what is on the path and what lies
outside the path. For a scientist a shared set of cultural values and
mores are examples of mundane norms. For an individual it is possible
to be guided also by elite norms. One example of an elite norm of a
scientist is the “truth”28. Obviously Cussins puts some philosophical
flesh on the bones offered by Kuhn and Lakatos, but what these
theories mean in practice needs to be asked and answered.
2.5. Navigating socially in our global
science society
In the mid 1980s and early 1990s two new disciplines, computer-
supported cooperative work (CSCW) and computer-supported
cooperative learning (CSCL), emerged out of the field of human-
computer interaction (HCI). The concept of social navigation is part of
this movement, and it was introduced by Paul Dourish and Matthew
Chalmers in 1994. For them social navigation means a phenomenon in
which a user’s navigation through the information space is primarily
guided and structured by the activities of others within that space29
(cf. Munro, Höök & Benyon eds. 1999;  Höök, Benyon & Munro eds.
2003; Benyon, Turner & Turner 2005).
“Social” navigation is contrasted to “spatial” and “semantic”
navigation. For instance, imagine browsing in a bookstore. If you pick
28 According to Cussins truth not only governs the activity of the scientists but is also constitutive
of the activity of science. If then after some research process you have listed all the reasons for
believing some statement, why would you need to add “an elevator word”: because it is
“truth”? (Hacking 1999). From this transparadigmatic framework also Engeström (1987) has
criticized the constitutiveness of the truth for science as activity. On the other hand both
Nonaka (with Takeuchi, 1995) and Bereiter (2002) favour the “truth”.
29 In a way Cussinsian cognitive trails could be understood as existing in an information space
under the stabilizing and destabilizing acts of social navigators.
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up a new book because it is sitting on the self next to the one you
have just been examining, then you are navigating spatially. If you
pick up another book because it was referred to in a citation in the
first book, then you are navigating semantically30; and if you pick up
yet another because it was recommended to you by someone whose
opinion you trust, then you are navigating socially. (cf. Dourish, 19 in
Munro et al. 1999)
All the above forms of interaction make sense for a researcher,
although they have some limitations. It is essential to balance all the
forms of interaction, although social and semantic navigation are more
recommendable (cf. e.g. Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 145) also for social
scientists. Following cognitive paths does not necessarily mean that
we reduce ourselves to “ant-like creatures” (idea coined by Herbert
Simon; cf. Hutchins 1995, 169 extending the idea; Hakkarainen et al.
2004, 145–146). Obviously in our cultural environment there lie
cognitive trails inside, but more interestingly between disciplines and
researchers or practitioners alike. We often tend to be unaware of
these cognitive trails while we may even be following them! In some
occasions, being aware of these trails, we prefer to choose and stick
around the chosen “paradigm” and discipline instead of using the trails
at our disposal. Or if we have a permission to follow a trail, do we
have the needed energy and motivation to do so? In the same manner
we could be nationally unaware of the international and global paths
(not only networks) along which we import tools for sensemaking,
understanding and competence development. Currently, and even
more in the future, we will be not just allowed but demanded to follow
these cognitive trails globally while we seek answers to our current
problems with the practitioners.
During the present research process both the individual and
collective abilities of the FNDC to navigate socially have been extended
by trying to master many respected cognitive trails made by the
researchers in the field of organizational learning and knowledge
management. The main cognitive trails (research programmes)
followed in this research are:
1. Social scientific theories of Finnish Defence Forces (military
pedagogy by professor Jarmo Toiskallio et al.; also leadership
and management studies).
2. Professor Ikujiro Nonaka with his disciples.
3. Professor Yrjö Engeström and the cultural-historical activity
theory in general (CHAT).
4. Professor Carl Bereiter and his colleagues (e.g. Doctor Kai
Hakkarainen with his colleagues).
30 Searching knowledge bases by the chosen concept or word could be seen to be one form of
semantic navigation.
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One reason for choosing so many research programmes was the
need to gain more explanatory power. In brief, in this field of
organizational learning and knowledge management the chosen
researchers with their references cover an excess of corroboration
which causes an increase of explanatory power (Popper 1959: 2002;
Lakatos 1970). In other words these research programmes are the most
theoretically ambitious and also practically relevant alternatives both
for global and local use in the present field. In order to search for the
“truth” and to answer the research questions, the study goes beyond
the chosen programmes31, climbing “up” to the metatheoretical and
philosophical levels. The occasional metatheoretical stance is needed
simply because only by doing so justifiable constructive criticism of
the chosen programmes can be done in a justifiable manner32.
As a starting point for the research, the military pedagogical
theories and practices of the FNDC have been carefully analyzed. The
researcher has worked at the FNDC since 2000 and during that time
he has been following the stabilized trails of military pedagogy in
order to identify its possible weaknesses and to destabilize it if needed.
At the same time the Finnish Defence Forces aim to develop their
operating culture based on the principles of the “learning
organization” (Finnish Security and Defence Policy, 2004), but what
do these principles mean to the FNDC? During past years the
educational practices of the college have faced continuous
rearrangements. The question is, what kind of principles have these
“transformations” been based on (FINHEEC 2001, 10)?
At the moment Europe, as well we Finns, seems to be catching two
birds with one stone: advancing European integration also in security
issues and re-balancing the transatlantic link with the United States.
At these times it is hard to anticipate other than increasing
internationalization in social and military scientific research. The
present research aims to be a tool for the deepening inter-
nationalization within the Armed Forces.
The researchers and practitioners of the Finnish Defence Forces have
already gained lots of fruitful experiences of the deepening
internationalization. The international development of military
pedagogy since the 1920s gives an example of this point (Toiskallio
ed. 2000, 2004; Florian ed. 2002).
31 In Cussinsian words there exists a landscape without “any paths” at all: some parts of our
current social reality seem to lie on a periphery, partly, if at all understood at least from the
perspective of the chosen research programmes. The paths need to be walked but occasionally
new paths need to be made.
32
 In other words the present study is practical, theoretical and also metatheoretical at
the same time.
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2.6. Social scientifically reflecting on
researcher’s metatheoretical
assumptions
While following the chosen cognitive trails the metatheoretical
assumptions have been recalled, occasionally reflected upon and
elaborated. Consequently, the assumptions have evolved when the
understanding of the researcher has increased. Despite this fact only
the present state of the metatheoretical assumptions will be explained
below.
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979; cf. Cohen et al. 2000) it is
convenient to conceptualize social science in terms of four sets of
assumptions, which are related to human nature, ontology,
epistemology, and methodology. Together this kind of set could be
called metatheoretical assumptions.
Referring to Mouly (1978), Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000, 3)
state that when people try to cope with their environment the means
used in these occasions can be classified into three broad categories:
experience, reasoning and research. It is often said that in our present
world there exists a deep tension between science and experience.
Science seems to be so dominant that we tend to give it the authority
to explain even when it denies what is most immediate and direct –
our everyday, immediate experience. Scientific accounts are seen to
represent fundamental truths while our immediate experiences are
seen as less true.
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991, 14) emphasize the need to cross
over the rift between science and experience – experience and scientific
understanding are like two legs without which we cannot walk. Often
the rift is exemplified as occurring between “everyday thinking” or
“non-rationality” and “scientific thinking” or “rationality”. According
to Jean Lave (1988, 77) the characteristics associated with everyday
thought have been merely transposed from the arena of cross-cultural
to intra-cultural social categories and relations without changing their
basic content. Instead of creating a wrong functional opposition
between two kinds of psyche we should understand the unitedness of
them (Vygotsky 1978; Leont’ev 1978, 1981; cf. chapter 4).
On the other hand it is possible to sustain the distinction between
“scientific rationalities”, and the “rationalities of everyday”; but not
without any reservations, or by a priori fixed demarcations (Barnes,
Bloor & Henry, 1996) as has been done traditionally (Giddens ed. 1975).
After the naturalistic turn (Mulkay 1991; Barnes et al. 1996; cf. Hacking
1999) of the science studies in the late 1970s the difference between
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lay people and scientists has been harder to accept because the
sociologists of science have become so successful at dissolving
dichotomies and classes that they no longer dare to construct them
(Collins & Evans 2002). Nevertheless, we cannot forget the possibility
that some kind of scientific ethos could be shared by the social
scientists, ultimately in an a posteriori manner, showing how the
difference between the science and other spheres of life could at least
occasionally still exist. Later in this chapter33 and also in chapter 8 the
essence of human nature of scientists and lay people alike will be
discussed further.
Secondly, there are assumptions of an ontological nature –
assumptions concerning the very nature or essence of the social
phenomena being investigated. To what extent can the reality be seen
as given “out there” in the world, or is it totally created by one’s own
mind? In the field of social sciences the avalanche of social
constructivism was launched partly by the influential book of Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) The Social Construction of Reality.
Another influential name in social sciences arguing (as often has been
insisted) that “reality could be socially invented” is Ernst von
Glasersfeld – the founding father of radical constructivism. Maybe
they could explain to us how reality is constructed or invented by us?
Berger and Luckmann (1966) did not stake a claim for any form of
universal constructionism (cf. Hacking 1999). They explained that the
paramount reality (natural environment) envelops multiple realities
of everyday life (Berger & Luckmann 1966, 25). These multiple social
realities interact with the natural environment when consciousness
always returns to it.
Also Ernst von Glasersfeld did not deny the existence of natural
reality, but he saw it “differently”. He claimed that the reality remains
forever behind the points of conceptualizations34. Always, sooner or
later, the knowledge constructed by us does not fit the reality; our
conceptualization fails and we have to make a better one.
Metaphorically speaking, as von Glasersfeld did, reality is a lock and
our knowledge is a key that unclocks possible paths for us. But the
success of a key does not depend on finding a lock into which it might
fit, but solely on whether or not it opens the way to the particular
goal we want to reach. (von Glasersfeld 1984, 1995; italics added)35
33 When criticizing the “positivistic stance”.
34 Cf. Pollack (2003, 5) on how our scientific investigations are enveloped with uncertainty at
every stage.
35 cf. Von Glasersfeld’s argument, quoted in Phillips (1995) “Superficial or emotionally distracted
readers of the constructivist literature have frequently interpreted this stance (the radical
constructivism) as a denial of “reality”.
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It is essential to see natural and social reality as both separate and
interactive entities. For us this means that human beings have created
social reality during the cultural evolution (Tomasello 1999; Berger &
Luckmann 1966). The natural reality limits our social reality. Both our
natural reality and our social reality resist scientists’ efforts to bring
up their goals. The goals, plans, models, material agency and social
organization tend to be interactively transformed in the mangle of
practice (Pickering 1995).
The realities are multilayered scientifically and social scientifically
conceptualized by hierarchic disciplines. Already Auguste Comte
(1798–1857)36 envisaged that sociology is going to be the Queen in
the hierarchy of scientific disciplines. The mechanism of scientific
development provides the key to the logical relations between the
sciences. The earliest sciences to come into being are those dealing
with facts of the greatest generality; thus each field of study in the
hierarchy of the sciences is predicated upon those lying below it,
although its own concepts and generalizations are irreducible.
(Giddens ed. 1975, 1)
Undoubtedly the Comtean vision of the hierarchy of sciences has
been challenged by many scientists but nevertheless each discipline
has its “main domain” (Kuhn 1962: 1970; Lakatos 1970); a part of
natural or social reality37 on which to concentrate. Michael Polanyi
(1966, 36) explains this multilayered reality interestingly by saying that
these levels form a hierarchy of comprehensive entities, the principles
of each level operating under the control of the next higher level.
Each level is subject to dual control: first, by the laws that apply to its
elements in themselves, and second, by the laws that control the
comprehensive entity formed by them. Also Polanyi did not deny the
differences between the systemic levels but claimed that actually these
levels are not reducible to the terms of the lower level. Gilbert Ryle
(1949, 16) speaks about a category mistake, meaning that applying
concepts to logical types to which they do not belong should be
avoided. This does not mean that other disciplines should not serve as
a source of metaphors, analogies and models as the history of the
science shows (see metaphors and analogies, Ortony ed. 1979: 1993;
Bono 1990; Turner 1996; Morgan 1997; Turner 2001) but where do the
limits to such a cross-appropriation lie? Therefore, there is a difference
between what something is said to be literally and what it is
metaphorically speaking38. As a conclusion it could be clarified that
36 August Comte is the “official” founder of sociology. Collins (1994); Giddens ed. (1975).
37 This part of reality or a domain could be defined either conceptually (i.e. knowledge science)
or “non-conceptually” (i.e. psychology or biology).
38 Although metaphors are more fundamental than this example shows, we cannot forget this
basic difference between “literal” and “metaphorical”.
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the ontological position taken in this study is more realist than
nominalist39 in the sense described by Burrell and Morgan (1979, 4; cf.
also Cohen et al. 2000).
The third set of assumptions identified by Burrell and Morgan is of
an epistemological kind. How one aligns oneself in this particular
debate profoundly affects how one will go about uncovering
knowledge of social behaviour. The (positivist) view that knowledge
is hard, objective and tangible will demand an observer’s role of
researchers, together with an allegiance to the methods of natural
science. To see (anti-positivist) knowledge as personal, subjective and
unique, however, imposes on researchers an involvement with their
subjects and a rejection of the ways of the natural scientists. (Cohen
et al. 2000)
According to Giddens (1975, 3–4) the “positivistic attitude” in social
sciences may be said to comprise the following connected suppositions:
– The methodological procedures of natural science may be directly
applied to social sciences.
– The end-product of investigations can be formulated in terms
parallel to those of natural science (law-like generalizations).
– Social sciences, as natural science, are “neutral” with respect of
values, providing knowledge which is purely “instrumental” in form.
The precise target of the anti-positivists’ attack has been the
mechanistic and reductionist view of nature by science, which excludes
notions of free will, subjectivity, and moral responsibility. The
sociological perspective on the human nature comes in different
flavours: the dimension between “subjectless” versus more “subject-
centric” sociological theories has kept its pivotal position.
It is useful to start with Niklas Luhmann’s “subjectless” sociological
theory (Luhmann 1995; cf. Tuomi 1999, 256). Luhmann sees society as
a self-referential (Maturana & Varela 1980) system with
communications as its elements. According to Luhmann human beings
are a part of the environment of the society (instead of a part of the
society itself). This does not mean that the human being is estimated
as less important than traditionally. The (social) system is first set in
motion and orients itself by the question asked or not by the individual
human being: “Will the partner accept or reject a communication?”
In principle also Luhmann’s person can control his behaviour (he has
relative autonomy) and doing so means that he can also remain silent.
39 According to Burrell and Morgan, for the realist the social world exists independently of an
individual’s appreciation of it. The individual is seen as being born into and living within a
social world which has a reality of its own. The nominalist does not admit that there is any
“real” structure to the world which these concepts are used to describe. Cf. also Hacking
(1999).
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The structuration theory of Anthony Giddens (1984) gives an
example of a relatively “subject-centric” sociological theory. Crucial
to the idea of structuration is the theorem of the duality of structure:
the structure is always both constraining and enabling, instantiated
in social practices, and partly controlled by individual actors. Giddens’
human actors are knowledgeable to some extent. The knowledgeability
is always bounded on one hand by the unconscious and on the other
hand by unacknowledged conditions/unintended consequences of
action.
When seeking for alternatives to positivistic social sciences, one
traditional rift has to be kept in mind: the rift between science and
experience (Varela et al. 1991). Especially positivistic social science has
failed to take into account our unique ability to interpret our
experiences and present them to ourselves (Giddens 1984). The social
sciences are not insulated from the social world in the way the natural
sciences are from the natural world. Hence, the social sciences enter
into the very constitution of the social world transforming their own
objects by a double hermeneutic process (Giddens 1984, 1990a, 200140;
cf. also Habermas 1984; cf. also Rynes, Bartunek & Daft 2001).
For the social scientist the double hermeneutic process means that
he operates at the intersection of two frames of meaning: one is the
meaningful social life as constituted by lay actors and the other is the
social scientific worldview expressed in theories (metalanguages)
invented by social scientists. According to Giddens (1979, 1984) the
“positivistic attitude” in social sciences has been seen as uninhibited
applying of the revelatory model of the natural sciences to the social
sciences. The main task of the researcher has been seen to reveal the
flawed common sensual beliefs to be corrected by scientific theories
and observations. In this attitude the researcher imposes the theories
on the lay beliefs, correcting them in the process.
Later, after the overall shift in the social sciences from the
positivistically oriented research towards more interpretative
approaches have taken place, some sort of paralysis of the critical will
seems to be a widely shared imperative. Often the interpretative
approaches have juxtaposed social science and common sense, claiming
that no kind of critical evaluation of beliefs or practices is possible
where such beliefs and practices form a part of an alien cultural system
(Giddens 1979).
A way out of this impasse, between the revelatory model and
uncritical stance, can be seen lying on one hand in a respect for the
40 Sociology seems to come up with findings we knew already. According to Giddens (2001) we
tend to be unaware that sociological research continually influences what our commonsense
knowledge of society actually is (cf. Wenger 1998, 295).
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authenticity of lay beliefs and on the other hand in a critical evaluation
of the justification of common sense beliefs41. The main role of the
social sciences as regards the critique of common sense beliefs is the
assessment of reasons as good reasons in terms of knowledge either
simply unavailable to lay agents or construed by them in a fashion
different from that formulated in the metalanguages of social theory.
But what can be seen as “good” or “bad” depends partly on the chosen
frame of meaning (the social scientific or the one of the lay actors).
For social scientists this means the need to gain shared understanding
with the lay actors and possibilities to explain convincingly the claimed
“goodness” or “badness” of the lay activity to the lay people but also
to other social scientists. Consequently, in the research process
knowledge should spiral in and out of the social life, reconstructing
both itself and that social life as an integral part of the double or even
a triple hermeneutic42 process.
For a social scientist, seeking appropriate alternatives for positivistic
social sciences means that it is not anymore appropriate to restrict his
interests to be “less than emansipatory” interests43. Instead of
unawareness, the social scientist needs to be aware of his
responsibilities to enable some “bad” to turn into “good”. This is not
just a possibility for him but it is also a moral responsibility of social
scientists (cf. e.g. Ziman 1998; Schweber 2000).
The inevitability of consequences (i.e. intended and unintended)
does not mean that the social scientist should partly act as the
interpretive social scientist as explained in the quotation below:
The purpose of social science is to understand social reality as
different people see it and to demonstrate how their views shape
the action which they take within that reality. Since the social
sciences cannot penetrate to what lies behind social reality, they
must work directly with man’s definitions of reality and with the
rules he devises for coping with it. While the social sciences do not
reveal ultimate truth, they do help us to make sense of our world.
What the social sciences offer is explanation, clarification and
demystification of the social forms which man has created around
himself. (Beck 1979 quoted in Cohen et al. 2000, 20)
41 Additionally, the critical evaluation of scientific facts and beliefs also comes to the fore.
42 Lay people, military scientists and civilian scientists having different kinds of frames of
meaning.
43 According to Jurgen Habermas (1972; cf. Cohen et al. 2000, 29) the knowledge constitutive
interests are “technical” (positivist methodologies), “practical” (interpretive methodologies)
and “emansipatory” interests (critical methodologies). The “emansipatory” interest subsumes
the other interests guiding the researher to go “beyond” technical and practical interests.
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The traditional positivistic researcher tends to adopt an objective
stance towards his research objects but the anti-positivistic researcher
has to recognize his responsibility in an unavoidable influence on the
research object. The interpretatively oriented social scientists could
have been taking the side of either the underdogs (bottom-up
approach) or the ruling actors (top-down approach); but who are the
rulers and who are those ruled in our global society?
Traditionally the researchers of the interpretive “paradigm” have
tended to examine situations through the eyes of multiple participants,
describing the social reality in question from multiple local
perspectives. Consequently, the researcher has been doomed to have
a passive role. This tendency did not deal adequately with the dangers
of false consciousness. Therefore, a researcher has an obligation to
seek an objective perspective ultimately on a global scale when acting
as a catalyst in a developmentally-oriented research (Engeström 2000b;
Miettinen 2004).
As already mentioned, the social scientist acts on two frames of
meaning: one is the local social reality under study and the other is
the global science society. The social scientist needs to move between
two thought positions: “insider” and “outsider”. In this study, being
an insider means being both a teacher (a representative of the research
object) and a researcher (a subject of the research) at the FNDC. On
the other hand the other thought position, the global science society,
has enabled the researcher to self-reflect on a “higher” level to the
quality of his ethical decision making44.
In other words this means that the social scientist should have a
priori commitment to which side he is on: interpreting and influencing
the global social reality in a responsible manner. The researcher has
responsibilities on various kinds of levels. Hence, he has a multilevel
social responsibility. On the “local level” he needs to contribute to
the development of the communities and activities he is studying. On
the “societal level” he also needs to produce certified scientific
knowledge45. The knowledge production has to be controlled by the
maintained epistemic and metaparadigmatic standards of the science
and by actively collaborating in researcher programmes and collectives.
44 The researcher agrees with Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee (1994, 1999) that we all,
not just scientists, should have some general shared principles governing our activities. For
example local scientific communities may specify, as they often do, ethical norms for their
members through “microsocial contracts” (they clarify authentic norms). But the crucial point
is that in order to be obligatory, a microsocial contract must be compatible with hypernorms
(e.g. ethos of science but also social transformation, equality, democracy, social justice).
45 Certified knowledge (“savoir” in French) means knowledge that has been legitimized by
some institutional mechanism (i.e. peer review) (Foray 2004, 6; cf. also Foucault 1972, 16). If
then science is actually a global activity, scientific research has to be internationally reviewable
and reviewed.
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Because science is fundamentally an international activity and each
researcher shares the responsibility for how science proceeds, the
researcher is also responsible on the “global level”. The main challenge
for a social scientist acting continuously both on the local and global
level is how to perform undistorted and balanced actions. Is he willing
to struggle against the distortion caused by the inevitable prior
commitments and influences of the various social perspectives
(Hammersley 2000; Miettinen 2004) other than the holistic global one?
Traditionally, critical theory has been the other main alternative of
anti-positivistic research, and action research is the main methodology
of it. The knowledge constitutive interests proposed by Jurgen
Habermas (1972) are briefly explained in footnote 43. The Habermasian
interests also play a pivotal role in the background of action research.
According to Stephen Kemmis (2001) much action research is of a
technical form. It is essentially oriented towards functional
improvement, measured in terms of its success in changing particular
outcomes of practices. On the other hand, a good part of action
research is best described as of a practical form. It has technical
aspirations for development, but it also aims to guide the practical
decisionmaking of practitioners (Schön 1983, 1987). However, unlike
technical action researchers, practical action researchers aim just as
much at understanding and developing themselves as the subjects of
a practice as developing the outcomes of their practice. There seems
to be a smaller body of action research which might be labeled critical
or emansipatory. This form of action research aims not only at
improving outcomes, and improving the self-understanding of
practitioners, but also at assisting practitioners to arrive at a critique
of their social and work settings. Emansipatory action research aims
at helping practitioners to develop a critical and self-critical
understanding of their situation and to transform these situations (Carr
& Kemmis 1986; Kemmis & McTaggart 2000; Cohen et al. 2000; Kemmis,
2001).
Action research46 is often distinguished from conventional research
by three particular attributes:
– Shared ownership of research projects.
– Community-based analysis of social problems.
– An orientation toward community action. (Kemmis & McTaggart
2000, 568)
46 It is akin to participatory action research, critical action reseach, classroom action science,
action learning, action science, soft systems approaches, and industrial action research (Kemmis
& McTaggart 2000). Action research is  analyzed here because it seems to offer an appropriate
alternative to be used in the empirical part of the study.
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If the purpose of action research is to change practices,
practitioners, practice settings and the situation in which the practice
is conducted, how do action researchers conceptualize these issues?
How do they make a difference between scientific research and normal
work?
Kemmis and McTaggart (1988; cf. Cohen et al. 2000, 227-228)
distinguish action research from the everyday actions of teachers as
follows:
– It is not the usual thing teachers do when they think about their
teaching. Action research is more systematic and collaborative in
collecting evidence on which to base rigorous group reflection.
– It is not simply problem-solving. Action research involves problem-
posing, not just problem-solving. It is motivated by a quest to
improve and understand the world by changing it and learning how
to improve it from the effects of the changes made.
– It is not research done on other people. Action research is research
by particular people on their work, to help them improve what
they do, including how they work with and for others.
– Action research is not “the scientific method” applied to teaching.
There is not just one view of “the scientific method”; there are
many. ..[Action research] adopts a view of social science which is
distinct from a view based on natural sciences..Its view is distinct
from the methods of the historical sciences because action research
is concerned with changing situations, not just interpreting them.
If then an action researcher should act on two frames of meaning,
how can he get the other frame of meaning – the outsider social
scientific view? Or is it possible to just use the “best practices” of
other educators when changing one’s own educational practice? Why
then do action researchers not often participate in the theoretical
debate (Robson 1993, 439–442; Miettinen 2004)? Maybe the purpose
to change has overridden the possibility for development and progress?
Even in the case of action research we cannot forget science and its
morals. According to Carr and Kemmis (1986) the purpose of
educational research is to ensure that the observations, interpretations
and judgments of educational practitioners can become more
coherent47 and rational and thereby acquire a greater degree of
scientific objectivity. As mentioned above, social scientific research is
47 Paul Thagard (1992) has coined the theory of explanatory coherence to be able to explain
conceptual change in science. He argues that examination of the recent history of psychology
suggests that conceptual change in the natural sciences differs from that in social sciences.
Using behaviourism and cognitivism as cases he explains that their adoption was more a result
of other considerations (e.g. methodological) and estimates of future explanatory coherence
(expected explanatory coherence) than actual explanatory coherence.
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and should to be a double hermeneutic process (Giddens 1984, 1990,
2001; cf. also Habermas 1984) - an interaction between the meaningful
social life of the practitioners and the social scientific worldview. In
the process the need for change is balanced by the understanding of
where we are heading in this development and why and how the
development can be achieved. In the next chapter the pedagogical
theories and practices of the FNDC will be put into interaction with
educational reform studies, aiming to develop the current educational
institutions.
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Chapter Three
REFORMING EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
3.1. Emerged paradox of educational
institutions
The main idea of this chapter is to introduce the topic of reforming
educational institutions. Some prominent researchers48 are identified
and their main studies analyzed. Here the intent is not to summarize
the content of their studies, but rather to condense the primary lessons
and identify their main dimensions.
According to Peter Jarvis (1999) an educational institution is a place
where education takes place49. This conceptualization allows us to see
strong similarities between all kinds of schools, colleges and
universities. This does not mean that there is some need to forget the
obvious and essential differences of different educational institutions,
but that we have to be aware of their similarities as well.
Among the chosen educational reform researchers a paradox50 has
emerged. Some insist that the educational reform has failed time and
time again (Fullan & Hargreaves 1992; cf. Goodlad, Klein & Associates
1970; Fullan 1993; Miettinen 1994; Hirsch 1996; Bereiter 2002; Olson
2003), while others claim that educational institutions have been doing
innovative reforms all the time. John Goodlad (1975) explains the
paradox so that while schools (educational institutions) have been
48 The chosen researchers are representatives of the English-speaking world. Miettinen is a Finn
but he has analyzed some of the studies of these researchers (especially Goodlad). When
following the chosen cognitive trails the general tendency to globally refer to the research
made by these prominent researchers needs to be recognized.
49 Olson (2003) claims that few reform writers acknowledge that the school is an educational
institution that imposes its criteria and norms on individuals. Olson’s sociological position did
not allow him to see how the institutionalized structure is always both constraining and
enabling, being in a certain sense more “internal” than exterior to their activities in a
Durkheimian sense. The structural properties of social systems are both the medium and
outcome of the practices they recursively organize (Giddens 1984).
50 The paradox could be labelled as the Innovative-Stability Paradox. Paradoxos in Greek
combines two roots: para, which can mean variously beside, by, with, beyond, past, against, or
contrary to; and doxos, which means “that which is generally thought or believed, “the
common opinion”. Interestingly a paradox is an argument in which you take sides – both
sides. (Wilder & Collins 1994, 84-86) Often the paradox is interpreted as a dilemma (cf. this
chapter) but the main unifying idea is the dimension between two essential poles of interest.
Of course various kinds of interpretations have been done about dilemmas (cf. e.g. Billig,
Condor, Edwards, Cane, Middleton & Radley 1988; Kärkkäinen 1995; Toiviainen 2003).
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attacked for not changing, for being mired in the past, they have also
been attacked for embracing the new uncritically, for grasping at every
passing fad.
When seeking the claimed educational innovativeness it is useful
to recognize that some innovations, once deliberate educational
reforms, have become so pervasive that they were no longer seen as
reforms and thus disappeared from the scoreboard of successful
changes51. Following the thinking of David Tyack and Larry Cuban
(1995), it is easy to recognize how filled with several kinds of
innovations an educational institution is, considering things like
blackboards and overhead projectors et cetera. Presently they may
seem trivial, hardly worth of the label of innovations, yet not long
ago they were high on the agenda of necessary innovations and
reforms. Interestingly the educational innovations seem to be mainly
product innovations but seldom process innovations (cf. Stoneman
1995). For educational institutions process innovations could mean
for example new kinds of teaching and learning processes.
On the other hand, we should remember that if viewed over a
period of roughly 500 years, the striking impression is of how little
educational institutions have changed (Olson 2003). The overwhelming
stability of the educational institutions is obvious, particularly when
remembering the ways how educational institutions divide time and
space, classify students and allocate them to classrooms or auditoriums
taught by individual teachers, splinter knowledge into “subjects”, and
award grades and “credits” as evidence of learning (Goodlad, Klein &
Associates 1970; Tyack & Cuban 1995; Engeström, Engeström & Suntio
2002). Hence, it seems that our means to overcome the mentioned
generalized and stabilized constraints and built-in obstacles to deep
educational reforms have not been as effective as it has often been
expected.
3.2. How to solve the paradox?
How then to solve the paradox between the stability and the fluidity
of educational institutions? For a start we need to recognize that we
often tend to refer to different dimensions of change in depth, breadth,
level, and time (Cuban 1999). The depth of change indicates the degree
to which the designers of a particular innovation seek to make minor
(“surface”, “incremental”), modest, or major (“deep”, “fundamental”,
51 Change is actually not synonymous with progress (Tyack & Cuban 1995) or development,
although in the present field the difference is often not so obvious.
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“radical”, “transformational” 52) changes or transformations in the
essential features of the educational institution (Fullan 1993; Cuban
1999).
Educational reforms, as other reforms, tend to slide towards quick-
fixes and faddisms (Fullan & Hargreaves 1992; cf. Miclethwait &
Wooldridge 1996) on a surface level. These reforms are often said to
be “transformational” or “fundamental”, although in reality they are
minor changes “above” the sound basic structure of the educational
institution in question. Often some “magical Phoenix” has been said
to arise from the “ashes” of the current educational institutions, but
actually no educational “Phoenix” is possible and the educational
institutions are not in ashes. Despite of these facts, quick-fixes are
often favored, supported by unrealistic time lines, by unawareness of
the essence of the educational institution, and unwillingness to face
the social reality (Fullan & Hargreaves 1992; Fullan 1993; Tyack & Cuban
1995; Cuban 1999, 200453). Michael Fullan (1993) explains this tendency
by emphasizing that we often tend to forget that problems are
complex, dealing with them by strategies making no fundamental and
systematic difference.
One example of a quick fix and surface level educational reform is
the adding tendency. It means symbolic curricular and pedagogical
changes by adding some new courses in a curriculum without affecting
the underlying basic assumptions, values and ways of practicing (Fullan
1993; Hirsch 1996; Cuban 1999; Bereiter 2002).
Educational reforms are intrinsically political54 in origin; also in the
politically controlled armed forces. For illustrative purposes the reform
process can be divided into three stages: reform talks, adoption of
reform and the actual implementation (Tyack & Cuban 1995). Different
kinds of groups organize and contest with other groups in the politics
of education to express their values, perspectives, suggestions and
imperatives for educational development. Hence, a continuous policy
and reform talk surrounds the educational institutions. In the next
stage a made reform decision is adopted by obeying officials and
teachers. Finally, the actual implementation of the planned change
follows in the educational institution, but is often much slower and
more complex than the first two stages. Separating these stages in
52 When comparing the views of Carl Bereiter (2002) and Larry Cuban (1999) it is essential to
notice that for Bereiter reform is not the “deepest” form of educational development but for
Cuban it is. Hence, we need to be aware how an individual researcher conceptualizes the
phenomenon and how he uses the concept.
53 An appropriate period for the evaluation of a educational reform seems to be somewhere
between over 5 years and a generation or even more (Miettinen 1994; Tyack & Cuban 1995;
Cuban 1999).
54 Despite of this, the contribution of the political science has been minimal to the field of
educational reform research. Hence, for example power seems to be a underanalyzed issue.
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analysis helps in specifying just what is changing in what way and
what remains relatively constant.
Educational reforms tend to offer battle grounds for contradictive
perspectives and values. Two main contradictive perspectives can be
identified: an administrative and an instructional perspective (Bereiter
200255). Since the 1910s and 1920s administrative progressives have
been applying the principles of Frederick Taylor’s “scientific
management” for the educational reforms in the United States and
elsewhere (Cremin 1961; Callahan 1962; Miettinen 1994; Cuban 2004),
neglecting the social reality of the teachers and consequently the
instructional perspective56. Hence, the quality of teaching and learning
is often left untouched, causing a chain of ineffective educational
reforms and sustained stability of the educational institutions.
Tyack and Cuban (1995) highlight some contradictive issues in
teachers’ social reality:
– Students need to be socialized, yet taught to be critical thinkers.
– Academic knowledge produced by previous generations needs to
be taught, yet also marketable and practical skills need to be
learned.
– Students need to be cultivated to cooperate, yet each student
competes with the others in the educational institution and later
in life.
– Students need to learn basics but also creativity and higher-order
thinking needs to be encouraged.57
The dilemma language could be justifiably extended to include also
the dualities below:
– Reform done in “top-down” or “bottom-up” manner.
– Centralized or decentralized governance of reforms.
– Excluding or including teachers to the planning of the reform.
– Narrow or multiple purposes of the schooling.
– Local or global cooperation.
Historically accumulated contradictions are intrinsic to human
activity and also to schooling (Engeström 1987; Cuban 1999), but what
55 Cuban (2004) makes a distinction between “administrative progressives” and “pedagogical
progressives”.
56 This means that the worlds of the administrators and the teachers may differ a lot. Tyack and
Cuban (1995) explain how the worlds of technocrats (administrators) and teachers have been
mainly miles apart during the analyzed past century.
57 This list offers some examples of contradictive features in educational institutions, but e.g.
Berlak and Berlak (1981) have developed a dilemma language containing sixteen dilemmas
(sets of “control”, “curriculum” and “societal”) to be explored in the educational institution.
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kind of a role do they play for the educational institution? According
to Cuban (1999), the university-colleges have been places where
contradictions have produced an enduring stability in beliefs,
structures, and cultures. On the other hand Engeström (1987) has been
arguing that new qualitative stages and forms of activity emerge as
solutions to the contradictions of the preceding stage of form. But
how then to explain the immanent stability of the educational
institutions facing several contradictions on a daily basis? Why have
the educational institutions been living in an state of everlasting
stability? Why have new qualitative stages and forms of activity not
emerged as solutions for educational institutions? Could this state of
affairs be explained by the lack of deliberate efforts of teachers?
The proper question for the teachers confronting the above
contradictive issues on a daily basis is not which one of the alternatives
to choose, because both offer points of departure for dialectical
synthesis. Often teachers tend to be unaware of these dilemmas and
contradictions, but they could be identified as a part of a necessary
but not sufficient prerequisite for deep transformational educational
reform during teacher education (cf. Fullan & Hargreaves 1992; Fullan
1993; Tyack & Cuban 1995; Hirsch 1996; Cuban 1999; Bereiter 2002).
The next dimension of change or development needs to be
remembered in this phase – the breadth. The breadth of change means
the continuum between unsystematic (“narrow”) and systematic
(“broad”) reforms (cf. Cuban, 1999). In this study unsystematic breadth
means emphasis on for example teaching methods (e.g. distance
learning), teacher education, or even shared values, norms and codes
of conduct. This does not mean, however, that we should forget these
issues but that we cannot deal with them unsystematically.
Rather than starting from a scratch in reinventing educational
institutions, it makes most sense to graft thoughtful reforms onto
what is healthy in the present system. When identifying unhealthy
features or problems in the present practices, the expertise and
knowledge of the teachers should not be excluded, at least if the main
purpose is to develop the teaching and learning (Tyack & Cuban 1995)
at the educational institution.
As Fullan and Hargreaves (1992) emphasize, teachers are a big part
of the educational institution, and as individuals and groups of
individuals, they must take responsibility for improving the whole
educational institution. If they do not, their individual classrooms will
not improve either, because forces outside the classroom heavily
influence the quality of classroom life. But was is meant by the whole
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educational institution and the system58? What has been the unit of
analysis in the educational reform studies?
According to Cuban (1999) the whole educational institution is not
just a bunch of individual teachers, students and administrators. He
reminds that the university (educational institution) is a decentralized
organization of nested, quasi-hierarchical layers of authority and
decision making interspersed with many semiautonomous units. For
Cuban these levels or layers are the “bottom” (e.g. lecture halls,
laboratories and seminar rooms), department, faculty and the
institutional level. Thus, in a deeply transformational educational
reform actions and activities on all levels are needed but how to do it
and how do these levels interact within themselves? Do we need other
layers than those proposed by Cuban?
The cultural core of the “bottom” layer is often left unchallenged,
and consequently possibilities to fundamental reform are turned into
impossibilities. The cultural “hard” core is also multilayered and
reformers often tend to be unaware of the core, namely basic
assumptions. If some kind of reform may take place, it often tends to
be accretions around the core (Cuban 1993; Tyack & Cuban 1995).
On the other hand a fundamental type of reform (transformational)
aims to alter the core beliefs, behaviors, roles, and structures of the
educational institution drastically. In these kinds of reforms it is often
recognized that less fanfare and display may be a more effective stance
for an effective and fundamental reform. The fundamental type of
reform represents systematic alterations in the ways teachers
understand the meaning of knowledge, teaching, learning and how
they see the learner (e.g. a passive receiver or an active actor59).
It is often thought that an educational reform can be generated by
a general formula (Olson 2003) and consequently, local conditions and
contexts have received only minor attention. The reality of the teachers
needs to be faced; the busy, contradictive and complicated “bottom”
level where teaching takes place needs to be kept in mind. As
mentioned above, some of these features are virtually the same for
all teachers, but some aspects vary. Students, curriculums, material
58 In his responsive model of educational improvement Goodlad (1975, 1984) claims that the
optimal unit for educational change is a single school where pieces of the whole, the
commonplaces of schooling (teaching practices, content or subject matter, instructional
materials, physical environment, activities, human resources, evaluation, time, organization,
communications, decision making, leadership, expectations, issues and problems, and controls
or restraints), constitute something close to the whole of the school. Goodlad’s unit of analysis
seems to be an ambiguous and eclectic list. Cf. Miettinen (1994).
59 Here it is crucial to remember the difference between espoused and “authentic” basic
assumptions (cf. Argyris & Schön 1978). Espoused assumptions are often said in unreflected
manner but the road towards “authentic” assumptions goes along self-reflection and social
evaluations.
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facilities, cultures60 and other organizational features vary in different
educational contexts a lot. Hence, teachers need to use different
approaches to teaching and classroom management in different kinds
of times and places.
Instead of being ready-made plans, reform policies could be stated
as principles, ideas, beliefs, general aims61, to be modified in the light
of experience (Tyack & Cuban 1995) and partly in the light of
pedagogical research. These features seldom determine specific
behaviors, but they do offer direction, heuristic support and
justification for actions taken (Cuban 2004; Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola & Lehtinen 2004).
Based on the present analysis, some primary lessons and guiding
principles have been condensed to the following list:
– Making fundamental changes (e.g. in basic assumptions, values,
cultures) in long-lived institutions is a rare but a real possibility.
– The ahistorical nature of most current reform arguments results in
both a magnification of present defects in relation to the past and
an understatement of the difficulty of changing the system.
– A deep understanding of the structures, processes and cultures of
the educational institution in question and of the larger
socioeconomic and political arena in which it exists should and could
be achieved systematically.
– Paradoxically, there seems to be a lack of collegiality and
individuality in the development of teachers. These features are
not incompatible; they can and must go together if we are to
improve our educational institutions fundamentally.
– Our “sociological beliefs” influence how we see our educational
institutions (as “bureaucratic factories” or “organic entities”), the
relationship between them and the society, and ultimately the role
of our teachers interacting with these social structures (cf. e.g. the
Durkheimian view of Olson 2003 (cf. Collins 1994), and the Giddesian
view of e.g. Fullan & Hargreaves 1992).
– Present problems are caused by historically accumulated
contradictions, and the reformers should be aware of these
(Engeström 1987; Cuban 1999).
– A continuous and life-long teacher education is a necessary but
not sufficient prerequisite for a deeply transformational educational
reform. Teachers could be seen as change agents of the educational
reform and they should have a clear moral purpose.
60 According to Schein (1992) the levels at which culture can be analyzed are basic underlying
assumptions, espoused values and artifacts.
61 Often the unreflected internal coherence of the logic of reform enables defective logics to
stay (Cuban 2004). Traditionally similarities have been emphasized and hence similar principles
have been put into practice in all kinds of organizations. Contrary to this tendency we should
be better aware of the differences between for example schools and businesses.
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– A strong commitment and strong will are required in the process
because fundamental reforms are made incrementally.
– Not just the means but also the ends should be reflected. There is a
strong need for a guiding long-term purpose (Tyack & Cuban 1995;
Cuban 1999), for a shared vision (Fullan 1993) and for guiding ideas.
The reform of the educational institution is also a prime arena for
debating about the shape of the future of the society, and schooling
is something more than an instrument of international economic
competitiveness (Cuban 2004).
– If then the educational reform is tried to be guided by ideas and
theories cross-appropriated from high technology firms (Hargreaves
1999) or from management “gurus” (Fullan 1993) should we analyze
these carefully before applying them to our educational
institutions? If we should abandon and replace these misleading
ideas (Fullan 1993; Hirsch 1996), by what kinds of theories could
this be done? Or is this just a matter of practitioners needing to
exchange “best-practices” with each other in our “post-modern”
social reality? Can we reduce this problem to a matter of following
simple rules without confronting the complexities, paradoxes and
contradictions of our current social reality?
In the next chapter the field of organizational learning and
knowledge creation activities is discussed to analyze the chosen
currently cross-appropriated educationally oriented theories more
deeply, aiming at deciding to what an extent we could falsify them
while aiming towards the “truth” and synthesizing a justifiable
framework for educational institutions.
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Chapter Four
RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
OF THE STUDY
4.1. The FDF as a learning organization: key
principles for reformers of military
educational institutions
According to the newest strategic decisions, the FDF’s operating
culture is developed according to the “learning organization”
principles (Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004; cf. Personnel
Strategy 2005). Hence, the emphasized principles of learning
organizations need to be analyzed before focusing more holistically
on the main principles and frameworks proposed in the studies of
organizational learning and knowledge management.
In the FDF Peter Senge’s (1990) principles for learning organizations
have been recognized and a process to put them into practice has
been started. Also in Finland these original principles have been cross-
appropriated by some Finnish researchers (cf. i.e. Sarala & Sarala 1996;
Moilanen 2001) but here these researchers (i.e. filters) have been passed
and the analysis begins straight from the text of Peter Senge (1990).
Senge’s main principles (1990, 6–10) are systems thinking, building
a shared vision, centrality of mental models, personal mastery, and
team learning. Firstly, according to Senge,
Systems thinking is the fifth discipline that integrates the disciplines,
fusing them into a coherent body of theory and practice.62
To Senge systems thinking is more or less a powerful language,
augmenting and changing the ordinary ways we think and talk about
complex issues (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross & Smith,1994). This shift
of thinking is aimed towards a common understanding of a system.
So it is not enough to say that we have a system but we have to
understand what kind of system we actually have, and this view should
be organizationally widely shared.
62 The roots of Senge’s systems thinking lie for example in cybernetics, in chaos theories and in
gestalt therapy. All these approaches have one guiding idea in common: that the behaviour
of all systems follows certain common principles. For further reading see Ståhle (1998).
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Some people think that the systemic structure of an organization
is the organization chart. Others think that systemic structure means
the organizational work flow and process figures. But in systems
thinking, the systemic structure is the pattern of interrelationships
among the key concepts of the system. It might include the hierarchy
and process flows, but it also includes attitudes and perceptions, the
quality of products, the ways in which decisions are made, and
hundreds of other factors. Often these systemic structures are invisible,
but sometimes also visible. Following this kind of systemic thinking,
our understanding of the process of organizational change has to be
re-evaluated. The process is not top-down or bottom-up but
participative at all levels (Senge et al. 1994). Senge’s systemic thinking
may challenge our habitual ways of thinking but it has also been argued
that he does not offer any clear systematic structure but mainly some
general conceptual tools (Engeström 1999a, 377) and metaphors (Kim
1993)63.
Secondly, as has already been mentioned, learning organizations
create desired results. One of these desired results is their own future
(Senge 1990) but also they themselves as individuals and organizations.
To achieve this, a learning organizations needs a shared vision.
Commonly a vision is understood to be an image of the desired future.
Senge explains that building a shared vision is actually only one piece
of a larger activity: developing the “governing ideas” for the
enterprise, its vision, purpose or mission, core values (Senge 1990, 223-
224) and even goals (Senge et al. 1994). The main thing is not what the
vision is but how the vision is formed and what the vision does. In
other words, the only meaningful criteria for judging the vision are
the actions and changes that ensue (Senge 1990; Senge, Scharmer,
Jaworski & Flowers 2005); if they do ensue.
Thirdly, for learning organizations problems are not just out there
but right here inside the organization and its individuals. For
organizations this means that they learn through individuals who learn,
although individual learning does not guarantee organizational
learning. But without it no organizational learning occurs (Senge 1990,
139). How to conceptually clarify what is meant by learning? According
to Senge learning always involves new understandings and new
behaviours, “thinking” and “doing” (Senge et al. 1994). Although
Senge’s theories of the learning organization involve a change in
mental models or a shift of mind (Senge 1990, 13) not only the thinking
mind but also the whole acting individual human being is needed for
successful development (cf. Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 239).
63 Cf. e.g. Senge, Cambron-McCabe, Lucas, Smith, Dutton & Kleiner (2000) for
counterargumentative examples.
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Fourthly, the learning organization needs individuals who learn and
who have personal mastery of their lives. The mastery does not mean
only adaptation to the situation at hand and foreseeing the future
but also capabilities to clarify what is desired and how the desired end
state can be achieved. Shared organizational visions should emerge
from personal visions, desires and deepest aspirations made by
intuitive individuals.
Fifthly, although originally Senge emphasized the importance of
team learning, later his emphasis shifted from team learning to more
organizational learning (Ståhle 1998, 251; cf. Senge, Cambron-McCabe,
Lucas, Smith, Dutton & Kleiner 2000; Senge et al. 2005). According to
Senge and his associates (2000) in all kinds of schools (i.e. in all kinds
of educational institutions) there are three nested systems at play –
the classroom, the school, and the community. All these are
interdependent with each other, and all are interwoven patterns of
influence.
As already mentioned, the FDF states its intent to develop its
operating culture on “learning organization” principles. After briefly
analyzing the main principles of Sengean learning organization we
need to focus on the issue of how these principles have been adapted
and maybe modified in the FDF.
According to the newest competence development strategy of the
FNDC64, common for the definitions made on the learning organization
are understanding the importance of learning in all efforts to change
and develop the organization. In the concept of learning the following
aspects have been emphasized:
– Individual experiences and those acquired in group are valued as a
basis for learning.
– The significance of social interaction, for instance discussions,
various opinions, joint planning and evaluation of activity is
emphasized.
– As a prerequisite for high quality learning, the emphasis is on
individual, group based and local self-directing properties and
activity based on critical thinking.
It is obvious that the concept of learning described above has been
influenced by David Kolb’s experiential learning method (the emphasis
on “experience”; Kolb 1984; cf. Nissinen 2001; Levomaa & Rokka,
200465). The emphasis is on social interaction, meaning that
64 Competence development strategy; i.e. the Competence Development of Salaried Personnel
in the Finnish Defence Forces (2004).
65 According to the Chief of the Training Division of the FDF (Nordberg 2004, 158) the conception
of learning is constructivist (cf. also Nissinen 2001; Kallioinen 2001; Kalliomaa 2003). The “tool
box” called constructivism will be discussed in Chapter 8. Cf. also chapter 2 where some views
of Ernst von Glasersfeld  (the founding father of radical constructivism) were introduced.
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implementation of the strategy of competence development requires
continuous discussions about the objectives of the activities and the
values that direct it on the practical level (Competence Strategy 2004,
4). As a main tool for these discussions the superiors and their
subordinates in the FDF have annual planning discussions.
The concept of learning is said to depend on how a human being
and knowledge are understood. In brief, a human being is seen to be
conscious, active and responsible; a person who is valuable as such.
Knowledge is said to be created by individual and joint action, which
is both practical and scientific (Competence Development Strategy
2004, 8). Having said this, a military pedagogical perspective needs to
be highlighted, translated to be defined as:
A doctrine of training skills. It is a doctrine of setting goals, guiding
learning and assessing training activities and know-how (Nissinen
2001, 138; cf. Toiskallio 1998a, 9).
In this phase a paradox is caused in the translation process because
actually Toiskallio does not mean that we should forget know-that
type of knowledge. But what is the relationship between competence
and knowledge; between know-how and know-that elsewhere than
in the FDF? This issue is discussed in this chapter and later in chapter
8.
Not just learning but high quality learning and centrality of the
learning culture have been emphasized in the competence
development strategy. The culture refers to the basic ways of acting
and doing (Toiskallio 1996, 3) and to hidden beliefs, views and routines
(Toiskallio ed. 2000, 61) widely shared in the organization. When
analyzing culture, the levels of organizational culture explained by
Edgar Schein (figure 4.1) need to be remembered (cf. Halonen in
Toiskallio, Royl, Heinonen & Halonen, 2002).
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Figure 4.1 The levels of culture by Edgar Schein
Source: Schein 1992, 17.
According to Toiskallio (2003a, 115), planning the education and
training means an attempt to make the future. Implicitly this means
that the culture is changing, but how and to what direction should it
be developed and transformed? Based on Burns (1978) and Bass (e.g.
1998) Nissinen (2001) explains that the development of the culture is
possible only through transformational leadership. The renewed
leadership training of the FDF66 aims to change the leadership culture
of the FDF so that in the future actual value discussions would be
possible, followed by conclusions and acts of development. In fact
this means that each and everyone serving in the FDF is partly
responsible for his or her personal development and hence for the
future of the FDF’s operating culture.
Not just values, but also more fundamental basic assumptions need
to be focused on. The competence development strategy clearly states
that a human being is seen to be a conscious and active one. Is it then
impossible to identify any “passivity” from the personnel of the FNDC
and what are the consequences if we neglect the possible passivity?
Artifacts
Espoused Values
Basic Underlying Assumptions
Visible 
organizational 
structures and 
processes
Strategies, goals, 
philosophies
Unconscious, 
taken-for-granted 
beliefs, 
perceptions, 
thoughts, and 
feelings
66 The Deep Leadership Model (Nissinen 2001).
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Obviously the conception of a human being and other main features
of the basic assumptions need to be researched. Consequently, the
individual learning processes are going to be influenced by the
produced research results.
The competence development strategy explains that when the FDF
will be developed into a learning organization, the system must be
examined as a whole and as relations of interaction between its
different elements (Competence Strategy 2004, 9). This statement raises
more questions than answers: what is meant by the system? What is
the unit of analysis when developing the organizations of the FDF to
operate according to the principles of the learning organization67?
4.2. The first generation knowledge
management theories producing ideas
for reformers
Serving in the FDF, it was natural to begin the analysis from the
works of Senge and his disciples, but because of the emerged need to
know other research “paradigms” in the knowledge society, a widening
of the scope was needed. Also other main research programmes in
the field of organizational learning and knowledge management68
needed to be included in the analysis.
With these future oriented research programmes the researcher
started to scan our social reality, recognizing a strong claim: knowledge
claimed to be the resource (Drucker 1993, 42, 45) and obviously
something to be learned at the educational institutions, but what was
meant by “knowledge”? Maybe the theories of knowledge
management could offer some assistance for these kinds of inquiries.
Why is it relevant to look at knowledge management theories when
trying to develop an educational institution? First, as explained in
chapter 3, knowledge management theories have presently been cross-
appropriated to be used as tools in educational reforms (e.g. Fullan
1993; Hargreaves 1999) but on the other hand “flawed” guiding ideas
have been demanded to be replaced (Fullan 1993; Hirsch 1996); but
before doing this it is justifiable to analyze what the essence of these
cross-appropriated theories is and what they should be replaced with.
67 In order to show the direction for further studies on the learning organization, three main
research programmes play a pivotal role in the field: Argyris & Schön (1978, 1996); Pedler,
Burgoyne & Boydell (1989). During the 1990s; Senge, 1990; Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross &
Smith (1994 ). Cf. also Garvin (1993).
68 The concept of knowledge management is “a tool box” including e.g. knowledge creation
(Nonaka) and knowledge building (Bereiter) as its tools.
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Second, based on this extended set of first generation of knowledge
management theories it is possible to have a wider view when locating
educational institutions as pivotal parts of national and supranational
innovation systems (Kline & Rosenberg 1986; Stoneman 1995; Freeman
& Soete 1997; Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen & Dalum 2002; cf. Miettinen
2002; Joint vision 2020 2000).
The concept of innovation is often used rather ambiguously and
paradoxically, depending on whether one has a wider or a narrower
definition of it. When the wider concept has been used, the
Schumpeterian trilogy (Stoneman 1995; Schumpeter 1934: 1983) has
often been referred to. In the trilogy, invention (the inventor),
innovation (when the “new” idea is put into practical use), and diffusion
have been differentiated. A paradox emerges due to the fact that on
the other hand the word innovation refers to the whole process (cf.
Freeman & Soete 1997) but it is often mixed with inventions and
creativity. For the purposes of the present study, innovation refers to
the entire process of the trilogy without mixing it with inventions
and creativity.
Although the Schumpeterian trilogy offers some clarity
conceptually, it is essential to remember that since the 1970s the linear
model of innovations has been challenged by “chain-linked models”
emphasizing feedback loops, complexity and uncertainty of
innovations (Kline & Rosenberg 1986; Tuomi 2002).
A way out of this ambiguous innovativeness lies in the clarification
made by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, 6): knowledge creation (and
alternatively or additionally organizational learning processes) fuels
innovation. Therefore, it is logical to start the analysis from the essence
of knowledge “management”. This allows us to make sense of what
happens inside the black box called “innovation” (cf. Miettinen,
Lehenkari, Hasu & Hyvönen 1999; Tuomi 2002).
When analyzing the roots of the knowledge management
movement historically it needs to be noticed that it has emerged from
information management (cf. e.g. Nonaka 1991b; Nonaka, Umemoto
& Senoo 1996). Ever since, the difference between the concepts of
information and knowledge has stayed unclear. This issue will be
discussed later when analyzing Nonaka’s theories.
Actually all the branches, generations and movements of knowledge
management and organizational learning can be seen as sensemaking
tools. Therefore it is essential to focus also on theories of sensemaking
when discussing the theories of this field (e.g. Weick 1995, 2001; Weick
& Sutcliffe 2001; Choo 1998).
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We live in a society often called information or knowledge society
where information or knowledge is claimed to be the resource. Based
on Peter Drucker, many researchers and practitioners have emphasized
that knowledge is the resource, and traditional factors of production
– land and other natural resources, labor, and capital – are secondary
ones (Drucker 1993, 42, 45; Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 6; Davenport &
Prusak 1998, 2–13; Choo 1998, 2; cf. Neef, Siesfeld & Cefola 1998; Foray
2004).
There is a difference between information and knowledge, but what
kind of difference? A hierarchy of data-information-knowledge has
usually been identified (Allee 1997, 16; Davenport & Prusak 1998, 2;
Tuomi 1999, 23769), although the main emphasis has commonly been
on the difference between information and knowledge (Nonaka &
Takeuchi 1995, 57-59; Sveiby 1997, 24; Choo 1998, 2). According to this
hierarchy, knowledge is more than information, although all lower
level features are obviously needed as a “raw material”. The researchers,
excluding Nonaka, do not explain the different aspects of information
(i.e. syntactic and semantic aspects), which are a pivotal issue when
trying to understand the essence of communication.
Von Krogh and Roos (1995) remind us that knowledge, as well as
the mind, the world, intellect, are highly experience-distant concepts
(cf. Geertz 1973). Hence, these concepts usually do not invite an
understanding of everyday life. For the first generation knowledge
management researchers this danger seemed to be a real one due to
the weak interdisciplinarity with the major social science disciplines
(e.g. sociology (cf. Gherardi & Nicolini 200170), but also other social
sciences (cf. Dierkes, Antal, Child & Nonaka eds. 2001)) and scarcity of
double-hermeneutic processes with practitioners. In the present study,
avoiding these kinds of dangers has meant crossing the boundaries
between various disciplines, between social sciences and natural
sciences while aiming at an “experience-close” double-hermeneutic
process at the FNDC.
Presently we live in a profit-driven economic world, as can be seen
at first sight in the first generation management theories (cf. Nonaka
& Takeuchi 1995; Leonard 1995; Sveiby 1997; Stewart 1997; Davenport
& Prusak 1998). In these theories the economic system seems to be a
machine where the profit motive and economic growth is the mother
of all ends, but this is not the whole “truth” in this case. For the
69 Cf. Tuomi (2000) for an alternative hierarchy.
70 They more or less explain the possibilities of sociology to make specific contributions to the
study of organizational learning. Their analysis shows how underutilized these possibilities
were among the first generation knowledge management researchers. The analysis made in
this research underlines the conclusion. The sociological theories of Luhmann offer an example
of the exception to the rule (cf. von Krogh & Roos 1995) as well as Giddensian interpretations
of Nonaka (Nonaka & Toyama 2003; Takeuchi & Nonaka eds. 2004).
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researchers of the first generation the economic machine seems to be
partly driven by other than profit motives (e.g. sustainability; good
life) as emphasized for example by Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992):
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order
is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in
concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is
thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” resources..It
is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources
known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative
importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a
problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its
totality. (Hayek 1945, 519–520, italics added; cf. Nonaka & Takeuchi
1995, 33)
According to these researchers knowledge is produced by
individuals and it resides in them and especially in the minds of knowers
(Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 126; Leonard 1995, 13; Davenport & Prusak
1998, 5; Choo 1998, 3). Although the knowledge creation process starts
at the individual level it moves up to the higher “ontological” levels
(Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 72–73; Leonard 1995, 118; Sveiby 1997, 23;
Stewart 1997, 163; Choo 1998, 10–11; Davenport & Prusak 1998, 19–
24) all the way to the knowledge ecologies (Davenport & Prusak 1998;
Nonaka & Konno 1998)71.
Despite the other motives, the economic machine needs knowledge
as its main input. Hence, knowledge seems to be needed to be wrapped
(codified) in measured boxes (Stewart  1997; Sveiby 1997; Edvinsson &
Malone 1997; Davenport & Prusak 1998; Choo 1998, 264–266) and
knowledge as a product is widely emphasized. But what to do with
the residue; with tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1966; Nonaka & Takeuchi
1995; Ahonen, Engeström & Engeström 2000; Hansen, Nohria & Tierney
1999)? Consequently, being partly unknown even to the individual in
question, knowledge seems to be largely unidentifiable and
unmeasurable as a whole (e.g. Foray 2004, 9–12). Despite this
unmeasurableness, the holistic nature of knowledge needs to be kept
in sight.
71 Ahonen, Engeström and Virkkunen (2000) have criticized that the researchers of the first
generation of knowledge management theories have used just the knowledge-carrying
individual as the unit of analysis for mapping and enhancing knowledge. On the basis of the
analysis mentioned above this criticism cannot be agreed upon. Cf. also Paavola, Lipponen,
and Hakkarainen (2002); Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola, Lehtinen (2004), stating how
Engeström’s, (1987), Bereiter’s (2002), and Nonaka’s (with Takeuchi 1995) models focus on
knowledge advancement at a communal level.
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But have the researchers of the first generation knowledge
management kept this holistic nature in their sight? Not necessarily.
According to Allee (1997; cf. Ahonen, Engeström & Virkkunen 2000)
we cannot solve our knowledge era questions with design approaches
that came out of information age thinking (cf. von Krogh & Roos 1995).
The current practices of “knowledge mapping” are cumbersome at
best. In worst situations, people spend much time and resources in
futile exercises. Unknowingly Allee described the present situation at
the FDF.
Hansen, Nohria and Tierney (1999; cf. Tuomi 1999, 389–390; Foray
2004, 217–221) propose that there are two generic knowledge
management strategies: codification and  personalization strategy72.
When choosing the codification strategy one codifies and stores
knowledge in databases to be reused in the future. On the other hand,
the personalization strategy means focusing on the dialogue and
interaction between individuals instead of knowledge objects in the
database. In the codification strategy the product nature of knowledge
is emphasized, but in the personalization strategy perspective the
processual view of knowledge gets more attention. But do we really
have any alternatives other than the personalization strategy
especially in our educational institutions?
Rather than being a codified product, knowledge has been seen as
a process among the researchers of the first generation of knowledge
management. For example Nonaka and Takeuchi have emphasized that
to them knowledge is a dynamic human process of justifying personal
belief towards the “truth” (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 58). Referring to
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), von Krogh and Roos (1995, 61)
present this same point differently, claiming that a great leverage of
knowledge is to be found in the interface between mind, society, and
culture rather than in one or even in all of them. Knowledge is enacted
in particular situations in a dynamic manner73, driven also by other
kinds of motives than a mere profit motive.
But how then do these dynamic processes emerge among
individuals and how to solve the problem of utilization? Actually a
communication problem emerges in the field of knowledge
management studies, mostly unconnected to the field of
72 Tuomi (1999, 389-390) synthesizes a third alternative: knowledge creation strategy where
the measurement system could include components that diagnose factors of organizational
culture that are critical for knowledge creation, dynamics of its ba’s, or social interactions that
facilitate innovation.
73 This statement challenges our widely shared assumptions of the unquestionability of
bureaucracies where the interaction happens linearly in a stepwise manner between the
different hierarchic layers of the organization.
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communication studies74. But what to do if individuals hesitate to
interact and if there is communicational malfunction partly influenced
by the local “system” or the local culture?
We seem to need a systemic shift of mind but how to describe the
system? Even Allee (1997)75 does not describe what a system means to
her, although she favors the Sengean (1990) shift of mind. One way to
conceptualize the needed systemness is focusing on cultures (cf.
Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Choo 1998).  Nonaka and Takeuchi explain
(1995) that studies of organizational culture have underscored the
importance of such human factors as values, meanings, commitments,
symbols, and beliefs, paving the way for more elaborate research on
the tacit aspect of knowledge. On the other hand Nonaka and Takeuchi
(1995, 42) identify some shortcomings in the Scheinian line of research.
The organization and its individuals are portrayed as rather passive,
neglecting the potential to change and to create something new.
Interestingly the first generation knowledge management researchers
have not explicitly uncovered the levels of culture76 (cf. Schein 1992;
Nissinen 2001, 216; cf. figure 4.1). Figure 4.1 shows in an explicit
form the underlying cultural aspects to be reconsidered when the aim
is to enable shifts of minds. But how to make this kind of shifts; can
we personally do something to make the shift happen?
There is a paradoxical situation between the theories of learning
organizations and knowledge management (especially knowledge
creation). There exists a link between learning and knowledge (Leonard
1995, 3; Choo 1998, 273; Davenport & Prusak 1998, 156; Nonaka &
Takeuchi 1995, 63) but these concepts are not combined as an aligned
system in the first generation of knowledge management theories. It
will be analyzed below how possible it is to exclude learning from the
practices and routines of different kinds of knowledge activities.
4.3. Knowledge creation theories by Ikujiro
Nonaka
The theories of Ikujiro Nonaka have been seen as an interesting
attempt (Engeström 1999a) to not just instruct but also explain how
74 The exceptional analysis of von Krogh and Roos (1995) confirms the rule but do not connect
the analysis adequately to the field of communication studies. Another exception is Aula
(1999) who has, partly based on Nonaka’s theories, coined a double function of communication
(dissipative and integrative functions), challenging the traditional unidirectional Shannonian
communication model.
75 Later in e.g. Allee (2003) she has developed her value network view to explain how she sees
systems and their relations.
76 The term “level” refers to the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the
observer (Schein 1992).
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to manage in the fierce competition of the Knowledge Age (Bereiter
2002). They have been seen also as an interesting suggestion for schools
(Hargreaves 1999) and maybe even to the educational institutions.
Nonaka was the world’s first holder of a professorship dedicated to
the study of knowledge. The professorship (the Xerox Distinguished
Professorship in Knowledge) was created in 1997 to the Haas School
of Business at the University of California, Berkeley. Nonaka draws a
clear distinction between knowledge management and knowledge
creation, as illustrated by the following episode. In naming the first
chaired professorship dedicated to the study of knowledge and its
impact on business the Haas School of Business initially recommended
the title “Xerox Distinguished Professorship of Knowledge
Management”. Nonaka inquired if the title could be changed to “Xerox
Distinguished Professorship of Knowledge Creation” due to the fact
that the Japanese approach to knowledge differs from the Western
approach in a number of ways. As a compromise, they agreed to call it
“Xerox Professorhip in Knowledge”. (Takeuchi 1998; Umemoto 200277)
One key reason for his appointment was obviously the research
done by Nonaka during the 1980s and 1990s and his influential articles
in Harvard Business Review (1991a), and in Organization Science (1994),
but especially his highly valued book The Knowledge Creating Company
published in collaboration with Hirotaka Takeuchi in 1995. In 1997 the
Economist (May 31) dubbed Nonaka “Mr Knowledge”, and so it seems
justifiable to see him as one of the most influential thinkers in the
knowledge management movement.
After gaining much publicity, and good assessments, the theories
of Nonaka have been widely criticized especially in the Western world.
Here this main criticism is used as a tool when aiming to get a deeper
understanding of Nonaka’s theories for the needs of the FNDC and
other organizations.
Critical analysts have often focused on Nonaka’s main book The
Knowledge Creating Company (1995). His article with Noburo Konno,
The Concept of ‘Ba’: building a foundation for knowledge creation,
published in 1998, has also been critically and explicitly analysed, as
well as his above mentioned articles (1991a, 1994). But only a few have
analyzed how his theories have developed after 199878 and no one in
77 The writer of the present study stayed at Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
(=JAIST) during 2002-2003 where Nonaka was the first Dean of the Graduate School of
Knowledge Science in 1997-2000. Since then he has arranged courses in knowledge
management at JAIST twice a year. During the period in Japan the researcher participated in
Nonaka’s Knowledge Management course at the University of Hitotsubashi, Tokyo, from the
1st of October 2002 to the 17th of January 2003.
78 Carl Bereiter (2002) offers an exception, citing also the Enabling Knowledge Creation by von
Krogh, Ichijo, Nonaka, 2000.
62
the Western world has explicitly analyzed how his theories have
evolved before the 1990s, during the 1990s and in the past years, aiming
to gain a holistic understanding of Nonaka’s theories.
The consequence of this narrow focus of the criticizers is an
overemphasis on the SECI model and a lost sight of the wider frame-
work of Nonaka. It seems to be justifiable to assume that with this
kind of wider perspective the re-evaluation of the criticism and also
Nonaka’s theories will gain some additional validity. The proper
framework for focusing on the theories of Nonaka is the framework
of the Organizational Knowledge Creation Theory presented in figure
4.2.
Figure 4.2 Nonaka’s framework of the Organizational Knowledge Creation
Theory
Source: Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001, 507.
In this framework the four79 layers of knowledge creation interact
with each other in order to form the knowledge spiral that creates
knowledge. The four layers are:
– The process of knowledge creation through socialization,
externalization, combination, and internalization (SECI), the
Knowledge vision
Knowledge assets
Ba
S E
C I
In
Out
Moderate
Build and
energize
Justify and direct
Define
LEARNING
79 Originally the framework has three layers but by adding the fourth layer, the knowledge
vision, the framework gets its holistic shape (cf. Nonaka, Toyma & Byosiere 2001) presented in
figure 4.2.
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knowledge-conversion processes between tacit and explicit
knowledge.
– Ba, the platforms for knowledge creation.
– Knowledge assets, or the inputs, outputs, and moderator of the
knowledge-creation process.
– Knowledge vision affecting and giving direction to the knowledge-
creation process. (Nonaka, Toyama, Byosiere & 2001, 507)
The cornerstones of the theories of Nonaka have been identified
as follows:
– An organization cannot create knowledge without individuals and
knowledge is created through the SECI process.
– Knowledge has its tacit and explicit parts and is neither information
nor data.
– Knowledge vision and organizational intention are a driving force
for a knowledge creating organization.
– Ba provides a platform, a shared context in motion, for knowledge
creation.
– Systematic knowledge creation involves not just the top
management but everyone in the organization, with middle
managers serving as the key knowledge engineers.
– The knowledge creation process cannot be managed but it can be
enabled by creating necessary conditions for effective knowledge
creation.
– Knowledge assets, which are the inputs and outputs of the
knowledge-creation process, form the basis of organizational
knowledge creation.
– Along the path of knowledge creation, there are many fundamental
dichotomies to be dealt with, and dialectic thinking and acting is
needed. (cf. Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka & Toyama 2002, 2003;
Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001; Takeuchi & Nonaka eds. 2004)
In the following analysis the cornerstones of Nonaka’s theories are
analyzed in a more detailed manner.
4.3.1. Knowledge creation needs also individuals
and knowledge is created in the SECI process
As mentioned above, SECI stands for socialization, externalization,
combination, and internalization. Socialization is the process of
bringing together tacit knowledge through shared experiences in day-
to-day social interaction. Because tacit knowledge is context-specific
and difficult to formalize, the key to acquiring tacit knowledge is to
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share the same experience through joint activities. Externalization is
the process of articulating tacit knowledge as explicit concepts. The
successful conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge
depends on the sequential use of metaphors, analogies, and models.
Combination is the process of systemizing concepts into a knowledge
system. This mode of knowledge conversion involves combining
different bodies of explicit knowledge. Internalization is the process
of embodying explicit knowledge as tacit knowledge, and learning-
by-doing is emphasized. (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 62–70; cf. Nonaka
& Toyama 2003, 495–498; see also Nonaka, Byosiere, Borucki & Konno,
1994)
Nonaka stresses that knowledge is created only by individuals: an
organization cannot create knowledge without its individuals. But he
does not mean that an organization does not need social communities
to create knowledge. Nonaka has emphasized that although the
knowledge-creation spiral starts at the individual level, it is elevated
dynamically from this lower level to higher ontological levels (like
teams, groups, and communities of interaction (Nonaka & Takeuchi
1995, 57–59; Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001, 497–498).
It is unjustified to make the conclusion that in Nonaka’s theories
the unit of analysis is just an individual human being (cf. Ahonen,
Engeström & Virkkunen 2000, 282). Nonaka presents the SECI model
in universal terms, explaining how it can be used on all “ontological
levels”, ranging from individual human beings to supranational
organizations (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 72–73; Corno, Reinmöller &
Nonaka 1999). Hence, it seems to be reasonable to understand the
SECI model as a flexible heuristic rather than as a strict algorithmic
rule (Engeström 1999a; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen,
2004) for fruitful knowledge creation.
The later developments of the knowledge-creating theory have
justified the conclusion that the theory is more or less a metaphorical
and heuristic tool for understanding the key features of the knowledge
creation system. In the revisited knowledge-creating theory dynamic
interactions among individuals, the organization, and the environment
are stressed. Knowledge is created in a spiral that goes through
seemingly antithetical concepts such as order and chaos, micro and
macro, part and whole, mind and body, tacit and explicit, self and
other, deduction and induction, and creativity and efficiency.
Knowledge creation is conceptualized as a dialectical spiral or process,
in which various contradictions are synthesized through dynamic
interactions among individuals, the organization, and the
environment. (Nonaka, Toyama & Nagata 2000; Nonaka & Toyama
2002, 2003; Takeuchi & Nonaka eds. 2004)
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Dialectical thinking has a long history in Western philosophy, from
Plato to Hegel and to Bhaskar (Nonaka & Toyama 200280), but its Eastern
roots should also be remembered. In Eastern philosophies the trails
go along Nishida (1958, 1970, 1990), Ilyenkov (1977, 1982), Marx and
Engels. It is interesting to recognize that also the cultural-historical
activity theory uses dialectics as a background theory when explaining
its key principles (Engeström 1987, 2001a).
To explain the synthesizing processeses and the emergence of
structure, the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens (1984; chapter
2) and critical realism (Bhaskar) have been used (Nonaka & Toyama
2003; Takeuchi & Nonaka eds. 2004). Critical realism explains (Bhaskar
1975, 12–20) how reality consists of three different layers: empirical,
actual, and real. The layer of the real contains structures that have
powers and liabilities from which observable events emerge. The
domain of the actual consists of these events and behaviours and the
domain of the empirical consists of our experiences. Thus, social
phenomena emerge from the deep underlying real structures, become
actual, and then empirical. Hence, although social structure is
dependent upon individuals’ actions it is irreducible to them and
ontologically autonomous from them.
 According to Nonaka and Toyama (2003), knowledge is created
through interactions between human agency and social structures.
Nonaka and Toyama cite Giddens, who explains how harmoniously
the two levels of consciousness (practical and discursive consciousness)
interact in our social reality. Nonaka and Toyama describe how the
inherent contrast between the levels of consciousness is the driving
force of the dialectical spiral. Interestingly, they fail to recognize how
also the Giddensian structuration theory gives an explanatory role to
the inherent contrasts; namely, to the contradictions. In the following
subchapter (see 4.4) the analysis turns to the concept of contradictions.
Nonaka’s theories have been criticized for being representatives of
the mind-as-container metaphor (Bereiter 2002). To justify his
argument Bereiter emphasizes that to Nonaka knowledge is things in
the mind, although knowledge is partly something out in the world
(Bereiter 2002, 176). Nonaka stresses that on the other hand knowledge
means a dynamic human process of justifying the personal belief
toward the “truth” (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 58; Nonaka & Toyama,
2002) but it is also a reality viewed from a certain angle (Nonaka &
Toyama 2003; Takeuchi & Nonaka eds. 2004). Hence, in knowledge
creation, one tries to see the entire picture of reality by interacting
with those who see the reality from other angles. In practice this means
80 For additional reading the following can be recommended: Gadamer (1976); Bhaskar (1993);
Falmagne (1995).
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a continuous pursuit to get an entire and correct picture of the reality
(the “truth”) by ongoing organizational communication and
collaboration.
Bereiter’s mind-as-container claim is rather misleading because
especially nowadays Nonaka emphasizes dialectical synthesis of such
seemingly antithetical entities as mind and body or an individual and
the society. Nonaka synthesizes both rational and arational human
capabilities (e.g. intuition, emotions) for the full use of organizations
and the global society (cf. Wierzbicki & Nakamori 2005, 1).
It seems justifiable to say that one of the paradoxes of Nonaka’s
theories is that when he emphasizes the fundamental role of the
individual in the knowledge creation process, he at the same time also
treats human beings more or less as “black boxes” and as “given”
(Bereiter 2002; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 9).
4.3.2. Knowledge has its tacit and explicit parts and
is not information or data
As mentioned above, Nonaka has emphasized the difference
between data, information and knowledge. Having such a long career
as a management researcher and teacher he has lived through the
times of information processing to the current times of knowledge
creation and management. The fact seems to be that concepts like
“information” and “knowledge” or “knowing” have often been used
interchangeably and ambiguously (cf. e.g. Toffler 1990; Webster 1995,
83; Sveiby 1997, 24; Castells 1996, 17, 1998; Bell 1973, 175).
For instance Manuel Castell’s widely cited trilogy The Information
Age (1996, 1997, 1998) pays little attention to the definitions of
concepts like knowledge and information. Castells (1996, 17) states
that he has no compelling reason to improve on Daniel Bell’s definition
(1973) of knowledge or Marc Porat’s (1977) definition of information81.
Consequently, Castells sees both information and knowledge as
organized statements of facts communicated systematically and the
difference between them stays doubtful.
The theories of Nonaka seem to give some tools to make the
difference more identifiable. Nonaka gives some clarification to the
essential difference between information and knowledge by reminding
about two aspects of information: syntactic and semantic (Nonaka
81 According to Bell (1973, 175) knowledge is a set of organized statements of facts or ideas,
presenting a reasoned judgment or an experimental result, which is transmitted to others
through some communication medium in some systematic form (italics added). According to
Porat (1977, 2 quoted in Castells 1996, 17) information is data that have been organized and
communicated.
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1988a, 1991b). The syntactic aspect concerns the Shannonian physical
information in bits in which there is no attention paid to any inherent
meaning. Although Shannon and Weaver82 (1949: 1998) started their
analysis on three levels (technical, semantic and effectiveness), they
concluded that the separation into three levels is really artificial and
undesirable due to the fact that semantic aspects are irrelevant to the
technical engineering problems.
On the other hand, Nonaka has explained that semantic aspects
are crucial for all kinds of organizations. In a sense organizations have
to be seen living in a middle of information ambiguity or chaos, trying
selectively identify semantic information from the environment to
form order (physical and mental patterns as organizational structures,
systems, visions, concepts, or values) out of the chaos. But even more
interestingly, Nonaka reminds us that also syntactic aspects of
information are useful for an organization because the two aspects
of information will actually complement each other, resulting in
greater efficiency (Nonaka 1991b83). In other words it could be said
that all three Shannonian levels of analysis are still needed when
analyzing the effectiveness of communication.
For Nonaka information is a necessary medium or material for
eliciting and constructing knowledge because it affects knowledge
by adding something to it or restructuring it (Nonaka &  Takeuchi
1995, 58–59). First, knowledge, unlike information, is about beliefs and
commitment. Knowledge is a function of a particular stance,
perspective, or intention. Second, knowledge, unlike information, is
about action. It is always knowledge to some end. Third, knowledge,
like semantic information, is about meaning. As Bateson (1972, 453)
puts it, information is a difference which makes a difference (in a
knowledge). (cf. Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 58–59)
 Mainly based on the philosophies of Polanyi (1966), Nonaka has
proposed that there are two types of knowledge: tacit knowledge
and explicit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). Tacit knowledge is
seen to be personal, context-specific, and therefore hard to formalize
82 Communication is difficult to define partly because the term seems to be one of the most
overworked terms in the English language (Littlejohn 2002). It could be said that the classical
model of a communication event (A-> B = X) has been heavily influenced by the theories of
Shannon and Weaver (Taylor 1993, 256-257; Aula 1999) but also Lasswell (1948; “who..says
what..in which channel..to whom..with what effect) and Bavelas (1948, 1950; Kurt Lewin’s
student).
83 Nonaka does not elaborate other aspects of information but concentrates on the difference
between information and knowledge. To those interested in knowing more about other
aspects of information, the following cognitive trails could be recommended. Yehoshua Bar-
Hillel (1964) has developed with Rudolf Carnap a theory for semantic information further
elaborated by Doede Nauta (1972) as a pragmatic information theory.  Interestingly e.g. the
FRISCO (1996) report goes also on a higher semiotic layer than pragmatic – to the social layer
(i.e. shared interests, beliefs and commitments).
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and communicate. As Polanyi (1966, 4) puts it, “we can know more
than we can tell”.
As has been already stated, Nonaka’s knowledge-creating theory is
a fruitful metaphorical and heuristic resource to shift our thinking
while trying to seek essential questions along the path to effective
knowledge creation and organizational success. Remembering this, it
is useful to recognize how Nonaka has criticized the general
overemphasis of explicit and codified knowledge, reminding us
Westerners of the so-called “paralysis by analysis” syndrome. By
emphasizing tacit knowledge Nonaka tries to propose that in order
to stay competitive also in the future we should not forget that
knowledge involves values, hunches and emotions, or that, in other
words, our competitiveness and well-being depends a lot on our
capability to use our human resources while avoiding the trap of
technological determinism.
Nonaka’s tacit-explicit distinction has been somewhat ambiguously
defined, making it possible for others to misinterpret his position in
this case. It has been stated that Nonaka sees tacit and explicit
knowledge as totally separate (e.g. Tuomi 199984; Cook & Brown 1999;
Brown & Duguid 2001) although Nonaka sees them as mutually
complementary entities85. Undoubtedly, Nonaka is far more interested
in knowing how to create new knowledge, causing him to undervalue
the importance of “old” public and cultural knowledge (Bereiter 2002;
Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004). But do we really need
to miss our great opportunity to “stand on the shoulders of giants”
when we develop our tacit knowledge in order to make novel
combinations of the “old” public and cultural knowledge for present
purposes (cf. the combinatorial character of innovation; Tuomi 2002;
Kogut & Zander 1992: 1997; Teece, Pisano & Shuen 1997; Brown &
Duguid 2001; von Hippel & von Krogh 2003; von Hippel 2005)?
Is tacit knowledge for Nonaka either an individual or a social
feature? The case seems to be such that for Nonaka tacit knowledge
is partly routinized and embedded within organizations and the
practices of organizations. It seems to be justifiable to agree with
Bereiter (2002; cf. also Hakkarainen, Paavola, Palonen & Lehtinen 2004)
that even the individualistic concept of the tacit knowledge of Nonaka
tends to be a mystified object, but even more mystified it will be if the
concept is extended also to the societal domain.
84 Later Tuomi (2002, 120) has admitted his misinterpretation of Nonaka’s position.
85 According to Nonaka’s latest conceptualization knowledge is not either explicit or tacit.
Knowledge is both explicit and tacit. Knowledge is inherently paradoxical, since it is made up
of what appears to be two opposites. (Takeuchi & Nonaka 2004, 4; italics added)
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The debate concerning the exact nature of tacit knowledge seems
to be stuck on the level of appropriate understanding of Polanyi’s,
Ryle’s and Nonaka’s writings (cf. e.g. Tsoukas 2002; Li & Gao 2003) but
the way out of this impasse is not just reanalyzing these thinkers. If
Nonaka has black-boxed and mystified objects like “tacit knowledge”,
we seem to need more social scientific tools than eclectic management
theories or analyses on the philosophical level only. The demystification
needs to be done by travelling along the cognitive trails made by other
disciplines. Later, in chapter 8, the analysis comes back to this issue
when the boxes of tacit knowledge and the human being are opened.
4.3.3. Knowledge vision and organizational
intention as driving forces for development
Some researchers have kept asking what is the force that drives
the knowledge spiral itself (Scharmer 2001, 71, 74; Engeström 1999a;
Tuomi 1999, 331). The knowledge spiral is driven mostly by
organizational intention, inherent contrasts (cf. contradictions) and
enabling contextual conditions. In subchapter 4.3.5 the Nonakaian
enabling conditions will be conceptualized and analyzed, but now the
focus shifts to the organizational intention and the vision.
Creating a vision or a dream is said to be the task of top manage-
ment, while middle management develops more concrete and
understandable concepts implemented by frontline employees. Middle
managers try to solve the contradiction between what the top
management hopes to create and what actually exists in the real world.
In other words, the top management’s role is to create a grand theory,
while the middle management tries to create a mid-range theory that
it can test empirically within the company with the help of the front-
line employees (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere
2001; Takeuchi & Nonaka eds. 2004). Paradoxically, Nonaka favours
old fashioned hierarchic and centralized methods for vision making,
although a vision gets its exact shape and meaning in the ongoing
dialectical process between the top management and other employees.
It is crucial to recognize that without real involvement and initiatives
of the lay workers the form and the consequences of a vision vary a
lot.
It has been traditionally argued that a vision could be an effective
tool for societal guidance. Unfortunately, in reality visions tend to be
just ambiguous statements made in a top-down manner and having
relatively minor effects on the organization in question. Not just the
content but also the manner how visions are made needs to be
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reconsidered. The concept of knowledge vision needs to be introduced
and elaborated as a tool for the needed shift of perspective.
The knowledge vision could be seen to have two main components:
an “absolute value system” or core ideology (core values, the mission
or core purpose) component, and a “relative value system” or the
envisioned future component (Collins & Porras 1994; Collins 2001;
Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001; Nonaka & Toyama 2002; Collins &
Porras 199486). The core ideology of the absolute value system plays
the role of an idealistic potential, always differing from the current
behaviour and reality but still energizing the individuals in question.
By a “relative value system” Nonaka means a component that
focuses on the environment of the firm. If the vision also determines
how the knowledge base will evolve in the long run (Nonaka, Toyama
& Byosiere 2001, 506), the purpose of this component of the vision
should be to explain how this relation seems to be evolving in the
future. As already mentioned, Nonaka sees how crucial individual
intuitions, insights and hunches are for a knowledge creating
organization making its knowledge vision. Due to the lack of explicit
connections to public and cultural knowledge the Nonakaian
organization tends to forget that not just intuitions and hunches, but
also deliberate R&D activities and science are needed for designing a
good knowledge vision87.
4.3.4. Ba and communities of practice: integrating
learning into knowledge activities
Although simplifying in terms, it is possible to say that communities
of practice are those communities where learning actually happens
(Lave & Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998; Brown & Duguid 1991, 2001),
and ba is the “place”, “space” or the “context” where knowledge is
created (Nonaka & Konno 1998; Nonaka, Konno & Toyama 2001;
Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001; Nonaka & Toyama 2003). A dialectical
analysis seems to be a proper choice in order to solve the unnecessary
confrontation between the concepts of ba and communities of practice.
Ba provides a platform, a shared context in motion, for knowledge
creation (Nonaka, Toyama & Konno 2001, 23; Nonaka & Toyama 2003,
6). Ba exists at many levels, and these levels may be connected to form
a greater ba (known as basho). Just as the ba for individuals could be
86 It is interesting to recognize how close the present description of the knowledge vision
comes to the Sengean (1990) view on visions (subchapter 4.1).
87 For additional cognitive trails to elaborate this point see Rosenberg (1974, 1992); Nelson &
Winter (1982); Cohen (1995); Mowery (1995); Boerner, Macher & Teece (2001); Fleming &
Sorenson (2004).
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seen as the team (cf. alternatively or additionally the communities of
practice), the organization in turn could be seen as the ba for the
teams (cf. alternatively the communities of practice).
So far mainly the differences between the concept of communities
of practice and the concept of ba have been emphasized. These have
been seen as follows:
– Ba is seen as a place where knowledge is created, but communities
of practice are just a place to learn and not to create knowledge.
– Ba’s boundaries are fluid and can be changed quickly, but the
boundaries of communities of practice are firmly set.
– Ba has a here-and-now quality, while communities of practice are
constrained by their history; the membership of ba is not fixed:
participants come and go, but in the case of communities of practice
the membership is seen to be more fixed. (Nonaka, Toyama &
Byosiere 2001, 499; Nonaka & Toyama 2003, 7)
It is obvious that there are differences between the concepts of ba
and communities of practice, partly because they emerge from different
cultural contexts. First we have to analyze the “differences” mentioned
above more carefully. It could be difficult to exclude the learning from
the practices and routines in ba because every human being is
continuously learning and habituated routines tend to emerge. So it
comes obvious that within ba there happens learning as well as there
can happen knowledge creation.
The theories of Nonaka and his colleagues are based on the
confrontation between the theories of learning organizations (Senge
1990) and knowledge creation (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). Learning
tends to be seen among knowledge-creation researchers as just
learning-by-doing in the phase of internalization (Nonaka & Takeuchi
1995, 69), although when describing the phase of socialization they
use apprenticeship as an example of effective learning (Nonaka &
Takeuchi 1995, 63). Hence, it is illogical to assume that learning happens
only in the phase of internalization. Therefore, the key issue is how to
combine learning and knowledge creation fruitfully.
When comparing the concept of ba to the concept of communities
of practice it becomes obvious that ba can be seen as more “dynamic”
than the communities of practice. But it is worth noticing that also ba
needs energy in order to become an active ba where knowledge is
created. So there could be different bas – “active” bas and “passive”
bas (Nonaka & Toyama 2003, 7) – just as there are active and passive
communities of practice.
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There seems to be a need to briefly dive into the origins of the
concept of ba and analyze the theories of Hiroshi Shimizu88 and Kitaro
Nishida, because the concept of ba was originally proposed by these
academics (Nonaka & Konno 1998, 40). According to Shimizu (1995),
although ba is alive in the daily life and social customs of Japanese
people, it is far from the daily consciousness of those who have been
busy in catching up with modern Western civilization. Due to this fact
we have to focus on the Japanese culture because the roots of the
concept of ba lie there.89
According to Shimizu a good introduction to ba is to understand
the concept and function of basho. It was mentioned above that
Nonaka has explained that a greater ba is basho (Nonaka & Konno
1998, 41). But what is basho actually according to Shimizu and Nishida?
The word-to-word translation of “basho” into English may be “place”
but it is not any semantic translation. “Sho” means “place” and so
“basho” indicates the place where ba is present or emerges (Shimizu
1995, 68).
For Nishida basho means a unity of absolute contradictories, the
absolute other and the self-determining universal or even absolute
nothingness (Nishida 1970, 6, 28; cf. Nishida 1958, 1970, 1990). By basho
Nishida stresses the need to understand ourselves as insiders rather
than outsiders contrary to for example the Cartesian tradition. In a
way Nishida offers a way to overcome the Cartesian split between
many kinds of “opposite” entities (e.g. mind – body, we – they, our
civilization – nature). Maybe even between ba and communities of
practice?
First of all we should focus on the concept of basho and to its
contradictive nature. Nonaka explains how inherent tensions (cf.
contradictions) play an essential role and give energy to be used in
developmental activities. In a way a greater awareness of basho means
more contradictions and potentially more energy to be used in
purposeful development. When emphasizing basho, instead of ba (a
shared context in motion), the possibility to recover basho potentially
increases. In other words emphasis on basho means also emphasis on
unity and consistency (Shimizu 1995, 72–73) in a larger context –
ultimately in a global context.
88 The researcher has had an opportunity to discuss these issues personally with professor
Hiroshi Shimizu during his stay in Japan in 2002 to 2003.
89 Shimizu (1995) explains how ba is embedded in social life. The present researcher sees that ba
is potentially embedded in social life but first of all it is a Japanese cultural phenomenon. The
emphasis on culture, instead of e.g. social life, means an emphasis on the deepest levels of
culture (unconscious phenomenon) and its culturally evolutionary development during history
(cf. Shimizu 2001).
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If then one of the main principles of basho is the consistency, is it
actually justifiable to divide ba into four types of “sub-ba”
corresponding to the four stages of the SECI model:
– Originating ba.
– Dialoguing ba.
– Systematizing ba.
– Exercising ba. (Nonaka, Konno & Toyama 2001, 19)
Assuming the SECI model to be more or less a heuristic tool to give
guidance for a dialectical knowledge creation process, the need for
abstract “sub-bas” is a limited one90. The main question seems to be
not how many “sub-bas” we have, but how we can energize these
shared contexts in motion.
4.3.5. The knowledge creation process cannot be
managed but it can be enabled
In subchapter 4.3.3 a fundamental question was posed: “What is
the force that drives the knowledge spiral itself?” It was shown that
when seeking an answer to such a question some theoretical sources
have been used by Nonaka (critical realism and structuration theory).
But more explanatory resources are needed if the aim is to
conceptualize the enabling conditions for organizational knowledge
creation.
According to Nonaka knowledge-producers and leaders must supply
the necessary conditions for the emergence as follows:
– Fluctuation and creative chaos.
– Redundancy.
– Requisite variety.
– Autonomy.
– Love, care, trust, and commitment. (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995;
Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001, 508–510; Takeuchi & Nonaka eds.
2004)
Since the 1980s Nonaka has been one of the organizational
researchers who emphasize the centrality of ambiguity and chaos to
organizations (cf. e.g. Nonaka & Johansson 1985; Nonaka 1988b; Imai,
90 In his careful analysis Tuomi (2002) argues how the four different types of ba proposed by
Nonaka collapse into two: a ba or a layer for combining existing resources and a ba or a layer
for interaction and novel creation of resources. On the community layer the meaning is
emerging and “above” it on the interaction layer sensemaking and communication take
place. Cf. also Bhaskar’s domains of the actual and the empirical (Bhaskar 1975, 14).
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Nonaka & Takeuchi 1988). The main “chaos-theoretical” article of
Nonaka was published in 1988 in the California Management Review
(Nonaka 1988a) and these influences have ever since been explicit in
his research (Nonaka 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka,
Reinmöller & Senoo 1998; Nonaka, Toyama & Konno 2000).
According to Nonaka, the most noteworthy principles are those
concerning the self-organization that emerges from the reality
explained by natural scientists, e.g. physicists and theoretical
biologists91. It becomes obvious that Nonaka does not draw a strict
line between natural and social sciences, showing his positivistic stance
explicitly (cf. chapter 2).
As a background it is useful to be aware of the evolved levels of
inquiry (Jantsch 1980) or paradigms influencing systems thinking
(Ståhle 1998). The paradigms of systemic thought are presented in
figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3 The paradigms of systemic thought
Sources: Cf. Ståhle 1998, 43; Jantsch 1980.
At this stage it needs to be assumed that the above scheme has
also some consequences for the theories of Nonaka. Further on it seems
to be justifiable to assume and expect that getting familiar with a
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91 Nonaka tends to refer to such physicists as Jantsch (1980) and Prigogine (1980; with Stengers,
1984) and theoretical biologists like Maturana and Varela (1980, 1992) and Varela, Thompson
and Rosch (1991).
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new systemic paradigm demands open-mindedness and willingness
to make it possible for a shift of mind or a gestalt switch to happen in
oneself (cf. Kuhn, 1962: 1970, 122). This means also that we have to
understand the conceptualized enabling conditions rather than follow
blindly the “checklists” offered for example by Nonaka.
According to Nonaka, the physicist Ilya Prigogine (with Isabelle
Stengers 1984) has demonstrated that nonequilibrium may be a source
of spontaneous formation of order or organization (Nonaka 1988a).
Based on Prigogine’s publication Nonaka claims that the new ordering
principle has been called “order through fluctuation” or “order out
of chaos”. A self-organizing system thus forms order through
fluctuation while reacting selectively to information (syntactic versus
semantic information) from the environment. Nonaka (1988a, 59-60)
stresses that the order is not formed simply by processing information
but by creating information and especially semantic information (i.e.
creating meaning).
Interestingly, Nonaka tries to explain explicitly how an organization,
living in a chaotic environment, has to intentionally harmonize
between external chaos and internal, although temporary, order
(Nonaka, Reinmöller & Senoo 1998, 67892). Occasionally the task of
the leaders is to create “chaos” intentionally by challenging the goals
and visions (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995)93.
The term “redundancy” may sound like something to be avoided
because of its connotations of unnecessary duplication, waste, and
information overload. For Nonaka redundancy means the existence
of information that goes beyond the immediate operational
requirements of organizational members. In organizations,
redundancy refers to intentional overlapping of information about
business activities, management responsibilities, and the organization
as a whole. Redundancy of information promotes the knowledge-
creation process in two ways. First, sharing redundant information
fosters the sharing of tacit knowledge by familiarizing one to other
perspectives in the organization. Second, redundancy of information
helps organizational members understand their position in the
organization by letting them see themselves from the outside. Thus,
redundancy of information provides the organization with a self-
control mechanism that keeps it heading in a shared and intended
direction. (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001;
italics added)
92 Aula (1999) has, partly on the basis of the theories of Nonaka, coined a double function of
communication (dissipative and integrative functions) challenging the traditional unidirectional
Shannonian communication model.
93 Actually it is not chaos in a scientific sense but “creative chaos” and some kind of temporary
organizational state of tension.
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As mentioned above, one way to explain knowledge is to claim
that it is a reality viewed from a certain angle (Nonaka & Toyama 2003;
Takeuchi & Nonaka eds. 2004). Hence, in knowledge creation, one tries
to see the entire picture of reality by interacting with those who see
the reality from other angles (Nonaka & Toyama 2003). One tries to
avoid ontological ills and fallacies by getting a relatively correct
description of the current reality. Therefore, redundancy means also
an awareness of several angles and perspectives shared by the
personnel of the organization.
Nonaka emphasizes that with a high level of information
fluctuation a firm could produce quite essential new concepts for the
use of its production needs. But how then does redundancy affect the
formulation of new concepts? How indeed are concepts formulated
and how do they emerge? It seems that Nonaka’s explanations about
these issues are rather ambiguous and need to be developed; just
emphasizing redundant information is not enough if we try to
understand what an organization could and should do for its enabling
conditions of knowledge creation.
In order to deal with challenges posed by the environment, the
internal diversity of an organization has to match the variety and
complexity of the environment (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka,
Toyama & Byosiere 2001; Ashby 1956); hence the requisite variety.
Developing a flat and flexible organizational structure in which the
different units are interlinked with an information network is one way
to deal with the complexity of the environment. As other means to
increase requisite variety Nonaka mentions also frequent organization
changes and rotation of personnel (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 83).
Requisite variety and redundancy are concepts developed in the field
of cybernetics and cross-appropriated to various fields of social
sciences. Hence, some basic understanding of cybernetics is needed
when evaluating the appropriateness of cybernetic concepts for social
sciences.
The term “cybernetics” was coined by Norbert Wiener in the
beginning of the 1940s and it was defined as the science of control
and communication, in the animal and the machine (Wiener 1948: 1965,
1954; Ashby 1956, 1; Bowker 1993; Bailey 1994; Jackson 2000; Littlejohn
2002; Rav 2002). In cybernetics the reality seems to offer a set of
possibilities (“redundancy”) and so the “redundancy” is not a state of
affairs to be obtained but the way how things are in our reality (Ashby
1956, 40).
According to Ashby (1956) one way of blocking the flow of
disturbances is to block them passively. Another way to handle these
complex and mobile disturbances is to use defence that is equally
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complex and mobile (ibid, 201). In this sense Ashby has coined the law
of Requisite Variety as follows: “Only variety can destroy variety” (ibid,
207). As mentioned above, to Nonaka, organizations live in a complex
environment needing to have a required variety to be able to
“destroy” variety (“redundancy”).
Ashby continues to stress that at the same time the quantity of
control exerted by this “diversified” organization is still bounded. This
boundedness needs to be overcome by the decision about “the list of
systems variables” in order to devote its limited powers to control
these “key variables”. Also Ashby claims that it is not enough to start
talking about systems but one needs to conceptualize the system. In
the early cybernetics the system meant not a thing, but a list of
variables that tries to control its redundant reality.
Redundancy and requisite variety seem to be linked to the
autonomy mentioned by Nonaka. If then an organization needs variety
to meet the redundancy posed by the complex environment, also
autonomy of the individuals is crucial if the required variety is going
to be achieved. But to be effectively autonomic in an organization
requires redundant information allowing one to act effectively, keeping
the organizational whole in the mind. Interestingly, redundancy of
information facilitates the interchange between hierarchy and
nonhierarchy, allowing an organization to develop itself as an
autopoietic organization (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka, Toyama
& Byosiere 2001; cf. Maturana & Varela 1980).
In order for knowledge to be shared and for the knowledge-creation
process to occur, there needs to be strong love, caring, and trust among
the organizational members. Knowledge-producers should also be
positive thinkers and should avoid having or showing negative
thoughts and feelings (Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001). Knowledge
seems to be mostly created by communication and shared activities,
which should not be taken as given. They do have some obstacles and
blocks but for some reason Nonaka does not concentrate on these
cultural phenomena.
The paradigms of systemic thought were presented in figure 4.3.
It is obvious that Nonaka draws rhetorical resources from all of the
systemic paradigms as the following analysis shows. Cybernetics, not
necessarily the later developed second-order cybernetics, can be
classified to the first paradigm (Ståhle 1998). According to Ludvig von
Bertalanffy (1981) (the founding father of the second paradigm and
the general systems theory), cybernetics and related approaches
showed many parallelisms with the general systems theory, but
fundamental differences existed: classical cybernetics dealt with closed
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systems and the general systems theory with open systems. Von
Bertalanffy (1981) claims that the classical cybernetic feedback scheme
explains94 how feedback regulation is a linear and unidirectional
(although circular) homeostatic process, but in open systems the
feedback is multivariable dynamic interaction. In a way the classical
cybernetic feedback scheme is reductionist, simplifying the reality too
much.
Von Bertalanffy draws a line between human beings and other
features by saying that homeostasis is inappropriate as an explanatory
principle for non-utilitarian human activities, not serving the primary
needs of self-preservation and survival and their derivates. According
to von Bertalanffy (1981) human needs are partly based on symbolic
rather than biological values.
In her foreword to Niklas Luhmann’s Social Systems (1995) Eva Knodt
explains how the book accomplishes in the social realm what Maturana
and Varela have done for cognitive biology and Prigogine’s work on
non-equilibrium thermodynamics for physics. As Knodt claims, the
adaptation of the concept of autopoiesis to realms other than biology
have encountered considerable obstacles; is there any categorical
distinction between human and non-human nature and are there some
limits to the use of for example physics in social sciences?95 Maybe
there still should be.
Focusing on the theories of Nonaka from the chaos-theoretical point
of view, some important questions could be put in the form of Table
4.1:
94 Orthodox behaviorism (Watson-Skinner) viewed the animal or human organism as a black
box, where only input-output relation mattered. In 1943 cyberneticists (i.e. Rosenblueth-
Wiener-Bigelow) but light into the box by introducing purpose and explaining the importance
of goals and their teleological guiding aspects and controlling feedback loops. (Bowker 1993;
Rav 2002; Littlejohn 2002)
95 Already in chapter 2 the unawareness of the “category mistake” was shown and analysis on
this issue will follow below. Also Maturana and Varela have debated the favouring and denying
the applicability of autopoiesis to social systems (1980, 1992); cf. also Mingers (2003); Tuomi
(1999, 192–200); Bailey (1994).
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Table 4.1 Emerging questions concerning Nonaka’s theories
We will return to these questions and answer them in chapter 8.
4.3.6. Knowledge assets
According to Paavola, Lipponen, and Hakkarainen (2002) there is
no explicit room for conceptual artifacts in the theories of Nonaka.
But the holistic framework of Nonaka (presented in figure 4.2)
enables us to see the potential of explicitly including knowledge assets
or conceptual artifacts also in the Nonakaian framework96.
Knowledge assets are categorized as follows:
– Experiential knowledge assets are the shared tacit knowledge that
is built through hands-on experiences that are shared between the
organizational members.
– Conceptual knowledge assets are articulated explicit knowledge like
brand equity, product concepts, and product designs.
– Systemic knowledge assets are systematized and packaged explicit
knowledge such as patents, licences, and manuals.
Nonaka’s framework Emerging questions 
Vision, knowledge vision What does a long-term view without “paralysis 
by analysis” mean for planning procedures? 
Could we use social science as a tool in the 
visionary process? 
Enabling conditions 
- fluctuation and creative chaos 
- redundancy and requisite variety 
- autonomy 
- love, care, trust, and commitment 
Is there a difference between e.g. human beings 
and machines? 
If there is a difference, what does the difference 
mean for organizational control and 
communication activities? 
What are the main obstacles to communication 
and how could these be avoided? 
SECI process What will be revealed if the black box of the 
human being is opened? 
If the tacit knowledge is demystified what will 
we get instead of it? 
What is the relation between learning, 
knowledge and knowing? 
Ba How to reasonably synthesize the concepts of ba
and communities of practice? 
Knowledge assets What does the synthesis of private and cultural 
knowledge mean for knowledge creation and 
management? 
Synthesizing capability What role does contradictions play and how to 
explain the emergence itself? 
What is the social system and how to deal with 
its boundaries? 
96 Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola and Lehtinen (2004) claim that some of the metaphorical
ideas that lie behind Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) cases are clear instances of what Bereiter
would call “conceptual artifacts”. Hence, according to them there is implicit room for conceptual
artifacts in the theories of Nonaka.
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– Routine knowledge assets are the routinized and embedded tacit
knowledge within the actions and practices of an organization.
(Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001, 501–503).
Knowledge assets, which are the inputs and outputs of the
knowledge-creation process, form the basis of organizational
knowledge creation. Knowledge assets are defined as firm specific
resources that are indispensable to the creation of the values of the
firm (Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001, 501; Nonaka, Toyama & Konno
2000) divided into classes following the stages of the SECI model.
According to Nonaka an effective system and set of tools with
which to evaluate and manage knowledge assets does not exist yet.
Because of the tacit nature of knowledge, the current accounting
system cannot adequately capture the value of knowledge assets.
Another difficulty in measuring knowledge assets is that they are
dynamic. Paradoxically there seems to be a need to build a system for
evaluating and managing the knowledge assets of a firm more
effectively, but on the other hand a taken snapshot of the knowledge
assets at one point in time is never enough to evaluate and manage
the knowledge assets properly (Nonaka, Toyama & Konno 2000;
Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere 2001). Therefore, a crucial question
emerges: how does one measure an unmeasurable entity or to what
extent is it a worthless act due to the fundamental unmeasurableness?
Again the main point is not whether we classify knowledge assets
into separate categories but how we overcome the unmeasurableness
and firm specificness of the knowledge assets. To overcome the firm
specificness of the knowledge assets we must be reminded that
knowledge can be seen as a reality viewed from a certain angle (Nonaka
& Toyama 2003; Takeuchi & Nonaka eds. 2004). In a dialectical spiral,
personal and cultural beliefs need to be synthesized to form a proper
description of the reality. To do so one cannot neglect either individual
or cultural knowledge (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen
2004), and also for knowledge-creating synthesizing processes both
angles are needed. Especially the concepts of conceptual and systemic
knowledge assets allow us to see how private and cultural knowledge
need to be systematized and combined together97.
The concept of conceptual artifacts proposed by Carl Bereiter (2002)
seems to be an appropriate candidate when deepening our
understanding of cultural knowledge. By his concept of conceptual
artifacts Bereiter means that these things have an objective, out-in-
97 As already mentioned in chapter 2, the present tension between science and the immediate
experience of individuals needs to be overcome. One way to do so becomes possible in the
systematization process.
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the-world existence, but they are not physical objects. Conceptual
refers to discussible ideas, ranging from theories, designs, and concepts
down to plans. Artifact conveys that these are human creations that
are created for some particular purpose.
4.4. Principles of the cultural-historical
activity theory: critical evaluation
While focusing on the field of educational research and knowledge
management, an obvious need to conceptualize a social system has
been noticed. An appropriate unit of analysis needs to be chosen and
its roots have to be understood. In order to explain man’s nature and
characterize the uniquely human aspects of behaviour we have to
concern the fundamental question of: What is the relation between
human beings and their environment, both physical and social? On
the other hand we have to answer the question: Could we reduce this
analysis to the level of an individual human being or not? If not, on
what level should the analysis be done?
One both theoretically ambitious and practically relevant alternative
is the cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT)98. CHAT was initiated
by Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934) in the 1920s and early 1930s (e.g.
Vygotsky, 1978, 1986). It was further developed by Vygotsky’s
colleague and disciple Alexei Leont’ev (1904-1979; 1978, 1981). It can
be seen that the activity theory has evolved through five
generations99. The first generation centered around Lev Vygotsky and
the unit of analysis remained individually focused. This was overcome
by the second generation, with Leont’ev as the main researcher.
Leont’ev analyzed the activity at three levels but he never graphically
expanded Vygotsky’s original model into a model of a collective activity
system.
A modeling especially for practical purposes was done by Yrjö
Engeström (1987, 73–82), and it is depicted in figure 4.4 as a
representative of the third generation of CHAT:
98 A weak link between the theories of Nonaka and Vygotsky should be recognized in Nonaka,
Toyama and Konno (2000, 8) and Takeuchi with Nonaka (eds. 2004, 94). Nonaka’s theories are
also also linked to the cognitive trail of CHAT by the criticism of the interpretations of Lave and
Wenger (cf. the confrontation between ba and the communities of practice).
99 Engeström (2001a) explains how the activity theory has evolved through three generations
of research. Despite of this the five generation scheme allows us to see how the unit of analysis
has expanded and how the theory has got its present shape. In a way the studies of Jean Lave
and Etienne Wenger (1991; Wenger 1998) offer an antithesis to the activity theory and by
including them to the scheme a fruitful synthesis will emerge.
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Figure 4.4 Engeström’s activity system model
Source: Engeström 1987, 78.
The structure of the activity system developed by Yrjö Engeström
is the social system of this research. The system allows us to keep the
holistic nature of the phenomena in question in our sight while looking
into its features. Simultaneously it helps us not to drown into the
forthcoming “sea of information” and enables us to make sense of
our social reality.
After several case-studies (e.g. Engeström, Engeström & Kärkkäinen
1995; Engeström, Engeström & Vähäaho 1999; Engeström 1999c; Tuomi-
Gröhn & Engeström eds. 2003) it came obvious that the proper unit of
analysis was not a single activity system but two, or even more,
interacting activity systems, and so the fourth generation started to
emerge. The fourth generation of CHAT tried to answer the question
of how the boundaries between activity systems could be crossed
effectively, because acting according to the “transmission metaphor”
this object could not be obtained. Also knowledge creation theories
seem to be in a need of similar tools and it is obvious that both research
programmes share several interests when trying to understand
organizational learning and knowledge-creation better (cf. e.g.
Paavola, Lipponen & Hakkarainen 2002; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola
& Lehtinen 2004).
INSTRUMENT
SUBJECT OBJECT
COMMUNITYRULES
DIVISION OF 
LABOR
OUTCOME
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The research made by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991; Wenger
1998) is included in the scheme as a representative of the fifth
generation of CHAT. As explained, CHAT has evolved by synthesizing
the original individualistic tendency of Vygotsky by the social tendency
of Leont’ev. In a way the concept of communities of practice developed
by Lave and Wenger offers a balancing stick for us wavering between
individual and social structures; in other words it guides us how to
live in the middle (Wertsch 1998).
In its current shape, the activity theory may be summarized with
the help of five principles (Engeström 2001a; for earlier summaries,
see Engeström 1993; Engeström, Miettinen & Punamäki eds. 1999) that
are useful as a point of departure for this analysis. First, the prime
unit of analysis is a collective, artifact-mediated (both material tools
and signs (psychological tools)) and object-oriented activity system
with its network relations to other activity systems. It is assumed that
human behaviour is understandable only when interpreted against
the background of the entire activity system.
Secondly, an activity system is always a community of multiple points
of view, traditions and interests. The multivoicedness is multiplied in
networks of interacting activity systems, causing troubles and
demanding actions of translations and operations, but on the other
hand being a source of innovations.
Thirdly, activity systems take shape and get transformed over
lengthy periods of time and their problems and potentials can only be
understood against their own local history. Fourthly, contradictions
are the central sources of change and development. Contradictions
are not the same as problems or conflicts but historically accumulating
structural tensions within and between activity systems. Fifthly, in
activity systems there are hidden potentials for expansive
transformations.
4.4.1. The main principles of Vygotsky
When trying to understand how and why the main principles of
CHAT have evolved we have to start our analysis from the research of
Lev Vygotsky. Lev Semenovich Vygotsky was known as a “Mozart of
psychology” but it is essential to recognize that he was not only a
psychologist but more or less a social scientists whose approach had
an interdisciplinary flavor. Also it is a necessity to notice that in the
former USSR the basic philosophy of Soviet psychology was based on
Marxism-Leninism and undoubtedly also Vygotsky was influenced by
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these ideas100. At the same time he was well aware of Western
philosophical traditions and was influenced by these. So in order to
critically evaluate the theories of Vygotsky and his followers we have
to keep this in mind. As a balancing factor it is useful to remember,
however, that Vygotsky’s and his followers’ research was and is oriented
to developing concrete ways for dealing with practical problems
(Wertsch 1985, 1991; Cole & Scribner in Vygotsky 1978; Kozulin in
Vygotsky 1986) and so these theories are not just abstract theories
without any concrete proof.
The three themes that form the core of Vygotsky’s theoretical
framework are:
– A reliance on genetic, or developmental analysis.
– The claim that higher mental functioning in the individual is derived
from social life.
– The claim that human action, on both the social and individual
planes, is mediated by tools and signs. (Wertsch 1985, 1991)
Genetic analysis in Vygotsky’s approach is motivated by the
assumption that it is possible to understand many aspects of mental
functioning only if one understands their origins and the transitions
they have undergone,
We need to concentrate not on the product of development but
on the very process by which higher forms are established…it is
only in movement that a body shows what it is. (Vygotsky 1978,
64–65)
According to Vygotsky, ontogenesis can be understood only as a
part of a larger, integrated picture involving several genetic domains
(phylogenesis, sociocultural and ontogenesis, and microgenesis;
Wertsch 1985, 54-57) and that the behaviour of acculturated humans
is the product of all three lines101 of development (Vygotsky quoted
in Wertsch 1985, 27)
100 In his foreword to Vygotsky’s Thought and Language (1986) Alex Kozulin quotes Vygotsky’s
explanation of the issue: “Immediate application of the theory of dialectical materialism to
the problems of science, and particularly to biology and psychology, is impossible, as it is
impossible to apply it instantly to history and sociology”. Vygotsky also strongly opposed the
method of casually picking and choosing quotations from the classics of Marxism. In words of
Rene van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner (1994, 3) Vygotsky was both a Marxist (honouring some
of Marx’s and Engels’ productive ideas) and non-Marxist (citing formalist poets and not
bothering to take his contemporary Marxists seriously); he was part of the construction of
“new society” but at the same time did not embrace the proletarian revolutionary ferment. Cf.
also Vygotsky’s “The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology: A Methodological
Investigation” in Rieber & Wollock eds. (1997).
101 Wertsch (1985) explains how occasionally the fourth genetic domain, “microgenesis”, played
a role in Vygotsky’s analysis.
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A fundamental feature of Vygotsky’s genetic analysis is that he did
not assume that one could account for all phases of development by
using a single set of explanatory principles. At certain points in the
emergence of a psychological process, new forces of development and
new explanatory principles enter the picture. (Wertsch 1985, 19-20)
According to Scribner (1985), Vygotsky’s work may be read as an
attempt to weave three strands of history – general history
(phylogenetical level), child history/life history (ontogenetic level), and
the history of mental functions (social level) – into one explanatory
account of the formation of specifically human aspects of human
nature. Scribner has proposed an extension to Vygotsky’s framework
by a “fourth level” of history – the history of individual societies. This
extension allows us to anchor our studies in the present of the society
or activity system in question. It seems that the development and
future of man is hidden in his history and this view leaves no room for
the influencing actions of individual human beings. Undoubtedly we
can wonder to what extent individuals actually make history and by
what kinds of means it is done (cf. e.g. Spinosa et al. 1997).
The dominant tendencies in psychology at the times of Vygotsky
and still later on were biological reductionism and mechanistic
behaviourism. According to Vygotsky, biological principles cannot
explain psychological phenomena beyond a certain level (Wertsch 1985,
20, 42).
The second form of reductionism that Vygotsky was striving to avoid
might be termed “cultural reductionism”, because it rests on the
premise that human psychological processes can be explained solely
on the basis of the mastery and internalization of symbolic means or
sociocultural practices. Such accounts often ignore biological forces
and other constraints involved in ontogenesis (Wertsch 1985, 43). On
the other hand, psychology has to have a solid biological foundation
(Vygotsky 1978, 1986) also in the present and future.
When dealing with the social origins of higher mental processes,
Vygotsky was mainly concerned with interpsychological functioning,
as reflected in his formulation of the “general genetic law of cultural
development”,
Any function in the child’s cultural development appears twice, or
on two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then on the
psychological plane. First it appears between people as an
interpsychological category, and then within the child as an
intrapsychological category. This is equally true with regard to
voluntary attention, logical memory, the formation of concepts,
and the development of volition. We may consider this position as
a law in the full sense of the word, but it goes without saying that
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internalization (italics added) transforms the process itself and
changes its structure and functions. Social relations or relations
among people genetically underlie all higher functions and their
relationships. (Wertsch 1981, 163 quoting Vygotsky; cf. Wertsch
1985, 60–61)
On the basis of Vygotsky’s claim about the close relationship
between inter- and intrapsychological forms of higher mental
functioning, it might be tempting to assume that he was proposing a
“transfer model of internalization”, whereby the properties of social
processes are simply transferred from the external, interpsychological
plane to the internal, intrapsychological plane. This kind of conclusion
can be avoided when taking a closer look at his statement of how
internalization actually transforms the process itself and changes its
structure and functions and their relationships. It seems to be
reasonable to modify the traditional view about the relationship
between individual and societal structures where the mechanism of
individual change is rooted in society and culture – it is, but only partly.
On the other hand societal change is deeply rooted in the choices of
individuals and the key question is how to balance these views together
(cf. Wertsch 1998; cf. also Giddens 1984).
But how should internalization be interpreted then? Internalization
seems to assume a “sender” unidirectionally sending something to be
internalized by the “receiver”. The metaphor of internalization seems
to be too strong in that it implies something that often does not
happen in social reality. Hence, unidirectionality shifts to
multidirectionality and to interaction or even to resonation. Instead
of internalizing, the metaphor of “appropriation”102 has been offered
by James Wertsch (1998, 53). But how then should the internalization
emphasized by Nonaka be appropriated or internalized by us and
should the SECI model be actually a SECA model?
The Vygotskyan man seems to be more a master than a mario-
nette103. In the middle of collisions between phylogenetic and
ontogenetic features he can learn to master his surroundings and also
himself. Prior to mastering his own behaviour, the child begins to
102 By appropriation Wertsch means “the process of taking something that belongs to others
and making it one’s own” (Wertsch 1998). Cf. Spinosa et al. 1997, 4 about the cross-appropriation
and Giddens’ reflexive appropriation (1990b, 304–305). This issue will be discussed in chapter
8 when focusing on the essence of social change from the Giddensian angle.
103 Criticism against CHAT often states that although it is masterful in the social domain it does
not do well at the level of the individual person (i.e. agents) (Minnis & John-Steiner 2001, 309;
Davydov in Engeström, Miettinen & Punamäki eds. 1999; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola &
Lehtinen 2004, 151–153; but on the other hand cf. Hakkarainen et al., 250; for further
information see the comparisons of CHAT and the Latourian actor-network theory (e.g.
Miettinen 1999) and the role played by human and nonhuman actors). It is useful to be aware
of the criticism when continuing the analysis of the key principles of CHAT.
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master his surroundings with the help of tools and speech104 - by
mediational means (Wertsch 1998, 38–42). The function of the tools is
to serve as the conductor of human influence on the object of activity;
it is externally oriented; it must lead to changes in the objects. The
sign, on the other hand, is a means of internal activity aimed at
mastering oneself; the sign is internally oriented (Vygotsky 1978). In
this process even children acquire the capacity to be both the subjects
and objects of their own behaviour.
According to James Wertsch, most discussions on Vygotskyan
mediation view it in terms of how it empowers or enables action.
However, such a partial interpretation of our reality overlooks an
equally inherent, although countervailing characteristic of mediational
means – namely, that they constrain or limit the forms of action we
undertake (Wertsch 1998; Gibson 1979). On the other hand, how we
observe and see our reality is caused by our chosen terminology
(Wertsch 1998, 40 quoting Burke 1966) and affects under what kind
of conditions we believe to be acting.
But how then do these conceptual systems emerge in the first place?
It seems to be reasonable to agree with Wertsch (1991, 47) that a
comparison of Chapters 5 and 6 in Thinking and Speech (Vygotsky
1986) reveals the shift in Vygotsky’s thinking about the emergence of
conceptual means. In chapter 5, written in the early 1930s, concept
development is treated primarily in terms of individual psychology
(conceptual development from “unorganized heaps” to “complexes
(including “pseudoconcepts”) and to “genuine concepts”). Later in
chapter 6, written in 1934, his perspective has shifted to focus on how
concepts emerge in institutionally situated activity.
In institutionally situated activity, like schooling, spontaneous and
scientific concepts develop at the same time – spontaneous concepts
proceed from concrete to the abstract and abstract scientific concepts
to the concrete level. In this process scientific concepts grow downward
through spontaneous concepts and vice versa in the process of
interacting105 conceptual systems. The very notion of a scientific
104 In other words the elementary functions are totally and directly determined by stimulation
from the environment (a formula of orthodox behaviorism (Watson-Skinner) S-> R) but for
higher mental functions the stimulations are self-generated. Self-generation means that an
individual must be actively engaged in establishing a link between the stimulus and response.
The needed intermediate link is a second order stimulus (sign) drawn into the operation as a
mediational means. The situation of the individual is “far-from-static” due to the fact that he
is simultaneously both directly and indirectly interacting with the reality and while doing so
constantly synthesizing these sources. (cf. Cole & Engeström 1993, 6-7)
105 Vygotsky believed (1986, 157; cf. Engeström 1999a, 398-399; Hakkarainen et al., 269) that
the two processes – the development of spontaneous and nonspontaneous (e.g. scientific
concepts) concepts – are related and constantly influence each other. Based on this line of
thinking Engeström (2000c, 2001a) has constructed a complementary perspective, namely
that of horizontal or sideways development of concepts. Cf. Tuomi (1999, 142-148) for additional
interpretation of Vygotskyan angle to the development of concepts (i.e. the development of
conceptual thinking).
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concept implies a certain position in relation to other concepts, i.e., a
place within a system of concepts. (Vygotsky 1986, 172, 192–194, 197)
During this developmental process the child (the learner) does not
just receive readymade scientific concepts for future purposes, but
when the system of scientific concepts is evolving, the way in which
reality is generalized and reflected in everyday situations changes at
the same time. (Vygotsky 1986, 212–213, 217)
What did Vygotsky mean by this development level? Wertsch (1985)
has argued Vygotsky’s position so that development cannot be reduced
to learning by instruction, although it seems to be most compatible
with his comments about the emergence of intrapsychological from
interpsychological functioning. In principle he understood that learning
and development are interrelated (Vygotsky 1978) and that instruction
must be oriented toward the future, not to the past (Vygotsky 1986;
Engeström 1987); not toward the actual but toward the potential level
of competence106.
There can be little doubt that, at least in the English-speaking world
(and also globally; by the researcher’s personal experiences), it is the
zone of proximal development that has been Vygotsky’s most
important legacy to education (Bransford, Brown & Cocking eds. 2000,
80; Wells 1999, 313). It has widely inspired educational researchers inside
the cultural-historical tradition (e.g. Engeström 1987; Tuomi-Gröhn &
Engeström eds. 2003; Wertsch 1985; Lave & Wenger 1991; Wenger
1998) but outside it as well (cf. reciprocal teaching by Palincsar & Brown
1984; Brown & Palincsar 1989; Brown & Campione 1996; progressive
problem solving by Bereiter & Scardamalia 1993; Bereiter 2002 and
progressive inquiry by Hakkarainen et al. 2004).
Vygotsky’s general claim about the social origins of higher mental
functioning in the individual surfaces most clearly in connection with
the zone of proximal development. Vygotsky defined it as the “distance
between the actual developmental level as determined by independent
problem solving and the level of potential development as determined
through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with
more capable peers” (Vygotsky  1978, 86).
The main question to be answered, based on Vygotsky’s line of
thinking, is not “how the child (or an adult) came to be what he is”.
The main question is “what he not yet is” (Wertsch 1985) and how we
could consciously enable this transition from present actual to future
106 Sutter (2002) makes a distinction between “learning the given new” (orientation to the
past) and “learning the societal new” (orientation to the future). Hence, learning as an activity
has to been seen as oriented at two directions (cf. also Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola &
Lehtinen, 2004).
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potentials to happen? But even more intriguingly we have to ask: “Who
are those “more capable peers” in our global society?107
Vygotsky’s sentence “it is only in movement that a body shows what
it is” (Vygotsky 1978) describes well also the development of his
concept of zone of proximal development. Unfortunately Vygotsky
did not live long enough to work out what his concept would really
mean to educational practice and what his theory really is. His early
death may be the cause of his failure to deal with broader sociocultural
issues and avoid the dangers of individualistic psychological
reductionism so often characterizing contemporary psychology
(Wertsch 1985, 1991).
Extending the concept of zone of proximal development has
received vastly differing interpretations, varying along the dimension
of individual reductionism (e.g. scaffolding, Lave & Wenger 1991; cf.
Brown & Palincsar 1989, 411; reciprocal teaching, Palincsar & Brown
1984; progressive problem solving, Bereiter & Scardamalia 1993;
Bereiter 2002) and of its socioculturally extended versions108.
In an individualistic direction the main issue seems to be the
reciprocal relationship between a teacher and a student where the
student internalizes the aid or scaffolding to be used in later situations
(cf. Brown & Palincsar 1989; Lave & Wenger 1991). It is highly
questionable what could be actually internalized or whether we have
to shift our view about consciousness (distributed or non-distributed?)
and its environment (in a “vacuum” or contextually embedded?).
Should we then abandon these “individualistic” examinations? No,
because also these theories are under continuous development
(movement) and it is useful to scrutinize what they really are. The
ongoing activity can be seen either from the perspective of the
individual participants acting with mediational means, or from that
of the social practices in which they and the mediational means are
involded (Wertsch, Rio & Alvarez 1995; Wells 1999). Here again the
key seems to be “living in the middle” (Wertsch 1998), and the concept
of zone of proximal development enables us to blend these
perspectives together. In this blending all aspects of the learner have
to be kept in mind.
Vygotsky himself referred to these aspects by emphasizing the
affective and volitional tendency behind thought. Only by analyzing
107 According to Wenger (1998, 162) identity in practice is always an interplay between the
local and the global.
108 Engeström (1987, 174) proposes an extension of the concept of the zone of proximal
development as the distance between the present everyday actions of the individuals and the
historically new form of the societal activity that can be collectively generated as a solution to
the double bind potentially embedded in everyday actions.
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these aspects can we find the answer to the final “why” in the analysis
of thinking (Vygotsky 1986). Behind every thought there is an affective-
volitional tendency, which holds the answer to the last “why” in the
analysis of thinking (Vygotsky 1986, 252). Mahn and John-Steiner (2002)
remind us of this largely unknown aspect, but nevertheless a central
one, of Vygotsky’s research. According to them this emotional aspect
includes the gift of confidence, the sharing of risks in the presentation
of new ideas, constructive criticism and the creation of a safety zone
(Mahn & John-Steiner 2002; Wells 1999). When a breach in this
complementarity occurs because the cognitive demands are too far
beyond the learner’s ability, or because negative affective factors such
as fear or anxiety are present, the zone in which effective teaching/
learning occurs is diminished (Mahn & John-Steiner 2002, 49).
The concept of zone of proximal development applies potentially
to all participants, and not simply to the less skilful or knowledgeable
(i.e. not only to a child but potentially to a teacher). Because learning
is a life-long process for us all, it could be assisted by others, including
those who are younger, less mature or novices (Wells 1999; Tuomi-
Gröhn & Engeström eds. 2003; Hakkarainen et al. 2004; Lave & Wenger
1991; Wenger 1998).
The zone of proximal development is created in the interaction
between participants as they engage in a particular activity together.
The interaction is not limited to human participants who are physically
present in the situation. The contributions of “absent” participants
are recalled from memory or encountered in artefacts functioning as
more capable peers in the zone of proximal development. Interestingly,
development does not seem to have any predetermined end; although
it is characterized by the increasing complexity of organization, this
does not, in itself, constitute progress. What is considered to be
progress depends on the dominant values109 in particular times (Wells
1999, 333).
The zone in question implies that firstly the level of actual, secondly
the level of potentials, and thirdly collectively generated solutions to
the experienced contradictive situation have to be kept in mind. To
organizations this means overcoming three “impossibilities” –
uncovering the actual (not just espoused but those in use or authentic
ones), widening the scope of possible solutions in an organizational
context, handling the organizational constrains as effectively as
possible, and probing into the potentials of the future. Interestingly,
rather often someone’s actual is someone else’s potential and the main
109 We have different kinds of values ranging from espoused values, to authentic values and
even to relatively stable “global values” or hypernorms (cf. chapter 2).
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question seems to be whether progressive inquiries are allowed and
made possible for the organization in question.
4.4.2. Man as a social being: Leont’evian and
Engeströmian expansions
Another angle to understanding how man does not act in a vacuum
but is social in his origins and fully “embedded” in his environment
starts to emerge with the assistance of Alexei Leont’ev. Before entering
into his analysis, an example presented by Gregory Bateson, often
used on the field of CHAT, needs to be introduced:
Suppose I am a blind man, and I use a stick. I go tap, tap, tap. Where
do I start? Is my mental system bounded at the hand of the stick? Is
it bounded by my skin? Does it start halfway up the stick? Does it
start at the tip of the stick? (Bateson 1972, 459; cf. Cole & Engeström
1993; Cole 1995; Wertsch 1991; Ingold 2000)110
Michael Cole (1995, 110) elaborates Bateson’s idea by arguing that
one seems to be committed to include in one’s analysis not only the
man and his stick but also his purposes and the environment in which
he finds himself. When the man sits down to eat his lunch, the stick’s
relation to the mind has totally changed, and it is forks and knives
that become relevant. The relevant order of context for analysis will
depend crucially on the tools through which one interacts with the
world, and these in turn depend upon one’s goals and other local
cultural constraints and enablers of action.
In his famous example of “primeval collective hunt” Alexei Leont’ev
explicated the crucial difference between an individual action and a
collective activity as follows:
When a member of a group performs his labour activity he also
does it to satisfy one of his needs. A beater, for example, taking
part in a primeval collective hunt, was stimulated by a need for
food or, perhaps, a need for clothing, which the skin of the dead
animal would meet for him. At what, however, was his activity
directly aimed? It may have been directed, for example, at
frightening a herd of animals and sending them toward other
hunters, hiding in ambush. That, properly speaking, is what should
110 According to Hubert Dreyfus (1972: 1999) Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Michael Polanyi
have each devoted a great deal of thought to this very same question. Dreyfus quotes Polanyi
(1958) as follows: “While we rely on a tool or a probe, these are not handled as external
objects.. they remain on our side.. forming part of ourselves, the operating persons. We pour
ourselves out into them and assimilate them as parts of our existence. We accept them
existentially by dwelling in them.”
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be the result of the activity of this man. And the activity of this
individual member of the hunt ends with that. The rest is completed
by the other members. What the processes of his activity were
directed to (the object; added by the researcher) did not,
consequently, coincide with what stimulated them, i.e. did not
coincide with the motive of his activity; the two were divided from
one another in this instance. Processes, the object and motive of
which do not coincide with one another, we shall call “actions”.
We can say, for example, that the beater’s activity is the hunt, and
the frightening of game his action.” (Leont’ev 1981, 210; cf.
Engeström 1987)
The key to understanding activity systems is their object-
orientedness as described by Leont’ev,
The main thing that distinguishes one activity from another is the
difference of their objects. It is exactly the object of an activity
that gives it a determined direction. According to the terminology
I have proposed, the object of an activity is its true motive. It is
understood that the motive may be either material or ideal, either
present in perception or existing only in imagination or in thought.
(1978, 62; italics added)
So the object is both something given (a thing out there) and
something projected or anticipated. This very duality of the meaning
of the term indicates that the concept of object carries in it the
processual, temporal, and historical nature of all objects. Objects are
objects by virtue of being constructed in time by human subjects
(Engeström 1990, 107; Miettinen 1998b, 424). Object construction could
be seen as a complex and continuous process where initially
unreflected, situationally given “raw material” is collectively construed
as meaningful and shared by the participants of the activity system
(Engeström 2001a, 136). In this sense, the object determines the horizon
of possible goals and actions. But it is truly a horizon: as soon as an
intermediate goal is reached, the object escapes and must be
reconstructed by means of new intermediate goals and actions
(Engestöm 1999c, 65).
 Because the object directs the activity system, the transformation
of the object has fundamental consequences for the whole system.
Hence, not always does the object work unconsciously “behind their
backs” of for example Leont’ev’s ancient hunters (Sutter 2002, 28); on
the contrary it is a moving target and also consciously under
transformation “in front of our eyes”.
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Activity is analyzed at three levels because activities are
distinguished on the basis of their motives and the object toward which
they are oriented; actions, on the basis of their goals; and operations,
on the basis of the conditions under which they are carried out
(Wertsch 1981, 1985; Leont’ev 1978; Engeström 1987). The object of
an activity is its true motive, and under the conditions of division of
labour the individual can participate in activities without being fully
conscious of their objects and motives. The total activity seems to
control the individual, instead of the individual controlling the activity.
The opposite is also possible because actions may develop into an
activity:
These are the ordinary cases when a person undertakes to perform
some actions under the influence of a certain motive, and then
performs them for their own sake because the motive seems to
been displaced to their objective. And that means that the actions
are transformed into activity. (Leont’ev 1981, 238)
The transformation does not happen automatically or unconsciously
but needs an act of reflecting and a special activity for these purposes
– a learning activity (Engeström 1987, 68).
According to Leont’ev (1981) it is obvious that the beater’s action
at a hunt is possible only on condition of his reflecting the link between
the expected result of the action performed by him and the end result
of the hunt as a whole. Actually the relation that connects the
individual’s expected results with the outcome of the collective activity
needs to be subjectively reflected. If then the object directs the activity
system, what kind of role does the transformed outcome play? It could
be said that the activity system is partly guided by the outcome; for
example if hunting becomes prohibited and deer must be preserved.
If then a demanding object makes the members of the tribe to
divide the labor (Engeström 1999d), could it be possible that depending
on the intended outcome various kinds of expertise and experts are
needed? Depending for example whether one is hunting or preserving
the deer? As Berthel Sutter (2002, 258) puts the Leont’evian idea:
“There is no activity without an object, and there is no object without
activity.”  But although there could be activities without the outcome
being in the minds of individual participants, the outcome could be
an intended one eagerly striven for and in a way guiding individual
participants. Consequently, the correct formula seems to be: activity/
object-> outcome (cf. Sutter 2002, 248; cf. also Engeström 1996).
At this phase CHAT seems to need a tool or a theoretical framework
within which social institutional, interpsychological and
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intrapsychological levels of analysis can be linked, but not reduced to
one another, so that questions about the relationship between activity
settings and the individual can be answered. By this tool the subjects
who are participating in the activity system in question could identify
the “hidden forces” influencing their performance (cf. Wertsch 1985,
215-216)111. To meet these kinds of individual needs exactly, Yrjö
Engeström has developed such an activity system (1987), shown in
figure 4.4.
Among the researchers of CHAT the contradictions are seen to have
a central role as a source for learning and development. Yrjö Engeström
(1987, 87-89) has conceptualised them as follows. The primary
contradiction of activities lives as the inner contradiction between
exchange value and use value within each corner of the triangle of
activity. The secondary contradictions are those appearing between
the corners. The tertiary contradictions come into being between
culturally more advanced and less advanced forms. The quaternary
contradictions require that we take into consideration the essential
neighbor activities and their elements.
Leont’ev has given a clarifying example of this primary contradiction
as follows:
The doctor who buys a practice in some little provincial place may
be very seriously trying to reduce his fellow citizens’ suffering from
illness (use value), and may see his calling in just that. He must,
however, want the number of the sick to increase (exchange value),
because his life and practical opportunity to follow his calling
depend on that. (Leont’ev 1981, 255; cf. Engeström 1987, 85-86;
2000b)
The activity system as a context of actions of individuals does not
determine these actions, but much depends on the properties of the
agents. In a way the agents can actively participate in the process of
making their future (Engeström 1987; Wertsch 1991, 1998) and they
should not be overemphasizing the exchange value. People have to
decide where they want to go, which way is up; or which way is the
ethically sound decision on the societal or even on the global level?
But to what extent can individuals actually initiate and control
current local and global changes? To what extent are they controlled
by the outer socio-economic structures? It may be true that many of
the current changes are manifestations of activities from below and
111 Interestingly, Wertsch does not personally synthesize the needed unit of analysis, focusing
instead on the mediated action in their contexts (Wertsch 1985, 1991, 1998).
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not just outcomes of traditional maneuvering among the elite of
political decision-makers (Engeström 1999b; cf. e.g. Spinosa et al. 1997;
Engeström, 2004a) – but many seem not. On the other hand these
changes are often unexpected or at least very sudden and rapidly
escalating. Occasionally they seem to be individually and collectively
planned and expected at least to some extent, but how about then in
the case of the FNDC?
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Chapter Five
THE DEVELOPMENT
LABORATORY METHOD AT
THE FNDC
5.1. The idea of the use of the Change
Laboratory method at the FDF
Since 2000 the researcher has served at the FNDC, first as a planning
officer112 in the headquarters and since September 2004 in the
Department of Education. The researcher has been involved in two
planning processes aiming at developing Finnish officer education (the
first one in 2000–2001 and the second one from 2003 onwards) and
lately more precisely in the development of on-the-job training
(education) of military teachers113. During the years the researcher
has established wide personal relationships inside the FNDC and FDF.
These formal and informal networks have allowed the researcher to
gain a relatively deep understanding and personal experience of the
case to be studied (i.e. the FNDC). At the same time the researcher has
learned to be an “insider” at the FNDC, being in a way a participatory
observer and later a developmental-interventionist (Engeström 2000a,
2000b; Virkkunen 2004; Miettinen 2004).
Already in 2000 the researcher got an idea that the Change
Laboratory® method could be applicable also in military organizations.
The idea was to apply the method to a chosen brigade and its
Management Group. But thinking retrospectively, the idea popped
up too early and the researcher needed some time to prepare himself
for the demanding use of the method.
In 2001–2002 the researcher participated in a Blended Learning
Course arranged at the FNDC, producing a development plan for a
new kind of course – a Military Teacher Education Course114. The first
Military Teacher Education Course was arranged in 2003. At the same
112 At that time the researcher was also a part-time teacher at the FNDC.
113 In April 2004 the Administrative Director of the FNDC gave an order (R2061/5.1/D/III/20.4.2004)
about planning groups for the Bologna process. Officially the group in question was called
“opetuksen laatu” or “the quality of teaching”. In the course of time the focus of the group
shifted from “quality” to the development of the teachers.
114 During the process the researcher made also a draft for a Teacher’s Self-Evaluation Sheet,
which is presented in the analysis of the Development Laboratory meetings (i.e. in chapter 6).
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time the researcher participated in a group giving guidelines for
“good” teaching at the FNDC, service schools and service branch
schools under the supervision of the FNDC. Also some pedagogical
seminars for the development of teaching were arranged, but despite
of these efforts it was felt that something more fundamental and
transformational was needed.
5.2. Developing the idea of possible
Change Laboratory meetings
In 2002–2003 the researcher studied in Japan at the Japan Advanced
Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST). The period gave the
researcher excellent possibilities to study the appropriate theories, to
get tacit knowledge from all kinds of scientists and social scientists
and to get an “outsider” perspective to the FDF and the FNDC.
Consequently, the researcher learned how to “switch” between the
perspectives of the “insider” and “outsider” at the FDF.
During the summer after returning back to the FNDC the researcher
made a memorandum for the Administrative Director of the FNDC
about the Bologna-process115. The memorandum contained a proposal
to arrange ten Change Laboratory meetings, but obviously the timing
was not right and it was too early to arrange such meetings. The
“window of opportunity” was not open and different kinds of interests
remained to be identified and notified.
On the other hand, in 2003–2004 the researcher supervised a
research done at the Senior Staff Officer Course. The title of the
research was: “The activity system of the military unit and its inner
contradictions – basis for further studies”116. The supervision process
allowed the researcher to deepen his understanding of the theories
of the cultural-historical activity theory. In September 2003 the
researcher wrote an article to the Defensor patriae (the official journal
of the FNDC), explaining in Finnish the basics of the activity system
idea. No further inquiries or discussions emerged and the “window”
remained closed. Paradoxically, in autumn of 2004 the Change
Laboratory education was included in the instruction of Cadet Courses.
During the year 2004 the winds changed and the “window” started
to open slowly, partly because of deliberate efforts of the researcher.
In January the researcher arranged for the Management Group of
115 The memorandum was dated 7th July 2003.
116 During the years another activity theoretical research has been done at the FNDC (by major
Mikko Lappalainen (1999; an unpublished Master’s Thesis of the General Staff Officers’ Course)).
See also Fransson (2001); Johnsson (2001), from the Swedish Armed Forces.
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the FNDC an opportunity to anonymously give feedback with the
Response®-system and consequently influence how the research will
proceed. Since then the researcher has been aware of wide informal
and formal expectations shared by the Management Group of the
research-based development of the FNDC.
In 2004 the researcher gave several presentations and made minor
interventions117 about current pedagogical issues in the Bologna
planning process of the FNDC. During this period also the planners
participating in the Bologna process were invited to discuss and plan
in the FDF Training Portal, and therefore an additional source of data
seemed to be available118.
In April 2004 the Administrative Director of the FNDC gave an
order119 about planning groups for the Bologna process. The researcher
belonged to the group of teaching development. The group arranged
two formal meetings and the researcher was nominated as the formal
leader by the official leader of the planning group. In October the
group submitted a memorandum, again containing the idea of Change
Laboratory meetings. On 2nd November 2004 the Commandant of the
FNDC gave the researcher an official permission to arrange about ten
Change Laboratory meetings120 and thematic interviews. The
commandant also decided that the researcher is officially the leader
of the group of teaching development.
In the period from November 2004 to February 2005 five
development meetings were arranged at the FNDC with
representatives of the departments of the FNDC. The research data
consists of five videotaped two-hour laboratory meetings. All
departments were represented only at the first meeting and the
participants kept changing. After each meeting the researcher made
a memorandum that was sent to all participants, to those invited and
to the Administrative Director, to the Chiefs of the Degree Divisions
and to the Chiefs of the Departments. All the videotaped data was
transcribed from June to July 2005 by a research assistant. The
researcher checked the transcription especially in major turning
117 The presentations (interventions) in a chronological order are: 24th February “Comparing
Science and Normal Work”; 24th May “About the Development of Teaching”; 26th May “The
Basics of the Core Curriculum Analysis”; 18th August “The Development of the College as a
Research Object”. 18th October the researcher invited an officer from the Finnish Air Forces to
talk about the experiences gained from “The Military Educational Innovation”.
118 The gained experiences will be reflected on in chapter 7.
119 Planning groups for the Bologna process.
120 The idea is to arrange “on the shop floor” a room or space in which there is a rich set of
instruments for analyzing disturbances and for constructing new models for the work practice
(Engeström, Virkkunen, Helle, Pihlaja & Poikela 1996, 291; cf. Virkkunen, Engeström, Pihlaja &
Helle, 2001; cf. in a school context Engeström, Engeström & Suntio 2002). See the following
chapter 6 for the idea of “change laboratory meetings” turning to “development laboratory
meetings”.
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points121 identified already during and right after the meetings. During
the transcription process no new turning points were identified. The
transcription conventions are listed in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Transcription conventions
After two Development Laboratory meetings, in December 2004,
the researcher gave a presentation of these issues at the Joint Services
Command and Staff College in the United Kingdom. The title was:
“Military Education in the Age of the Bologna Process”122. The intent
was and is to produce social scientific knowledge to be used while
developing European military educational systems.
After five Development Laboratory meetings the researcher
decided that also other sources of data were needed. In order to get
familiar with the interests and “angles” of the managers of the FNDC
the researcher decided to conduct thematic interviews with the senior
officers and professors of the FNDC.
Semi-structured thematic interviews were conducted with the
chosen senior officers and professors of the FNDC123. The thematic
interviews, each lasting between one and a half to three hours, were
carried out from March through April 2005. The interviews were
structured around the questions presented in appendix 1. During
Convention Meaning 
[word] researcher’s comments added 
word.. or …word turn or sentence remains unfinished or 
turn continues from the same speaker’s 
previous turn (the exact meaning varies 
case by case) 
(//) whole sentences are cut out 
(word) or (-) unclear word 
word word(s) with special emphasis 
## overlapping speech 
121 A turning point stands for new insights and perspectives appearing in the discussion and,
consequently, changing the course of the discussion (Toiviainen 2003, 74; Engeström & Escalante
1996: 2005; Kärkkäinen 1995).
122 An article based on the presentation has been published in the “Science and Weapon”
(2005).
123 The interviews were conducted with the Commandant, the Administrative Director, the
Chiefs of the three Degree Divisions and the six Departments and the Professors (excluding the
professor of Military History due to practical difficulties in finding an appropriate time for the
interview). Therefore, the perspective of the Department of Military History was expressed
solely by the Chief of the Department.
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the interviews some new questions and topics emerged to be discussed.
Field notes were done during the thematic interviews.
The analysis of the gathered data started during the thematic
interviews by writing the emerging concepts down in the margins of
the field notes. The constant comparative method of grounded theory
was used in comparing the data, especially from the same individuals
with themselves at different points in time, comparing different people,
(the official view of the FNDC (the Commandant and the Administrative
Director and the other views) while looking for similarities and
differences, the views of the Degree Divisions and the views of the
different Departments; cf. previously mentioned “angles”) and
comparing an incident in the data to one recalled from experience or
from theoretical research already done124. (cf. Charmaz 2000, 515-519;
Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss & Corbin 1998)
While comparing the data the researcher started to code it. In the
beginning he perused the entire individual interview while typing a
memo of each. Then he focused on each question at a time, writing
another memo. Finally before writing a third memo of the thematic
interviews he counted the themes in the individual answers given to
the questions, checking the unbroken chain between the data and
the conclusions made of them.
The main purpose of the comparison and coding was to get
sensitized to the properties and dimensions in the data. For example
the question about the meaning of learning was asked: “What is the
meaning of “learning”? (Mitä mielestäsi merkitsee “oppiminen”?). The
answers of the respondents contained different kinds of properties
varying dimensionally.
The thematic interviews were a great learning experience also to
the researcher125. During each interview the researcher made several
decisions about the issues to be focused on in order to fill the identified
gaps in the data and holes in the used theories. The researcher went
back to the archives and studied more, trying to understand the present
situation of the FNDC, aiming at helping the college to develop its
teaching and to participate in the theoretical debate in the field of
organizational learning and knowledge management. In the next
chapter the meetings will be analyzed.
124 Cf. chapter 4 how spontaneous and scientific concepts can interact with each other, and as
in this case, can enable the researcher to adapt to the situation while making sense of the social
reality in question.
125 It is unclear how the interviewees experienced the interviews and what kind of influences
were caused by the interviews, but there is no reason to doubt that the interviews had fruitful
consequences at the FNDC. Consequently, we could assume that the double hermeneutic
process at the FNDC has had some intended and unintended consequences remaining to be
identified in the future.
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Chapter Six
DEVELOPMENT
LABORATORY MEETINGS AT
THE FNDC
6.1. Before the first meeting
On the 2nd of November 2004 the researcher got an official
permission from the Commandant of the FNDC to arrange not more
than ten Change Laboratory meetings and some thematic interviews.
The risks of such a project were explicitly discussed with the
Commandant and the Administrative Director of the FNDC. The
researcher promised to take the full responsibility of the overall success
of the meeting process.
A representative from each department of the FNDC had to be
invited to the meetings and so the researcher contacted each Chief of
Department. On the basis of these contacts the researcher received
some illustrative answers from some departments. Excerpts of these
are quoted here in order to get a basic picture of the overall situation
at that time.
Excerpt 6.1 (5th of November)
The Department of .. has not reserved any annual work unit [or
some portion of it] for the research in question and all the teachers
have been allotted their duties for the next year in a detailed
manner. We do not have any resources to participate in this
project... I will personally participate in the first meeting and will
decide how our department will proceed in this project in the future.
Excerpt 6.2 (5th of November)
From our Department, X [a named teacher] will participate in the
meetings at least for a start. Personally [the head teacher of the
department] I do not have time for such meetings because of my
teaching duties and the main Bologna process.
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The main process of the Bologna educational planning was identified
to exclude the present process aiming to develop teaching in the FNDC.
Obviously the fact that the Commandant of the FNDC had allowed
the project, and by doing this had “ordered” to arrange such meetings
with the representatives of each department, seemed to be unclear.
6.2. The first meeting
The first meeting was arranged on the 10th November 2004.
Representatives of all departments were present. For a start the
researcher gave an explanation of the historical roots of the Change
Laboratory meetings. The researcher emphasized that it was an official
project accepted by the Commandant and the intent was to go
“deeper” than already done (cf. chapter 5 of the main attempts to
develop teaching in the FNDC during the present research project).
The researcher told about the meaningful difference between
change and development. According to dictionaries (e.g. Longman
Dictionary of Contemporary English 2001) “change means to become
different” and on the other hand “development is the gradual growth
of something, so that it becomes bigger or more advanced”. Hence,
the word development seemed to describe better than the word
change the overall intent of the researcher and the meetings were
renamed Development Laboratory meetings.
The researcher emphasized, in a slightly simplified manner, that
the main aim was to identify A (the present state of the teaching
practices at the FNDC) and B (a visionary end state where we want to
develop our teaching practices). Also C (how to fill the gap between A
and B) was a fundamental question to deal with and also to be answered
in a practical manner. No theories were introduced to the participants
and the discussion was intended to be as practical as possible.
After the welcoming words of the researcher participant D
expressed his initial point of view by saying:
Excerpt 6.3
When focusing on the essence of teaching we have to ask what it
really is. Obviously it is the transmission of culture from the older
generation to the younger generation. From my point of view the
question about what will be transmitted and where it will be
transmitted from is the most essential question to answer…
Consequently, the question of how the teacher arranges his
transmission duties in practice is a completely secondary issue..
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From my point of view these kinds of [developmental] activities
are useless.
Participant B was hesitant to accept the above mentioned and
commented,
Excerpt 6.4
So, not actually exactly to your point, although you begun rather
provocatively...if you cannot teach at all then it does not matter
even a little bit if you personally know how to do it but cannot
make the students to learn it..
After two turns teacher F expressed his wider focus on the object
in the question by saying,
Excerpt 6.5
Now we are talking just about the individual teacher and how he
feels about this kind of work and way of working..but we should
be talking about..the methods to help an individual teacher towards
some new kind of direction and right for a start it becomes obvious
that we do not have any organization whose responsibility is to
bring new [pedagogical] ideas to our college on a daily basis.
Interestingly the object of the discussion shifted from the individual
teacher to the FNDC as an organization. Noticeably the Department
of the Education at the FNDC was not considered as such a
“supporting” organization and potentially having expertise on such
pedagogical issues. But the object kept expanding even during the
very same episode when teacher F continued:
Excerpt 6.5 continues:
Our problem from my point of view is the fact that we keep saying
how knowledge could be found from the military units. In practice
this saying means that it cannot be found anywhere and we keep
going according to our subjective views.
This statement meant that the object shifted to include both the
FNDC and its environment [the military units].
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Even this was not enough for teacher F and he widened his and our
perspective by continuing,
Excerpt 6.5 continues:
How about then this guidance [of our teaching practices]; if we
again start with the fact that the field guides us and the
requirements expressed by the field guide us..but is it not our duty
to see, not necessarily “beyond” but having a little bit “wider” point
of view than just the perspective of the military units?
Teacher H took an initiative and started to explain his view to the
mentioned wider point of view by recollecting his experiences at the
FNDC,
Excerpt 6.6
After coming back to the FNDC [after serving many years in the
military units] and knowing how this organization has changed I
have recognized how the research and developmental activities of
the FNDC have proceeded..when I personally wonder how it could
be possible to develop our teaching practices, the idea about
developing research to focus on such issues to be concretely
applicable in our teaching and to give some justification and backing
to our teachers is needed.
When this wider view had been reached, teacher A explained his
systematic view by emphasizing that it is not enough to be aware of
the box (the FNDC) having its outer relationships (with the
environment; with the military units) but we have to look inside the
box because,
Excerpt 6.7
Then another clear feature [the first one emphasized by him was
the heterogenic student population] of us are those different kinds
of subsystems as student feedback systems, peer evaluation systems,
leader evaluation systems and systems like these and the fact that
these good subsystems do not often make a good system as a whole
but serve ourselves in a contradictory manner...
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In other words teacher A brought up the issue of alignment and in
this case especially misalignment when he spoke about misaligned
subsystems. When the discussion reached the level of subsystems and
systems, hesitation appeared on the scene. Teacher B expressed a
rather widely shared view as follows:
Excerpt 6.8
But discussing the change and development of our objectives brings
to my mind an idea that there could be such an issue that we cannot
guide and affect.
The dimension between possible and impossible emerged during
the very first meeting, but why? Could it really be so that the chosen
teachers did not have or could not have any influence on the FNDC as
a whole? After the meeting the researcher made a memorandum and
sent it to the participants and to the Administrative Director, to the
Chiefs of Degree Divisions and to the Chiefs of Departments. This
routine was repeated after each meeting.
6.3. The second meeting
The second meeting was arranged a week after the first one (on
16th November). At this phase not all departments were represented126
and there were two new participants. Consequently two new
phenomena emerged on the table of the group: haste and the question
of priorities.
An example of the haste was already given in excerpt 6.2 when a
teacher explained his paradoxical situation by explaining his priorities
so that normal teaching is more important than its development. The
situation is like in the saying where “the person is so busy that he
cannot even say “a cat”, (and in this case has enough time to say “a
ca”; notice the missing letter “t”).
It is interesting to notice how this kind of perspective does not
take into consideration the normal routines of making some
preparations (i.e. developing) for the next course or teaching session.
Teaching seems to be a routine executed in a habitualized manner
and it seems to be “teaching without preparations”. In the midst of
126 One representative was making a paper (based on paper made by the Centre for Educational
Assessment; see chapter 7) for the Chief of Personnel of the FDF to be presented on the 19th
November.
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the busy situation the individual teacher may not be fully aware of
the main point: the main thing should be how well the students are
learning, not how much the teachers are teaching.
For a start the researcher emphasized that the aim is to develop
our teaching practices by identifying some effective methods for
societal guidance. During the first meeting this kind of question
emerged and the participants were hesitant with it: is it possible and
especially is it possible for us at the FNDC? Teacher E explained this
difficulty as,
Excerpt 6.9
Especially in our project, but also in all kinds of activities aiming at
developing learning, the basic problem and challenge is the question
about the levels. Personally I could identify three possible levels:
on the first level there are individual teachers, on the second level
there is the system [the FNDC] and on the third level there is an
outer level (the FDF or the outer area of operations). The main
problem is to choose the proper level, and complete unification of
the three levels is not a easy task... Personally I prefer choosing one
of these three levels to focus on.
In his comment the researcher explained his point of view by saying
that the main question is not necessarily which one of the levels to
choose but to identify those intertwined levels and act actively on
several levels. The researcher introduced the key principles of the
cultural-historical activity theory (see 4.4) to the participants when
the shared attention of the group had shifted towards the question
about the levels. The researcher gave each participant a copy of the
draft analysis of the FNDC made by him (figure 6.1):
107
Figure 6.1 A draft analysis of the FNDC.
The analysis shows how each corner of the activity system of the
FNDC seems to need developmental actions potentially “lifted” to the
qualitatively higher levels. But how well aligned with the basic
assumptions and beliefs of the participating teachers will the analysis
be?
The introduction of the CHAT theories caused teacher F to give a
comment,
Excerpt 6.10
Here we have a problem when we start to discuss about time
because this model [the activity system model based theories of
CHAT] does not really see the present time as such as we should
understand it by making our present activities dependent of the
past..because the past times are such an essential part of ourselves
and we cannot take distance out of being able to understand what
is our present state… the one problem with this kind of way of
looking at things [represented by CHAT] has been the fact that it in
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a way pushes the understanding from the past but in what phase
we are going to draw a line between the past and the present? If
we cannot draw such a line we cannot understand our present state
and consequently not our future.
When looking with the perspective of CHAT, history could help us
uncover the contradictions and potentials of an activity system, but it
does not tell us how those contradictions are to be resolved (Engeström
2004c, 156).
Teacher F tried to look “behind” ourselves and inside our culture
(“where we stand”) by explaining the key feature of the current
teaching practices at the FNDC,
Excerpt 6.11
In our institution some kind of repetition has been canonized and
due to this fact it will be difficult to achieve renewal [in the FNDC].
Teacher B wanted to emphasize the main point of our current
teaching practices,
Excerpt 6.12
Critical evaluation of your own teaching is a nasty business to
do…do [our teaching practices] they really represent teaching or
indoctrination?127
Teacher I seemed to agree strongly with teacher B by saying,
Excerpt 6.13
..the guidance for the teaching is arranged in a very scattered
manner, or more precisely put, it is practically non-existent, or if
there is such guidance it happens within teacher groups.
At this phase a very intriguing question emerged: If the current
state of the teaching practices needs to be scrutinized at the FNDC,
how willing are we to do it? With the words of teacher F [cf. excerpt
6.10] are we ready to “draw a line” between the past and the present
for the sake of the future? Are we ready to overcome the cultural
barriers currently identifiable at the FNDC?
127 He expressed his view based on Tapio Puolimatka’s views (see Puolimatka (1997) Teaching or
Indoctrination: Power and Manipulation in Teaching, Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä), which is not
included in the references due to the fact that the researcher has not read the book, although
he knows that teacher B has.
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An episode picked up from the first and second meetings seems to
be clarifying at this phase. A younger teacher J, having kept his opinions
about potential problems by himself during the first meeting128 took
an initiative in the second meeting by saying,
Excerpt 6.14
..personally I have a such a feeling that we are teaching ..[in our
discipline]..at least on the  first degree level [in the cadet courses]
examples and models or lists and then if we take something out of
the totality, one example or a model, and put him [the individual
learner] to a little bit different [situation] where one has to put it
in practice and think then we will go to the grey area..
Obviously teacher J feels that the stated issue shows a potential
problem area for the department and maybe even for other
departments, but being curious about the further actions concerning
the potential problem the researcher asked: “Have you discussed the
observation with someone?”
Teacher J responded,
Excerpt 6.15
As a matter of fact we have discussed the observations after I
recognized that it was connected to my personal objectives [as a
student in a pedagogical master’s program] to develop our practices
and so within our teaching group actually we discussed these
observations and immediately the question concerning our tests
arose: “What kind of know-how are our tests actually assessing;
some kind of [disciplinary] know-how or something else?”
The researcher asked about discussions within the whole department
and the teacher answered,
Excerpt 6.15 Continues
Not yet, but I do not know whether someone else has discussed it;
but I think that he [the Chief of Department] will ask about what
kinds of thoughts have emerged here because he [the Chief of
Department] gave me this task [ordered me to participate in the
group].
128 The reasons for “not-voicing” potential problems may have been caused by the presence of
the older colleague of the same department and due to the “face saving” needs of the
younger officer.
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The excerpts interestingly show some cultural barriers influencing
the way the department is moving along the dimension of
organizational silence and open communication. The phenomenon
came up also during later meetings, as will be seen when diving deeper
into the present culture at the FNDC.
6.4. The third meeting
The third meeting was arranged on the 12th of January 2005, and
also one of the Chiefs of the Departments was present. The principles
of CHAT were explained to the participants during the second meeting.
Consequently in this phase it seemed to be appropriate to use the
activity system model as the “glasses” to separate fundamental
questions from secondary ones.
During the second meeting the issue of levels was already discussed
in the group. Is the main duty of the group to choose the appropriate
level for further discussions and developmental activities or is it even
better not to stick to a single level but act on multiple levels at the
same time instead? In the second meeting the researcher explained
how he feels that instead of reducing the analysis on a single level (i.e.
to the level of an individual teacher), there is a strong need to conduct
the research simultaneously on multiple levels.
In the third meeting this view was challenged by teacher F when he
said,
Excerpt 6.16
..do I need to focus on something [i.e. on rules, teachers, tools,
object] and emphasize something instead of thinking that
everything is going to be developed and consequently nothing will
be developed at all?
This expression did not take into consideration the fact that since
the introduction of the principles of CHAT the researcher has been
stressing especially the fundamental systemic questions instead of
secondary ones. In practical words this means focusing for example
on “the outcome” and “the object” of the FNDC. But someway these
“systemic cornerstones” were not enough for the group, and teacher
B put the idea in the form of the question,
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Excerpt 6.17
How do you see those values as guiding our activities? Where do
you put these values on the activity system model?
The researcher explained that values could be seen as akin to rules.
The centrality and the essentiality of the values were explained by the
teacher I as follows:
Excerpt 6.18
..without values, enduring values, in a way without such energizing
values this organization will not even sustain its vitality.
Paradoxically when the importance and the significance of the
values was recognized it was also felt that it was not the duty of our
group to focus on values and their meaningfulness – the parallel
process to make a new strategy for the FNDC, led by the Commandant
of the FNDC himself, seemed to be the most appropriate forum for
such discussions. A more simplified version of the CHAT model was
introduced by teacher K to be later explicitly elaborated by  teacher I,
Excerpt 6.19
..I put it into a simplified form and emphasized three areas [issues]:
teacher, student and outcome..it would be more motivating to work
with such a simplified model than with the whole [the activity
system] model which cannot be influenced by our group.
Later teacher I elaborated the idea into the form of a figure as
presented below in figure 6.2:
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Figure 6.2 Model proposed by a teacher
To highlight an essential point in the figure, teacher I continued by
saying,
Excerpt 6.19 continues:
..then this that [teacher D] spoke about, this production of
knowledge..someone has to produce [also pedagogical] knowledge
in this organization or it has to be got otherwise..
But what is the pedagogical expert organization in the FNDC
capable to produce pedagogical knowledge or has the FNDC only one
reasonable alternative for the need – to get pedagogical knowledge
from outside of the FNDC? Interestingly the above mentioned
knowledge production seems to be “hitting” on the cultural “walls”
and barriers present at the FNDC, as already explained after the
introduction of the principles of CHAT to the group during the second
meeting,
Excerpt 6.20 (teacher E)
Here we have, as in Auschwitz, this cultural historical context. This
[CHAT] was born in the Soviet Union where it was seen that the
community has the power; [on the contrary] the American heroic
legend tells the same story of a sheriff who shoots the deer [cf. the
Leont’evian example of the ancient hunt told also to the group]
and the community, especially the women, are just clapping their
hands there.
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Curiously, teacher E does not locate the Finnish military culture on
the dimension between the Soviet [or the culture represented by CHAT]
and the American individualistic culture. As previously studied at the
FDF (Halonen, forthcoming), during the past decades the Finnish
military culture has seemed to be shifting between individualistic and
communal edges. Having different levels, the culture could be seen
partly “hidden” in the individuals in their unconsciousness.
Consequently, there is no reason to be surprised if the FNDC has been
for some years expressing how it does value, for example, feelings of
togetherness. But this comment leaves open the question about the
authentic culture of the FNDC.
As has already been mentioned, also teacher E advised us to focus
on culture (at the FNDC, the FDF and in Finland). In a way the
dimension between an individual and the community comes to the
fore. The group seemed to feel the centrality and essentiality of the
shared enduring values. Despite of this the task (the value process or
how to get people committed to the values) seemed to be more
appropriate for the group making the new strategy for the FNDC led
by the Commandant of the FNDC.
Teacher D explained how close our “windows of opportunity” seem
to be, by emphasizing “evolutionary change” in the words below ,
Excerpt 6.21
..it does not matter what the outcome of our group turns out to
be, recommendations to be used at the FNDC or not, the fact is
that the world goes on in every case.
Curiously the teacher imagined ourselves as “the frogs in the
Sengean boiler” being steadily boiled and unaware of the situation,
just “drifting” and being satisfied by the current situation, at least
publicly. This kind of view excluded the active role of the teachers but
interestingly it was expressed by the very same teacher who sees
teaching as a transmission kind of process done by “knowledgeable”
teachers (cf. excerpt 6.3). The passive role of the teacher was not a
shared point of view at the group according to several proposals (see
e.g. figure 6.2 by teacher I).
As presented in excerpt 6.13, the pedagogical guidance or support
at the FNDC has been arranged, to put it positively, in a very scattered
manner. Hence there are no formal methods at the FNDC for the
teachers to develop their pedagogical competencies and capabilities.
Due to the fact that the researcher serves in the pedagogical “expert”
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organization of the FNDC129, he felt a need to take the initiative and
act in a morally responsible manner as a representative of the pedagogic
expert organization.
Since 2001 the researcher has been developing an evaluation tool
for the teachers (cf. chapter 5) and the teacher community at the FNDC.
Also the development of the tool met quite severe resistance because
the individuality of the teachers seemed to be threatened. But despite
of this claimed “threat” there seemed to be relatively shared needs to
give some pedagogical support and guidance for the teachers, as
already shown during the first meetings.
In his explanations the researcher connected the ideas of shared
enduring values, the espoused values of the FNDC (especially the
expertise), “goodness” or “badness” of the teaching to the idea of an
evaluation sheet for the teacher community. With the evaluation
tool the current practices of the teachers was thought to be taken to
the fore and to be developed by the resonation (societal progressive
inquiries) with the social scientific theories combined by the
pedagogical expert organization of the FNDC (the Department of
Education).
The idea of simplifying the activity system model was introduced
and elaborated by the teachers of the group (cf. excerpt 6.19 and
figure 6.2). Despite of the claimed need to simplify and the need to
focus on something “controllable”, the idea of the evaluation sheet
and the method were valued as interesting ones:
Excerpt 6.22 (teacher K)
This [project] is already in a good shape, as we already have some
tools to develop these issues.
The teacher’s evaluation sheet idea is discussed in the analysis of
the fifth meeting as well as the other initiatives of the teachers at the
FNDC. During the second half of the third meeting the discussion
turned to the relationships between soldiers (“amateurs in pedagogy”)
and civilians (“experts in pedagogy) and between military pedagogy
and university pedagogy as explained by the words of teacher F,
129 Actually this could be only hypothesized when remembering the discussions in the other
meetings.
115
Excerpt 6.23
..here we are in this meeting, and personally at least I am completely
an amateur in these pedagogical issues, and it is a frightening thing
as such to be debating on the basis of our personal intuitions..
But if then teacher F, and maybe some of the other teachers as
well, feel themselves more or less as amateur pedagogs, is this feeling
expected and acceptable from the angle of  soldiership? In a hierarchic
military organization the official expectations and the exact
acceptability is shown by the current leaders of the organization and
ultimately by the commander [or in this case by the Commandant] in
question. Some shared expectations of the managers were in the
thematic interviews (see the next chapter).
In the analysis of the fifth meeting there are some examples of
how to overcome the contradiction between civilian pedagogical and
military pedagogical practice successfully. As shown in figures 6.1
and 6.2, there seems to be some need for pedagogical knowledge
production at the FNDC.
6.5. The fourth meeting – an emerging
crisis
The group was routinely invited for the fourth meeting to be
arranged on the 18th of January 2005. Originally the meeting was
thought to be arranged in December but due to problems in finding a
suitable time for it, the meeting was rescheduled for January.
Surprisingly only a few of the participants came to the meeting
and the researcher felt put down. But the challenging situation turned
out to be an effective brainstorming with a few participants. To the
researcher the episode was a strong signal of the need to change his
plans and act differently.
The researcher thought that maybe some past discussions were felt
to be too theoretical and unpractical, although in the first meeting
no theories were introduced. The researcher got an idea: maybe we
have to take a close look at the current pedagogical practices,
introducing the already done departmental pedagogical innovations
to each other. Maybe the departments are not so familiar with the
kinds of innovations made in the other departments? Maybe it could
be more useful instead of weaknesses and problems to focus on
strengths and possibilities?
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The researcher had a brainstorming session with the colleagues at
the scene and identified some interesting pedagogical topics to discuss.
Each department got an opportunity to introduce its “pedagogical
innovations” to the representatives of the other departments as
follows:
– The Department of Technology: Science and its main characteristics
(the idea came up due to a recently published publication of the
department (cf. chapter 2 about the counterargument).
– The Department of War History: The learning log as a tool.
– The Department of Tactics and Operations Art: Teacher assessment
as a balancing act for students’ feedback.
– The Department of Strategic and Defence Studies: The process to
identify the main pedagogical principles at the Swedish National
Defence College.
– Department of Education: The Teacher’s Self-Evaluation Sheet130 (see
appendix 2).
Also representatives of the Department of Management and
Leadership were invited to introduce some of their present
“pedagogical innovations” to the participants.
6.6. The fifth meeting
The fifth meeting was arranged on the 3rd of February 2005. All
departments were not represented and there was one new participant.
In the beginning of the meeting the researcher repeated in a little bit
modified form his idea of the development on different intertwined
levels. On the most simplifying level the development could be
described as a movement from A (the current state) to B (the visionary
endstate) by Cs (by e.g strategy). Naturally the effective use of even
this formula demands that A is appropriately located “on the map”. A
SWOT-analysis (i.e. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats)
is an appropriate candidate to be utilized in open and constructively
critical discussions. “Below” this level we have made an analysis on
the level of interconnected (cf. figure 6.1) activity systems. “Below”
it the researcher identified some key educational dimensions for the
teachers to be balanced on a daily basis131. Someway we discuss the
very same issue on each particular level but when we go to the deeper
130 The sheet has been synthetized from the research of Yrjönsuuri & Yrjönsuuri (1995); Mäkinen
(1998); Helakorpi (1999, 2001). It is essential to recognize that the Teacher’s Self-Evaluation
Sheet is not a quantitative but a qualitative evaluation tool.
131 The dimensions were: practice versus theory; old (“the given”) versus new (“the produced
and created”); individual versus community; local versus global; school versus work.
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and deeper levels the complexity of the analysis grows, caused by the
fact that more units and dimensions will be taken under consideration.
Consequently the bounded capacity of the acting individual will be
overloaded and he has to overcome his limitations by different kinds
of methods, as by writing (including all kinds of drawings) and
especially by collaborating with his peers on a communal dimension.
When we see our situation like this, we can avoid the real possibility
to be flooded by too many details and information, keeping the most
fundamental questions in mind.
During the meetings the researcher emphasized how meaningful a
role the choices of the individual teachers actually play for the social
structures of the FNDC. Sometimes, as well as during the present
process, it is argued that it is “impossible” for an individual human
being to affect social structures. In order to enable the participants to
see this “impossibility” to be at least occasionally a real possibility, the
researcher told the participants a story of a learning log experiment
initiated by an individual teacher from one department,
Excerpt 6.24
..one example of a department where an individual teacher has
thought these things by himself and discussed his ideas with his
colleagues, with his superiors and has then just started to use it in
his own teaching, in cadet courses, in senior staff courses and in
general staff officer courses and so on.
At first sight, the total activity seems to control the individual,
instead of the individual controlling the activity (Engeström 1987, 66).
However, the opposite is also possible because the actions of individuals
may develop into an activity,
These are the ordinary cases when a person undertakes to perform
some actions under the influence of a certain motive, and then
performs them for their own sake because the motive seems to be
displaced to their objective. And that means that the actions are
transformed into activity. The transformation does not happen
automatically or unconsciously but needs an act of reflecting and a
special activity for these purposes – a learning activity. (Leont’ev 1981,
238; cf. Engeström 1987, 68)
This case shows how the actions of an individual teacher serving at
the FNDC can also have some essential influence on the activities of
the FNDC. In other words this means that by a relatively “simple” act
of learning an individual teacher can turn the “impossibility” into a
real opportunity.
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Presently some individual teachers seem to be making pedagogical
innovations for their own purposes but how about the communal
aspect of the FNDC? Currently the communal aspect of the of the
FNDC seems to be underdeveloped, as shown by the example quoted
below,
Excerpt 6.25 (teacher L)
It has to be said and which I see as a major weakness here is the lack
of ordinary research groups [at the FNDC]..
Currently some sort of cultural barriers limit the expansion of the
communal dimension, as shown by the experiences during the
Development Laboratory meetings (cf. e.g. the participants kept
changing) and by the low intensity of the use of the Training Portal
during the Bologna process (cf. the next chapter).
Now it is the right time to elaborate the draft analysis of the FNDC
(figure 6.1). It seems that currently at the FNDC there exist several
latent primary contradictions and a latent secondary contradiction,
as can be seen in figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3 An elaborated analysis of the FNDC
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Figure 6.3 explicitly shows how well aligned with the
interpretations of the participated teachers the draft analysis actually
was (cf. figure 6.1). There seemed to be some sort of agreement on
the need states of the different aspects of the activity system of the
FNDC, but despite of this, due to the latent secondary contradiction,
the developmental mission was generally felt as impossible; at least
for the teachers, but what about the managers of the FNDC? The
answer to this question will be given in the following chapter.
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Chapter Seven
THEMATIC INTERVIEWS AT
THE FNDC
7.1. More fundamental questions than
secondary ones
In the previous chapter the teachers of the FNDC participating in
the Development Laboratory meetings shifted along the dimension
between possible and impossible already in the very first meeting. It
was explained that these kinds of actions are understandable due to
the secondary contradiction between the subject and the community
(cf. figure 6.3). Now the focus will be on the official representatives
of the community in question – the managers of the FNDC, in order
to see the social reality from their angle.
The rather widely shared view seemed to be that the teachers
cannot contribute to the FNDC as a whole but have to take a more
limited perspective (student, teacher and outcome; figure 6.2). If then
the participating teachers cannot influence the FNDC as a whole,
maybe the Management Group of the FNDC can? As experts of the
disciplines, also the professors needed to be included among those to
be interviewed.
The questions used in the thematic interviews are presented in
appendix 1132. The intent of the researcher was to identify
fundamental questions instead of secondary ones. The researcher
assumes that the right answer to a secondary question is also
secondary, but the fundamental question, even when insoluble in its
exact form, can be a guide to a major discovery and to deep
transformations.
It can be said that the “truth”, or in this case the fundamentality of
the questions, lies in the eye of the beholder. This time the “eyes” or
“glasses” were made while researching for the theoretical part of the
present study. Especially the theories of the cultural-historical activity
theory, but not solely these, justify the fundamentality of the posed
questions (see appendix 1 for the links between the analyzed theories
and the posed questions).
132 Chapter 5 contains some additional background information about the thematic interviews,
including a description of how the analysis of the interviewed data was done.
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In the beginning of each interview the researcher told the
interviewees that he was ready to answer the questions concerning
the research in progress and emphasized the main aim of the research:
to develop the teaching practices at the FNDC. The researcher also
suggested that the respondents could take in the first place a
perspective not restricted to the departmental or even to the divisional
level. Each person was asked to focus on the FNDC as a whole, the
college having connections to the Defence Staff and to Ministries
(especially the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Education). Later
some of the questions allowed those serving on a departmental level
to restrict the scope into the department where the respondent
worked.
As a background it is useful to know that at national Finnish level,
all universities are steered by the Ministry of Education. On the other
hand, the FNDC is a profit centre of the Defence Staff supervised by
the Chief of the Defence Staff with the assistance of the Chief of
Personnel. Since 1993 the FNDC has had a university status, and
consequently a dichotomous and paradoxical situation has emerged,
taking shape as a university-scientific versus a military organization
paradox133 (i.e. the USMO paradox) having different kinds of
manifestations at the FNDC and elsewhere134, as will be shown in the
analysis.
7.2. Seeking guiding ideas and key
pedagogical principles
The USMO paradox could be seen for example in the answers given
by the respondents when asked to express the leading idea of the
FNDC. On the other hand the FNDC was seen to be producing officers
(professional soldiers) for the needs of the defence of Finland, but on
the other hand the university status of the college was emphasized
(an innovative research centre; university level research community
etc.). Interestingly some respondents synthesized (they did not just
choose one or the other aspect as a “right answer”) these different
aspects together to the idea of training and educating soldiers based
on researched knowledge135.
133 Paradoxos in Greek combines two roots: para, which can mean variously beside, by, with,
beyond, past, against, or contrary to; and doxos, which means “that which is generally thought
or believed, “the common opinion”. Interestingly a paradox is an argument in which you take
sides – both sides. (Wilder & Collins 1994, 84-86) Often the paradox is interpreted as a dilemma
(cf. chapter 3) but the main unifying idea is the dimension between two essential poles of
interest.
134 Since the autumn of 2001 the training and education of Finnish officers has been conducted
at the FNDC and also in the schools of the services and branches, supervised by the FNDC.
135 In the draft of the FNDC’s strategy (6th September 2005) this point was mentioned in the
form “the teaching is arranged based on research and practices in the field”.
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The role of the Ministry of Education in Finnish higher education
seemed to be a professed fact by the respondents. The Ministry of
Education has a seemingly clear role in controlling the educational
activities of the FNDC. On the other hand the evaluation of the FNDC
made by the Finnish Higher Education Evaluation Council (FINHEEC)
in 2001 was familiar only to some of the respondents. Further on it
seemed to be the case that more the strengths than the weaknesses
mentioned in the evaluation report were analyzed at the FNDC. Only
in one department a development plan based on FINHEEC’s evaluation
was made.
When focusing on the relations between the FNDC and the Defence
Staff and the mentioned ministries, one point from the newly formed
competence development strategy made by the Division for Personnel
of the Defence Staff is especially interesting: the development of the
training and education system forms the basis for the competence
development of the FNDC136. The question asked by the FINHEEC in its
evaluation report of the FNDC (2001, 10): according to what kinds of
guiding principles the FDF is going to develop its training and education
system, still needs an answer. Rather often also in the FDF the difficulty
seems to be the general tendency to see the trees instead of the forest;
details are discussed instead of the question of how to guide the
systems. Hopefully this tendency will be overcome when the FNDC
gets prepared for the next evaluation of the FINHEEC.
Another conceptual structure emphasized in the competence
development strategy is the learning organization (cf. chapter 4).
When asked about the meaningfulness of the idea of the learning
organization, the respondents could be grouped to those considering
that there have been learning organizations in the FDF for a long
time already (e.g. the military units), and those who saw that the
importance of the idea was relatively small or “numerically zero”.
Interestingly those serving on the departmental level were more
sceptical than the others of the idea of the learning organization.
If the idea of the learning organization divided the opinions of the
respondents, how did they understand learning itself? The respondents
understood the concept of learning very differently. Some of them
emphasized that the students need some background knowledge and
understanding to be able to solve practical problems. It could be said
that generally speaking learning was identified to be a unification of
learning “old things” and creating something new. Learning was not
limited to “internalization” or to “appropriation” of the given
information but it was also seen to have a functional and practical
136 Competence development strategy (2004, 5).
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aspect (i.e. identifiable e.g. in the capability to solve practical
problems).
When asked about the pedagogical principles, two main idealistic
themes emerged over others: focusing on wholes, and individual
responsibility to solve problems when learning. Although the
individual responsibility of the students was emphasized, the
overindividualistic competition was identified to be balanced by an
emphasis on social cooperation, which is already the general strength
of the students.
Learning seemed to mean the ability to show on a practical level
how the learner has learned. Hence the question of assessment
methods was a fundamental question. In their answers the respondents
stressed quickness, easiness and the feedback system (feedback
received from the students, ex-students and their superiors). The
responsibility of the assessment practices seemed to be shared more
or less by the students, ex-students and their superiors. In one
department a teacher has developed a new kind of tool for evaluation,
a learning log, but the log method was not used by the other
departments137.
The question about the need to look at the assessment methods at
the FNDC emerged already during the Development Laboratory
meetings138. There the question was put into the form: “What kind of
know-how are our tests actually assessing; some kind of [disciplinary]
know-that or something else?” When the researcher asked about the
discussions concerning “the problem” the lack of open discussions
came up as a response.
Starting to learn seems to need some willingness to confess that
some problems do exist139. The same demand applies also on the level
of organizations. The learning organizations have to be able to identify
some “potential problems” and societally make them authentic and
shared problems to be solved. One more example of the cultural
barriers hampering this development was also explicitly identified at
least by some of the respondents. The intent was to use the Training
Portal as a planning tool enabling open and fruithful discussions, but
contrary to expectations “people used the technology badly” (i.e. the
Portal) and the intensity of the discussions remained on a low level. It
could be said that the organizational silence restricts potential
problems from becoming authentic and shared problems waiting to
be solved in the process of learning.
137 The Continuing Education and Development Centre offers an exception in this case, having
put the same idea into practice during the past years.
138 Cf. Chapter 6 and excerpt 6.15.
139 Cf. the following chapter about the analysis of the learning concept from a social scientific
perspective.
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One main principle often emphasized by the respondents was the
comparability of the degrees (civilian versus military ones). The principle
has been highly valued at the FNDC, aiming to get and sustain its
university status. The importance of the comparability principle has
been increased also through the Bologna process140. Despite of this,
the degrees of the FNDC have also lately kept shifting between
comparable and incomparable (Viitasalo 2005).
Another main principle, answered in the form of the leading idea
of the FNDC by the respondents, was the training and educating of
soldiers based on researched knowledge. The respondents saw that so
far the biggest reform of the Bologna process has been the emphasis
on scientificness. But what is the essence of being scientific? Based on
what kinds of shared principles and ethos the boundary between
“civilian science”, military science and the ordinary activities of the
professional officers will be negotiated and renegotiated by each
individual researcher on a continuous basis?  When the military
researchers give reasons for e.g. the choices of books (cf. choices of
theories; various kinds of choices needed to be done during the
research process), what kinds of reasons do they give, if any?
The researcher asked about the principles behind the choices of
the books and the respondents expressed views like “the classics must
be read”, “centrality”, “stimulating”, “offering problems”. Curiously
explanations related to scientificness or some sort of scientific ethos
were missing. Obviously at the FNDC much work needs to be done
also on the metatheoretical or philosophical level when the basic
assumptions of social scientific research are scrutinized141.
In the renewal processes of the FDF’s officer education system the
guiding object of the developmental activities seem to be a written
curriculum. The researcher asked about the idea of the curriculum
having three layers142. Some respondents were not familiar with the
layered curriculum idea but those who were could be divided into
two groups: those who saw the layeredness as a process (first the
written, then the taught and finally the learned) and to those
emphasizing the levelness of the curriculum (we have to act
simultaneously on all of these different layers and especially focus on
140 Cf. e.g. Bologna Process; http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/educ/bologna/
bologna_en.html. The European higher education will be developed based on a set of specified
objectives, such as the adoption of a common framework of readable and comparable degrees,
two levels of degrees, the ECTS-compatible credit system, a European dimension in quality
assurance and the elimination of remaining obstacles to the free mobility of students. On the
other hand for example the fundamental principles of autonomy and diversity are respected.
141 Chapter 2 shows the position of the researcher in these kinds of questions.
142 Cf. Karjalainen’s (ed. 2003) and Tyack and Cuban’s (1995) argument explained in chapter 3.
According to them the educational reform could be divided into three stages: reform talks,
adoption of reform (=at least producing a written curriculum) and the actual implementation
(=on the layers of taught and learned curriculum).
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what will be learned in practice). It seems that the respondents shared
a view that the concept of learning is a key issue and in the future we
need to focus more on how we conceptualize the learning.
Consequently, the deep transformational educational planning cannot
be replaced solely by focusing on the production of a written
curriculum or by the use of planning tools (i.e. the Internet-based Core
Edit (a Finnish tool of the ECTS system, cf. the main Bologna principles).
Let us return briefly to the issue of organizational silence. Some of
the respondents said that maybe there have been too many and too
long discussions during the Bologna process, slowing down the
otherwise rapid planning process. The silencing of organizational
discussions could be the most effective way to act if the process is
reduced only to the level of the written curriculum. When
remembering the other layers of the curriculum, we do not have the
alternative of avoiding discussions, at least if the goal is effective
educational development or even educational transformation. If the
discussions need a more focused structure and alignment, this could
be achieved by the identification of the fundamental questions and
starting the planning process from these kinds of questions instead of
decentralizing the issues to be dealt with in the six autonomous
disciplines, and controlled by unidentified principles.
The dangers of imitation and blurred identity were noticed by the
participants of the Development Laboratory meetings, but how about
the respondents of the thematic interviews? In general the FNDC
follows the actions of the European universities by participating
actively in the Bologna process. Interestingly, not so many other
European military educational institutions have joined the Bologna
planning process as actively. We cannot overrule the possibility that
the active role taken by the FDF in the Bologna process could have a
meaningful influence on other nations dealing with same kind of
challenges and problems but presently the paradox is clear: the
Europeans are integrating their higher educational systems, but military
educational systems are in the periphery or sometimes not even on
the map of the process143.
143 Despite of these kinds of national differences, the USMO paradox is a universal one due to
the fact that the spheres of science and “lay military work” still coexist, having various kinds of
relations causing e.g. quaternary contradictions to emerge. One of the key issues is whether
the USMO paradox is tried to be solved inside the military educational system or out of it in the
military units.
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7.3. Solving the key paradoxes; USMO and
Soldier’s Basic Paradox
When the spheres of interests of the military educators and those
who are in charge of the development of the military educational
systems as a whole keep widening, it is interesting to recognize how
differently the different nations have solved the paradoxical situation
between soldiership and scientificness.
Although the respondents explained that the FNDC has to adapt
to the general principles shared by the Finnish and European
universities, some core features of soldiership need to be remembered
in the “adaptation process” guided by the dominant principle –
comparability.
In the midst of the turbulent, even chaotic, globalizing
environment, the huge information overflow and increasing
complexity of social systems seem to have obvious consequences on
individuals. Nowadays it seems to be almost impossible to identify
what is going on and make sense of it and at the same time not lose
touch with the most important issues – what is the purpose of this all?
What are we aiming at? What is and should be the main outcome of
our military educational system? To avoid these dangers we have to
focus on the forests rather than the trees – on the fundamentals of
the specific social system in question.
When asked, the respondents named some core features of
soldiership as worth nurturing. An officer’s basic virtues, such as
capability to lead, manage and execute plans, positive discipline and
order, shared communal values and morally ethical aspects were
emphasized by the respondents. But how systematically do we nurture
these kinds of virtues in the decentralized military educational system
of the FDF?
Traditionally, a good officer has been understood as an individual
actor on the battlefield; especially capable to lead, train and educate
his personnel and troops. Obeying orders, just doing and thinking less,
has been the main idea behind the educational arrangements. But
interestingly, a good officer and a good soldier has always been aware
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of the fundamental paradox: the Soldier’s Basic Paradox144. According
to the paradox, obeying orders is not enough but the individual officer
needs to use all his resources as effectively as possible to achieve
effectiveness and gain good results. He has always had to act “beyond”
the ordered.
In other words the secondary contradiction between the subject
(i.e. the individual teacher) and the community could take the form
of the Soldier’s Basic Paradox. Obviously the relationship between the
deep-seated paradox and the identified secondary contradiction needs
to be understood (cf. chapter 8).
 Presently the paradoxes and the identified secondary contradiction
seem to be made into a solvable form along the key educational
dimensions as follows (cf. chapter 9 for a practical example),
– Practice (knowing how) versus theory (knowing that).
– Old (internalizing the given) versus new (combinatorial innovations;
knowledge creation and production by progressively inquiring).
– Individual versus community.
– Local versus global.
– School versus work.
In the past just knowing how to win and survive on the battlefield
has been the only relevant goal. Hence, the need for theories (know-
that) has always been rather difficult to explain and to understand145,
but essentially needed to be understood also by the officers. Also many
of the respondents stressed that the officer of our age needs to learn
to research and to integrate the researching to his normal way of
working (e.g. as a teacher).
Previous generations have not solved our problems and we cannot
solve our students’ problems on their behalf, was a shared opinion of
the respondents. On the other hand, also in the FDF we are used to
developing “solutions” on a continuous basis, but the reasons behind
144 The Soldier’s Basic Paradox is a metatheoretical (cf. Toiskallio 2002, 86) paradox that needs
to be solved. On the theoretical level this metatheoretical problem is akin to the Leader-
Follower Paradox (or the Burns Paradox; Burns 2003, 171) emerged in the field of
transformational leadership (Burns 1978, 2003; Bass 1998). By the words of the Deep Leadership
Model (a transformational leadership model developed at the FNDC, Nissinen 2001) the
paradoxical question is mainly about which one of these two leadership dimensions (i.e.
transactional and transformational) is more dominant in the behaviour of a military leader. Cf.
also Macgregor (2003, 208); Brownlee & Schoomaker (2004); Dixon (1976, 194). Hawkins
(2001) name unity, endurance, obedience, hierarchy, and readiness for violence as the main
American warrior premises. The fact seems to be that these kinds of premises are universal by
nature and the main question deals with the dynamic nature of the premises. The case of
obedience clarifies the point. Of course also in the future soldiers and officers are expected to
obey orders but this does not tell the “whole truth” of the case.
145 Cf. the translation mistake in the case of military pedagogy presented in chapter 4.
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these solutions need to be made more transparent and justifiable. The
reason for acting in a traditional way cannot be justified by the saying
“because we are used to doing so”. Therefore, understanding the
understanding (also emphasized by some of the respondents) comes
to the fore (cf. the following chapter).
When asked about the role of the individual teachers in the Bologna
process, and in the educational development in general, the centrality
of the teachers in the process was a shared opinion of the respondents.
This answer is paradoxical when comparing to the interpretations of
the participating teachers during the Development Laboratory
meetings when they were wondering about the possibility or maybe
the impossibility of themselves to influence on the FNDC as a whole
and as a system. Maybe the teachers are not aware of the expectations
of the managers of the FNDC?
In the FDF and also in the FNDC there is a tendency to emphasize
the centrality of the cultural aspects and consequently its relative
stability. Interestingly, the respondents emphasized that (the culture
of) the FNDC will certainly be carried by the tide of Finnish culture,
overruling the need for teachers’ activeness and innovativeness.
Paradoxically the respondents stressed that the teachers will play an
active role in the development but on the other hand this activeness
is expected to be useless because of the “evolutionary change process”.
Consequently, an appropriate role for the officers is expected by the
respondents to be passively adapting to the changing situation. As a
counterbalanced act the activeness of the individual agents (i.e. the
teachers) needs to be reconsidered and the possibility to develop
societal structures (i.e. culture) needs to be understood (cf. chapters 8
and 9).
When struggling with such difficult paradoxes as the Soldier’s Basic
Paradox, imitation guided by the comparability principle is not all that
is needed. Solving the paradox effectively needs more than just
imitating best practices, especially when in the field of schooling there
is lack of such systemic and well aligned best practices. The roots of
the paradoxes and problems have to be faced and it is impossible to
do this without focusing on how to enable teachers to develop
themselves and their peers and become more like what they keep
teaching to their students (i.e. to make justifiable judgements based
on research and give reasons for their own actions). Hence, on the
28th of July 2005 the researcher sent a Teacher’s Self-Evaluation Sheet
with the needed instructions to the teachers of the Department of
Education in order to focus on teaching practices146.
146 The idea of the sheet was elaborated during the Change Laboratory meetings. Cf. chapter 6.
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During the interviews the respondents told researcher about many
pedagogical innovations, such as emphasizing key principles instead
of details, web-based blended education, learning in small groups, use
of assistants147, staff excursions and inquiring stance on working. The
innovativeness of the departments varied a lot, small departments
being the most innovative. Paradoxically no traces of research-based
pedagogical development were noticed. Some of the respondents told
the researcher that the Department of Education was expected to be
a producer of “practical pedagogical knowledge”. So far the
Department of Education has not met with these expectations (cf.
also chapter 6).
When we begin to discuss the expertise in the case of the FNDC, we
simultaneously have to focus on the espoused values of the FNDC148.
Also in the Development Laboratory meetings the essentiality of the
shared values was notified, and a similar conclusion was made by the
interviewees. It was stated that values guide our actions and activities
but how about then in the case of expertise?
The relationship between officers and civilian university graduates
(i.e. “pedagogical experts”) recruited from the civilian markets deserves
to be reconsidered. Paradoxically these “pedagogical experts” enter
the core area of soldiership as mentioned above, having a lot of useful
experience and theories from universities but lacking experiences
gained from the field (i.e. the military units). The proposal of the
researcher is that instead of looking out, and expecting that more
civilian “pedagogical experts” will solve our pedagogical problems,
the FNDC needs to concentrate on the development of the pedagogical
expertise of their own teachers149.
If the FNDC really values expertise, and especially pedagogical and
managerial-leadership expertise, the college has to identify what it
means by the expertise or pedagogical expertise. A close look at the
present state of the educational practices have to be taken and
individual knowledge of how to train and educate needs to be
“externalized” to be socially scrutinized. Hence, the Teacher’s Self-
Evaluation Sheet as mentioned above.
When speaking about the values, the respondents mentioned that
the issue is wider than the espoused values of the FNDC. The value
discussions at the FNDC have to take also academic or scientific values
(i.e. the ethos of science) and basic values of soldiership under
147 Students who were more knowledgeable or competent in the issue to be learned.
148 The espoused values of the FNDC are patriotism, expertise, trustworthiness, feeling of
togetherness and development.
149 We can hypothesize in a parallel manner in the case of leadership and management. Will
the FNDC try to recruit civilian “outsiders” to be experts on leadership and management in the
FDF or develop themselves as experts of leadership and management?
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consideration. It is not only discussions that are needed, but the made
conclusions have to be identifiable in practical educational activities
as well. Some of the respondents wondered how the espoused values
of the FNDC could be turned into authentic ones. If the FNDC values
expertise, how is this seen in, for example, the strategy planning
process of the FNDC? Or in the Bologna process?
Along the dimension of local and global the respondents saw that
in the future the continuing internalization will be a fact. Presently
the international cooperation is at the FNDC arranged unsystematically
and lacks strategic guidance. The respondents said that the
arrangements have to be systematized and activated on all disciplines
and in all levels of the military educational system. Maybe this tendency
could be seen in the newly made strategy of the FNDC or in the
strategies made by the departments?
Presently the community aspect has been gaining some ground
among the Armed Forces because of the increasing interest in
communities of practice150 (i.e. communities of experts). It needs to
be emphasized that also these constellations could be partly consciously
extended and enabled. Through communities an educational
institution could extend its networks to be effectively used in
educational practices. More interestingly, they should be globally
expanded among the military educational institutions.
The relationship between school (the FNDC; as B) and work (the
military units; as A) seem to be in need of reconsideration. According
to the responses, the present situation can be put into the form of the
formula: A -> B. In this formula B (the FNDC) expects to get feedback
to be able to measure how successfully it has taught its students.
Actually this kind of formula does not recognize that in reality the
FNDC is powerfully influencing, through the graduating officers and
publications, the resources of the profit centres of the FDF and FBG.
This means that the formula has to be corrected into the form: A <->
B.
Someway the respondents have identified the correct formula when
they emphasized for example the need of the student to learn to solve
problems. Due to the fact that mainly the problems of the FDF can be
identified on the field, the dimension between the FNDC and the other
profit centres needs to be reevaluated. In practice this could mean
that instead of dealing with well-defined problems made by the
teachers, the students have to face the ill-defined problems of the
150 Lave & Wenger (1991); Wenger (1998); Wenger, McDermott & Snyder (2002); Kilner (2002);
Brown (2003). See the analysis in chapter 8. For current examples see e.g.
companycommand.com and squad-leader.com.
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field units and organizations. This means that also the FNDC has ill-
defined problems to be used in its teaching.
7.4. Who are and should be the objects
(active versus passive students) of our
schooling?
When focusing on the problem of how to effectively produce a
new written curriculum within the given time limits, the layredness of
the curriculum, and consequently the main issue (the learning of
students), is left almost untouched.
The respondents said that the activeness and the responsibility of
the students is highly valued. Lately the PISA (The Programme for
International Student Assessment) reports have given some of the
respondents high expectations on the student population of the FNDC.
Contrary to these kinds of expectations, heterogeneity of the students
was identified in a study made with the assistance of the Centre for
Educational Assessment151.
The question about the increasing responsibility of the
heterogeneous students is not an easy question at all, but despite its
difficulty it needs to be faced on an ongoing basis by the teachers,
departments, divisions and the schools of the services and branches.
The main idea152 of the need of a close look was put into an explicit
form by colonel Douglas Macgregor when he analyzed the
transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States of America:
“It is unrealistic to expect that military leaders will demonstrate the
requisite physical energy, mental agility, and moral courage in war to
inspire subordinates to exercise initiative, to innovate, and to take
risks if they have been discouraged from doing so throughout their
military careers” (Macgregor 2003, 208). The question seems to be
highly relevant also in the case of FDF and the FNDC.
Presently the educational arrangements restrict the flourishing of
the principles of activeness and individual responsibility. Putting the
problems into the form of a question, we have to ask whether we will
change our key principle or our educational practices in this case?
151 The Centre for Educational Assessment is a research centre of the Faculty of Behavioural
Sciences at the University of Helsinki in Finland.
152 The very same idea comes to the fore when solving the Soldier’s Basic Paradox.
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7.5. What is and should be the intended
outcome of our military education?
Using the methods of MBO (Management by Objectives), the final
outcome of the FNDC seems to be “the number of graduated
students”. Another key objective seems to be the “level of feedback”.
But is this really the final outcome of schooling in the FDF?153
The reasonability of the level of student feedback as a result
objective was severely challenged by the respondents. They saw that
the quantitative result objectives were not so essential as qualitative
ones. Although we cannot to a full extent measure qualitative features,
the “unmeasurableness” needs to be faced instead of neglecting the
importance of the qualitative aspects.
In the beginning in the 1920s European military pedagogists made
collaboratively a combinatorial innovation for developmental
purposes: the concept of action competence (Toiskallio 1996, ed. 2000,
ed. 2003a; Florian ed. 2002). The concept of action competence has
four intertwined dimensions: psychic, physical, social and ethical
(Toiskallio 1998ab, ed. 2004, 109), giving some guidance for further
inquiries to understand the secrets of human actions and activities
(cf. Toiskallio 1998b, 161). Presently in the FDF the action competence
concept has been melted to the emphasis on competencies154, causing
metaphorically speaking an overemphasis on the tree (codifying the
competence requirements in the form of competence maps) and almost
neglecting the soil (action competence; authentic competencies).
For the FNDC this means that for a start, as a result of the college’s
educational activities, the graduating officers should be as action
competent as possible. Naturally this does not exclude the need to
get more specific competencies during the studies. The general
tendency at the FNDC is to imitate and adapt concepts from the civilian
world without hesitation (e.g. the concept of competencies) and to
neglect combinatorial innovations made in the FDF. This attitude will
be challenged in chapters 8 and 9.
As mentioned above, despite the almost systemic neglect of the
action competence concept, the respondents emphasized the ethical
dimension a lot. When connected to the emphasis on the written
curriculum it is interesting to recognize the neglect of the ethical
dimension in officer education, especially on the senior staff and
general staff levels.
153 In the Annual Order of the FNDC for 2005 the expected outcome (the level of student
feedback) is balanced by the feedback of the superiors of the ex-students.
154 Cf. Competence development strategy (2004).
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7.6. Decentralization as an overriding norm
and misalignment as a fact
Because decentralization seems to be the overriding norm155 of the
Finnish officer education, open and fruitful discussions between the
departments (which are in charge of the guidance of the service and
branch schools in a particular discipline) and the service and branch
schools are in a need of expansion. Not only the coverage and the
intensity of the discussions are what matters, but the FNDC needs to
clarify its shared pedagogical and other kinds of guiding principles to
be able to explain its expectations in an aligned manner to the service
and branch schools. And because these schools receive guidance from
various sources, alignment and consistency156 need to be achieved in
the intertwined learning organizations of the FDF.
When taking a holistic view “above” the military educational
“transformation” happening at the FNDC, guided partly by the Chief
of the First Degree Division and partly by the Chief of the Postgraduate
Degree Division, misalignment was identified by the respondents.
Some respondents thought that the new vice commandant,
concentrating for example on the development of teaching, is the
answer to the present misalignment. It will be interesting to see what
kind of guiding principles will be used by the vice commandant and
how effectively the developmental influence can be extended over
the vast network of the Finnish Officer Education system, especially if
done under the circumstances of organizational silence.
During the thematic interviews the researcher tried to identify
exactly and truthfully the present situation at the FNDC seen from
the managerial perspective. Each of the respondents got a suggestion
to describe somehow on paper how he personally saw the present
state at the FNDC (position A) and the desired future state (position
B)? As mentioned above, the focus was already in the beginning said
to be on the educational practices of the whole FNDC.
The analyzed drawings showed misalignment of the analyses of
the present as well as of the future state of the FNDC. This point can
partly be explained by the fact that the planning process for a new
strategy was going on at the FNDC at the same time. On the other
hand, the fact can be explained by the different kind of perspectives
of the respondents. This distortion was tried to be avoided by asking
the interviewees to focus on the FNDC as a whole organization. In the
155 The studies are arranged in the First Degree Division and under its supervision in the service
and branch schools all over Finland.
156 Cf. The Annual Order of the FNDC for 2005 where consistency and development are
emphasized for the whole military educational system.
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future, when the strategy is completed, it will be interesting to focus
on the kind of means by which the identified misalignment will be
met.
7.7. Towards aligned practice of schooling
at the FNDC
The position taken in this study (cf. chapter 2) is that social scientific
research is and should to be a double hermeneutic process (Giddens
1984, 1990a, 2001; cf. also Habermas 1984); an interaction between
the meaningful social life of the practitioners and the social scientific
worldview. In the process the need for change is balanced by
understanding why and how the development can be achieved.
Operating at the intersection of two frames of meaning, the lay
worldview and the social scientific worldview expressed by the chosen
research programmes, the researcher has taken in chapters 6 and 7 a
close look at the current pedagogical beliefs at the FNDC needing to
be reflected both on individual and collective levels. In the following,
the focus will again be on social scientific theories, trying to bring
new theories into the military scientific knowledge base, offering some
proposals and suggestions as guiding principles for the teachers of
the FNDC and the service and branch schools. Consequently, further
learning processes emerging in the Finnish military educational system
(FMES) will be enabled by the researched social scientific knowledge.
Ultimately, as a result of the learning processes in the Finnish military
educational system, the state of pedagogical alignment will be the
desired end state to be aimed at, although never to be fully gained.
Why not? The researcher assumes that the right answer to a secondary
question is also secondary, but the fundamental question, even when
insoluble in its exact form, can be a guide to a major discovery and
deep transformations.
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Chapter Eight
THE ESSENCE OF LEARNING
AND WHAT WILL BE
LEARNED
8.1. A brief introduction to learning and
constructivism
As noted in chapter 4, the FDF aims to operate according to the
principles of the learning organization, and the official conception of
learning of the FDF was explained in chapter 4 as well. In chapters 6
and 7 it was identified how teachers and managers of the FNDC
interpret the meaning of learning. Here the intent is to shift the
perspective to a social scientific one and inquire to the depths of the
concepts of learning, knowledge and knowing.
According to Peter Jarvis (1999, 104) learning can be understood as
– A more or less permanent change in behaviour as a result of
experience.
– The acquisition of knowledge, skills and attitudes as a result of
experience.
– The transformation of experience into knowledge, skills, attitudes,
values, beliefs, senses.
– The construction and transformation of experience into knowledge,
skills, attitudes, beliefs, values, emotions, senses, etc.
In chapter 4 it was explained how the official conception of learning
in the FDF has been influenced by experiential learning and especially
by constructivism. Also here the intent is to open the black box called
constructivism and to identify what kinds of tools (i.e. theories) have
been labelled as “constructivistic” ones.
Constructivism seems to be a loose collection of theories ranging
from the philosophies of Kant, Piaget, Kuhn and Dewey to the social
scientific theories of Vygotsky (sociocultural theory; cultural-historical
activity theory), Blumer and Mead (symbolic interactionism; see e.g.
Charon 2004), Gergen (social psychological constructionism) and von
Glasersfeld (radical constructivism) (Prawat 1996; Phillips 1995;
Miettinen 2000b; Bransford, Brown & Cocking eds. 2000, 10–11).
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Psychology, and constructivism, owes a great deal to the work of
Jean Piaget (1896–1980; cf. Vygotsky 1986, 12; Wells 2001, 176).
Although Piaget revolutionized the study of the child’s speech and
thought, his work bears the stigmata of crisis characteristic of all
modern psychology. The historical development of psychology has led
to a situation in which, to borrow the words of Franz Brentano157,
there are many psychologies, but there is no one, unified psychology
(Vygotsky 1986, 13).
Piaget proposed an account of intellectual development that
emphasized the learner’s active, exploratory transactions with the
environment. Prior knowledge arises out of reciprocal processes that
Piaget called assimilation and accommodation. If the new information
appears to be compatible with what is known, it will be easily
assimilated, although it may be reformulated to some degree in the
process. If, on the other hand, it is in conflict with what is known,
either the new will be rejected or the existing knowledge will have to
be transformed in order to accommodate the new. In either case,
however, what is known by any individual is the outcome of a
continuing constructive process that depends on opportunities to
encounter and make sense of challenging new experiences. (cf. Bereiter
2002, 228–229; Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 20; Wertsch 1991, 19)
According to Vygotsky, one main flaw in Piaget’s research was his
universalistic presupposition that learners, in all essentials, are the same
at all times and places, believing that a child’s thinking goes through
certain phases and stages regardless of any instruction given (Vygotsky
1986, 176). Consequently, Piaget paid less attention to the cultural
context within which development occurs (Wells 2001, 177; Wertsch
1991: 1993, 19).
Of course, at least to some extent, Piaget also recognized the
importance of the child’s intellectual development of knowledge
obtained through social interaction with others, although he did not
consider it adequately in his theories of cognitive development (Wells
2001, 177; cf. Olson 2003, 136). According to von Glasersfeld this
criticism is unjustified because if one reads Piaget’s original works with
the necessary attention, one finds that somewhere in almost every
book he reiterates that the most important occasions for
accommodation arise in social interaction (von Glaserfeld 1995, 11).
But how then can a teacher arrange a proper context for effective
learning or is it even needed from the Piagetian perspective? Further
on, we should ask what the role of a Piagetian teacher actually is.
157 Franz Brentano (1838–1917), German philosopher and psychologist. He is famous for having
introduced the notion of intentionality to contemporary philosophy. See e.g. Varela, Thompson
& Rosch (1991, 15–16).
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According to von Glasersfeld, learning requires self-regulation and
the building of conceptual structures through reflection and
abstraction. The effective motivation to continue learning can be
fostered only by leading the students to experience the pleasure that
is inherent in solving a problem seen and chosen as one’s own. Whereas
the trainer focuses on the trainee’s performance (the behavioristic
stance), the teacher must be concerned with what goes on in the
student’s head (i.e. the constructivistic stance). (von Glasersfeld 1989,
163, 1995, 14) It seems obvious that at least radical constructivists do
not solve the perennial problem of the Cartesian split (cf. Bereiter
2002) at least if we remember that we are teaching whole human
beings instead of “heads” or “minds”.
During the development of constructivism the movement has
shifted from individual-oriented radical constructivism158 towards
social constructivism or social constructionism. In a sense social
constructivism seems to be an extension of radical constructivism,
including some appropriate and inappropriate (cf. the good and bad
features by Phillips, 1995) features. It seems to be appropriate to focus
on the individual learner (quite often an active one) both influencing
and being influenced by the social context.
Identification of the historical roots of constructivism is a necessity
in order to explain the present position of constructivism. Carl Bereiter
(2002, 293; cf. e.g. Miettinen 2000b) has argued that there seems to be
a line of pedagogical cultural evolution where constructivism (or more
precisely radical constructivism) had its proper role. Due to the fact
that this cultural evolution is proceeding we have to open the black
box named “constructivism” and focus on the different kinds of
pedagogical theories inside it (e.g. the cultural-historical activity
theory).
When analyzing radical constructivism critically, the following key
questions can be posed:
– How do we account for the fact that learners are able to build for
themselves concepts that seem fully congruent with those of
others?
– Is it useful and justified to draw people apart rather than bring
them together in a learning situation?
– If the purpose is to understand a phenomenon as learning why there
seems to be no need to go beyond the individual learner?
– How do people bridge individual and public possessions? (cf. e.g.
Sfard 1998, 7-8; Cobb 1994, 19; Miettinen 2000b)
158 Cf. Nissinen (2001) as a counterexample of this.
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Because man is fundamentally a social being, we have to make the
dialectical interdependence of social and individual processes more
explicit. Instead of focusing on the individual mind in a vacuum we
have to see him in the middle of social interactions where the very
existence of the whole (the whole person in context; cf. e.g. Toiskallio
eds. 2004, 126) is fully dependent on the parts.
Also more general questions about learning should be asked,
especially before starting the following analysis. Learning seems to
be a process where experience is transformed into knowledge and
into other individual features (skills, attitudes, values, beliefs, senses,
emotions). But what does it mean to have an experience and what do
we mean by knowledge, and what does the talk emphasizing the
difference between knowledge and knowing mean (for a start cf.
chapter 4)? How can learning be integrated into the scheme?
8.2. “Having an experience” by Kolb
Experiential learning is an important approach within the
theoretical tradition of education in almost all continents (see e.g.
von Krogh, Ichijo & Nonaka 2000 for knowledge creation; Boud &
Feletti 1997 for problem based learning). David Kolb’s book
Experiential Learning (1984) is the best known presentation of the
approach (cf. Jarvis 1987, 1992; Dixon 1994; Dierkes, Antal, Child &
Nonaka eds. 2001). As shown in chapter 4, there is a tendency in the
FDF to refer to the theories of Kolb when trying to figure out the
basics of the concept of learning. Hence, a critical analysis of Kolb’s
theory of experiential learning is in place.
In his book Experiential Learning Kolb states that the intellectual
origins of the book are in the work of John Dewey (1859–1952), Kurt
Lewin (1890-1947) and Jean Piaget (1896–1980). In the book Kolb names
his model as The Lewinian Experiential Learning Model but the model
is generally known as Kolb’s model. He emphasizes two aspects of his
learning model that are particularly noteworthy. The first is its emphasis
on here-and-now concrete experience to validate and test abstract
concepts. Kolb’s intent is to differentiate the experiential learning
theory from rationalist and other cognitive theories of learning but
also from behavioural learning theories that deny any role for
consciousness and subjective experience in the learning process.
Second, he emphasizes feedback processes familiar from the Lewinian
tradition. (Kolb 1984) Kolb’s learning model is shown in figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1 Kolb’s learning model
Source: Kolb 1984, 21.
Although widely referred to, Kolb’s model has been criticized for
being too simplistic (Jarvis 1987, 1992) and a collection of theoretically
unrelated concepts (Miettinen 2000a; Tuomi 1999). Especially Kolb’s
conception of experience has been interpreted to be a problematic
one (Miettinen 1998a; 2000a), as it assumes that experience is more or
less a mental phenomenon (Tuomi 1999) and gives an inadequate
interpretation of Dewey’s ideas. The case seems to be that Kolb both
gives a unilateral and erroneous picture of Dewey’s theory of
experience and reflective thought and action (cf. Miettinen 2000a).
Consequently, Deweyan philosophies deserve more careful analysis
than that done by David Kolb.
8.3. Experience and inquiry by Dewey
For John Dewey (1859–1952) the job of the (American) intellectual
was to attempt to address numberless social problems. For him,
addressing these ills also meant the application of philosophical wisdom
to the intelligent conduct of the affairs of social life. Dewey’s social
philosophy (cf. Pragmatism; Instrumentalism; Experimentalism) is a
combination of the inquiring and critical spirit of Charles Sanders Pierce
(1839–1914), with a focus on the issues of general and direct human
concern that interested William James (1842–1910)159.
CONCRETE 
EXPERIENCE
OBSERVATIONS 
AND 
REFLECTIONS
FORMATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
CONCEPTS AND 
GENERALIZATIONS
TESTING 
IMPLICATIONS 
OF CONCEPTS 
IN NEW 
SITUATIONS 
159 Cf. Dewey (1925) The Development of American Pragmatism in Hickman, Alexander (1998).
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John Dewey is the founder of the Chicago School of Pragmatism
with for example James H. Tufts (1862–1942) and George Herbert Mead
(1863–1931). This developing philosophical view includes
– A metaphysics that emphasizes processes and relations.
– A naturalistic and evolutionary understanding of human existence.
– An analysis of intellectual activity as problem-oriented and as
benefiting from historically developed methods.
– An emphasis upon the democratic reconstruction of society through
educational and other institutions. (Campbell 1995, 14)
There are two basic assumptions underlying this perspective
(Campbell 1995, 13): firstly, a melioristic belief that although there
cannot be guarantees that our efforts will make our situation better,
the improvement of our situation is a real possibility. Secondly, we
can learn from our mistaken efforts. The melioristic perspective160
offered by Dewey seems to be even more promising in our
“postmodern situation” when we are almost loosing our faith in the
control of social forces and the contribution of individuals. It is worth
making a difference between optimism and meliorism. According to
Dewey meliorism is the belief that the specific conditions which exist
at one moment, be they comparatively bad or comparatively good, in
any event may be bettered (Dewey 1920, cited in Campbell 1995, 261).
Meliorism thus encourages intelligent action and human effort, which
pessimism cannot, and arouses confidence and hopefulness without
relaxing us into optimistic passivity.
Not just a short-term view but first of all a long-term focus is needed
(Dewey 1930 cited in Campbell 1995, 192). According to Dewey there
is but one sure road of access to truth – the road of patient, cooperative
inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record and
controlled reflection (Dewey 1934 cited in Campbell 1995, 104).
Dewey advocates the importance of focusing upon the relationship
between ends and means. According to him the distinction between
the instrumental and the final adopted in philosophic tradition as a
solving word presents in truth a problem, a problem so deep-seated
and far-reaching that it may be said to be the problem of experience
(Dewey 1925: 1929 cited in Campbell 1995, 122). For Dewey, then, it is
not that the means justify the ends, but that the means (i.e. reflective
and progressive inquiry) are the ends161 (Dewey 1916: 1997; Glassman
2001; Campbell 1995).
160 Dewey’s use of the term “melioristic” is derived from James’s use of it to emphasize the
possibilities and the need for our efforts to attain them (Campbell 1995, 261; cf. James 1890:
1950, vol 1 and 2.)
161 Cf. George Herbert Mead, cited in Campbell (1995, 62: “the human social animal has acquired
a mind, and can bring to bear upon the problem his own past experiences and that of others,
and can test the solution that arises in his conduct. He does not know what the solution will be,
but he does know the method of the solution”).
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How then does the reflective inquiry proceed according to Dewey?
Before entering in the Deweyan process of inquiry, his conception of
experience needs to be analyzed. Dewey makes a distinction between
primary and secondary experience (Dewey 1925: 1929; Dewey 1934:
1980; cf. Campbell 1995; Miettinen 2000a). Primary experiences are
the gross, everyday activities in life that have consequences. Primary
experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of a live
creature and the environing conditions are involved in the very process
of living (Dewey 1934: 1980, 35). More fundamentally, primary
experience is an unanalyzed totality (Dewey, 1925: 1929, 10-11) and a
living reality of experience prior to the separation of the subject and
the object.
A secondary experience is a reflective experience that makes the
environment and its things objects of reflection and knowledge. As
examples of secondary experience Dewey offers the objects of both
science and philosophy, objects like theories, equations and intellectual
conventions (Campbell 1995, 72). According to Dewey there needs to
be a relationship between primary and secondary experience – it has
a dual nature (Dewey 1925: 1929, 7; cf. Engeström 1987, 223; Miettinen
2000a, 68). The ordinary role of secondary experience is to explain the
meaning of primary experience – it enables us to grasp the primary
objects with understanding, instead of just having sense-contact with
them (Dewey 1925: 1929, 7; Campbell 1995, 73). It seems to be obvious
that the Deweyan scheme comes close to the double hermeneutic
stance of Giddens and Habermas (cf. chapter 2).
Dewey tries to modify the ancient scheme of experience holding
individuals tightly within a given order subordinate to its structure
and patterns by emphasizing our inner experiences and individual
capabilities to make a contribution – to modify structures and culture.
(Dewey 1925: 1929, 143; Miettinen 2000a, 70; Campbell 1995, 68; cf.
also Kolb 1984, 1)
If then experience has a dual nature as proposed by Dewey, it is
unjustified to reduce it to just individual and psychological phenomena
(Miettinen 2000a, 70-71; cf. Olson 2003, 126) leading us finally towards
the “hands-on” fallacy (Bereiter, 2002162). However, the interaction
between our daily primary experiences and “records” of previous
cultural accomplishments needs to be understood.
162 For an alternative point of view about this issue cf. e.g. Bransford, Brown & Cocking eds.
(2000, 132/133). According to them two notions of knowledge were identified by Dewey: first,
“records” of previous cultural accomplishments and engagement in active processes as
represented by the phrase “to do”. Consequently, to emphasize “to do” is not equivalent to
“hands-on”.
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Dewey described our social situation as follows:
..experience is already overlaid and saturated with the products of
the reflection of past generations and by gone ages. It is filled with
interpretations, classifications, due to sophisticated thought, which
have become incorporated into what seems to be fresh, naïve
empirical material163 (Dewey 1925: 1929, 34; cf. Miettinen 2000a,
63).
As Dewey added,
It would take more wisdom than is possessed by the wisest historic
scholar to track all of these absorbed borrowings (prejudices) to
their original sources.. but intelligent furthering of culture demands
that we take some of them off, that we inspect them critically to
see what they are made of and what wearing them does to us.
(Dewey 1925: 1929, 34–35)
Having analyzed the Deweyan conception of experience it comes
possible to enter his interpretation of the process of inquiry. Dewey
has presented his conceptions of reflective thinking and learning
(reflective and progressive inquiry) most clearly in his works on
thought and logic: How we think (1910: 1933; especially pages 102-
118) and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938: 1991; especially pages
105-122)164
For a start let us imagine that we are drifting (wondering, day
dreaming or even consciously aiming to do something). In a way we
are continuously experiencing until we meet a perplexing situation:
When a situation arises containing a difficulty or perplexity (the
situation is the indeterminate situation), the person who finds
himself in it may take one of a number of courses. (Dewey 1910:
1933, 102; Dewey 1938: 1991, 111165).
When choosing to face the situation he begins to reflect. But when
choosing not to face the situation he refuses to reflect. So the
163 Cf. chapter 2 and the Cussinsian cognitive trails, being stabilized but sometimes in a need for
destabilizing acts.
164 Miettinen (2000a) adds also Dewey’s Essays in Experimental Logic (1916) which is not analyzed
here. Cf. also Campbell (1995, 47) for additional reading about the Deweyan process of
inquiry.
165 Jarvis (1992, 70-85) gives (cf. Jarvis 1987) a more elaborated analysis of the nine possible
types of responses to an experience grouping them into three overarching categories:
nonlearning (presumption, nonconsideration, rejection), nonreflective learning (preconscious
learning, skills learning, memorization) and reflective learning (contemplation, reflective skills
learning and experimental learning). Cf. also Schein (1993).
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reflection is not an automatic consequence of a perplex situation but
an example of human intentionality. To see that a situation requires
inquiry is the initial step in inquiry (Dewey 1938: 1991, 111), but on
the other hand an individual can  easily follow his habituated ways of
doing things even in a perplex situation.
The real opposition is not between reason and habit but between
routine, unintelligent habit, and intelligent habit or art (Dewey 1922
cited in Campbell 1995, 125). The main difference between unintelligent
and intelligent habit lies between incoherent or coherent consequences
of habits (or misaligned or aligned consequences of habits)166. In
general intelligent habits tend to have coherent consequences, and
therefore we tend to sustain them even when not aware of them.
Intelligent habits are useful to us because they free the mind for a
higher order of thinking. (Dewey 1938: 1991, 20; Dewey 1916: 1997
cited in Campbell 1995, 46)
On the other hand, habits can be unintelligent and have control
over us (Dewey 1922, cited in Campbell 1995, 124). Custom is for social
life what habit is for individual life and we can be seen as prisoners of
our customs and habits (Dewey 1910: 1933 cited in Campbell 1995,
124; Dewey 1916: 1997 cited in Campbell 1995, 44). The shift Dewey
has in mind is a shift from unintelligent habits and customs to
intelligent habits and customs achieved by reflective inquiry. Dewey
has defined inquiry as follows,
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an
indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of
the original situation into a unified whole. (Dewey 1938: 1991, 108)
When describing his logic of reflective thinking Dewey tries to avoid
the three main mistakes most characteristic of the history of logic.
One of these is highly relevant in this phase because logical theory is
quite often liberated from the unobservable, transcendental and
“intuitional” (Dewey 1938: 1991, 107). When contemplating the
analyses of Dewey’s reflective thinking made by James Campbell (1995,
47–51) and Reijo Miettinen (Miettinen 2000a, 65–67; cf. Tuomi 1999,
309) a question asked by Dewey comes to the fore: “Is the doubt put
166 In this study the concept of coherence is replaced by the concept of alignment, although
metaphorically speaking the phenomenon is the very same. It is argued that one key
characteristic of human thought is the human beings’ tendency to search for explanatory
coherence and unification (cf. e.g. Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 156;
Thagard 1992). Hence, coherence is suitable for psychological analysis and alignment refers
more or less to societal and organizational features.
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to “productive use”” (Dewey 1929 cited in Campbell 1995, 101, 148)
and is it justifiable to forget “intuitional” aspects of human beings?
Dewey has mentioned that the sequences of reflective thinking (five
phases; Dewey 1910: 1933, 1938: 1991167) are not fixed and in some (or
all?) situations a look into the future, a forecast, an anticipation, or a
prediction, should be included as a first phase of an inquiry process
(Dewey 1910: 1933, 115-117). Hence, the Deweyan model has five
phases driven by a social human being acting in a future-oriented
manner.
The moment a person begins to reflect, he necessarily begins, alone
or with someone, to observe in order to form “the facts of the case”
as Dewey explains our actions in the middle of the indeterminate
situation (Dewey 1910: 1933, 103; Dewey 1938: 1991, 113). But how
and from what kind of perspective are we looking at our indeterminate
situation and could we be aware of our perspective? Dewey refers to
this fundamental issue in the following manner:
When we look back at earlier periods, it is evident that certain
problems could not have  arisen in the context of institutions,
customs, occupations and interests that then existed, and that even
if, per impossible, they had been capable of detection and
formulation, there were no means for solving them. If we do not
see that this conditioning, both negative and positive, exists at
present, the failure to see it is due to an illusion of perspective.
(Dewey 1938: 1991, 481–482; quoted in Wertsch 1998, 40–41)
A further point that emerges is that the constraints imposed by
cultural tools are typically recognized only through a process of
comparison from the perspective of the present. Consequently, it is
usually only with the appearance of new, further empowering and
constraining forms of mediation that we recognize the limitations of
earlier ones. (cf. Wertsch 1998, 40) By conscious efforts we can partly
develop the way we see situations and influence what will be possible
to see and inquire. In an indeterminate situation, a person making a
reflective inquiry about starting needs to be aware how he is influenced
by social structures. At the same time he has a possibility to act as a
167 In How we think (1910: 1933) these five phases are 1) suggestions, 2) intellectualization of
the difficulty into a problem, 3) collection of factual material guided by a leading idea or
hypothesis, 4) the mental elaboration of the idea and 5) testing the hypothesis by overt or
imaginative action. In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938: 1991) Dewey focuses more on the
uncertain, unsettled, disturbed and indeterminate situation. Miettinen (2000a; cf. also Tuomi
1999) defines these five phases as 1) disturbance and uncertainty: habit does not work, 2)
intellectualization and definition of the problem, 3) studying the conditions of the situation
and formation of a working hypothesis, 4) reasoning and 5) testing the hypothesis in action.
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knowledgeable agent with all human capabilities (e.g. anticipating,
using his intuitive capabilities and making suggestions (Dewey 1910:
1933, 103–108)) in the comparative learning process.
Imagine that you are acting in an indeterminate situation where
some perplexities have just emerged. You have decided to reflect on
the situation at hand, anticipating some courses of action.
Undoubtedly, the situation rather often demands progressive inquiry
with the help of experts, some methods and techniques (cf. Dewey
1938: 1991, 108).
It is a familiar, and according to Dewey, also a significant saying
that a problem well put is half-solved (Dewey 1938: 1991, 112). To find
out what the problem and problems are which an indeterminate
situation presents to be inquired into, is to be well along in the inquiry.
To make a mistake about the problem involved is to make the
subsequent inquiry irrelevant or to go astray (Dewey 1938: 1991;
quoted in Campbell 1995). Hence, the importance of well-put problems
can not be overemphasized while the inquirer continues his inquiry
process.
Observation of facts and suggested meanings or ideas arise and
develop in correspondence with others:
Some observed facts point to an idea that stands for a possible
solution. This idea evokes more observations. Some of the newly
observed facts link up with those previously observed and are such
as to rule out other observed things with respect to their evidential
function. The new order of facts suggests a modified idea (or
hypothesis) which occasions new observations whose result again
determines a new order of facts, and so on until the existing order
is both unified and complete. In the course of this serial process,
the ideas that represent possible solutions are tested or “proved”
(Dewey 1938: 1991, 117).
In the end of the analysis of the Deweyan way of thinking it seems
to be useful to link these ideas to the present situation at the FNDC.
For the teachers at the FNDC, struggling along the dimension between
the possibility and the impossibility of the influential developmental
efforts or for the managers struggling with the case of controllability
and uncontrollability of the educational transformation, the melioristic
faith exemplified by Dewey seems to offer one of the needed props:
“Specific conditions which exist at one moment, be they comparatively
bad or comparatively good, in any event may be bettered”. Secondly
“a problem well put is half-solved”. For a potential learning
organization, as the FNDC, the fixing of the unbroken is obviously a
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needless activity. For a start the personnel of the FNDC have to have
courage and an organizational climate allowing authentic problems
to be put on the table in an open discussion. When this becomes
possible, fundamental questions (i.e. well put problems) rather than
secondary ones can to be discussed.
The third Deweyan prop is the idea of the means and ends. Using
Meadian words to explain the Deweyan idea this prop could be formed
as follows: “We do not know what the solution will be, but we do
know the method of the solution”. The needed method is the
progressive inquiry scrutinized also by Dewey. When seeking solutions
to our current research problems we cannot stop here, but have to
continue our path of inquiry by the following cognitive trails.
8.4. Levels and loops of learning based on
Bateson
Along the journey to find the most fruitful learning theories it is
time to introduce the learning theories of Gregory Bateson (1904-
1980). It is essential to know more about his theories before entering
the analysis of the learning theories of Chris Argyris, Donald Schön
and Yrjö Engeström. The intent is to introduce the basic ideas and
concepts of Bateson’s learning theories and how the above mentioned
scholars have used them in their own research.
In chapter 4, when analyzing the theories of Nonaka, cybernetics
was discussed. Now these theories come again to the fore, as the roots
of Bateson’s learning theories lie partly in cybernetic theories.
According to Bateson, all biological and evolving systems are
homeostatic, i.e., the effects of changes of input168 will be negated
and the steady state maintained by reversible and hierarchic
adjustments. All evolving systems need adaptation and flexibility in
order to live and exist (Bateson 1972, 273–274).
Gregory Bateson (1972, 293) divides learning (adaptation) into five
hierarchical levels. Zero learning is a label for non-corrective behaviour.
Learning I is a label for the revision of choice (response) within an
unchanged set of alternatives. It is equivalent to the formation of
unconscious operations in the course of simple adaptation to existing
external conditions (cf. Leont’ev 1981, 237; Engeström 1987, 145). In
Learning II the set of alternatives is unconsciously revised. In other
words the system learns to learn (deutero-learning). Learning III means
change in the process of revising the set of alternatives in Learning II.
168 According to Ashby (1956), disturbances.
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Learning III is motivated by the resolution of the contradictions or
double binds of Learning II. On level III the individual learns to change
consciously the habits acquired by Learning II. According to Bateson
Learning IV is a “theoretical label” because probably it does not occur
in any adult living organism on this earth.
Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1974, 1978) distinguish two levels
of behavioural learning: single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris
& Schön 1974, 18; cf. Ashby 1956). In single-loop learning we act
according to a set of alternatives, but in double-loop learning we can
learn to change our governing variables. There is no need to reduce
Bateson’s learning levels to the loops proposed by Argyris and Schön,
but despite of that it seems interesting to compare these views and
try to understand the transition from single-loop (cf. Learning II
unconsciously) to double-loop (cf. Learning III consciously) learning.
What are then the necessary ingredients for a double bind situation
maybe making the transition from single-loop (cf. Learning II) to
double-loop learning (cf. Learning III) to happen? According to Bateson
(1972, 206-207) a double bind needs two or more persons, repeated
experience, some contradictive injunctions (primary, secondary and
tertiary) 169 until the set of these ingredients can be learned by the
individual in question. Bateson offers a useful example to clarify the
double bind situation with a story of a Zen master and his pupil,
The Zen master attempts to bring about enlightenment in his pupils
in various ways. One of the things he does is to hold a stick over
the pupil’s head and say fiercely, “If you say this stick is real, I will
strike you with it. If you say this stick is not real, I will strike you
with it. [Then what may the student do in this “what do you do if
you “cannot” do anything situation?] The Zen pupil might reach
up and take the stick away from the master. (ibid, 208)
In this example the Zen master offers some hints about the proper
set of alternatives but the pupil does not act according to ready-made
alternatives; he solves the double bind by revising the available set of
alternatives, as the purpose of the Zen master was. The very nature of
the pupil’s actual and indeterminate situation seems to evoke inquiry
for the potentials of the situation (cf. Dewey 1938: 1991, 109)
accelerated by the intentionality of the pupil.
169 Also Argyris and Schön have for a long time proposed that in all kinds of organizations
people are familiar with double bind and contradictive situations. They describe these as a no-
win game where the rules (governing variables) of the game are undiscussable (Argyris &
Schön 1978, 118, 121–123).
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Yrjö Engeström has developed the double bind concept further and
defines it as follows:
A double bind is a social, societally essential dilemma which cannot
be resolved through separate individual actions alone – but in which
joint co-operative actions can push a historically new form of activity
into emergence (Engeström 1987, 165; italics added).
What kind of relation may there exist between double binds and
contradictions and do the human needs and intentionality play some
role in this game? Engeström explains that to him the double bind is
the psychological and experienced counterpart of the secondary
contradiction of the activity (Engeström 1987, 188–189, 322).
Being already familiar with Engeström’s view on contradictions (cf.
chapter 4), it needs to be reminded that the theoretical analysis of
contradictions is also a wider sociological phenomenon. According to
Giddens the concept of contradiction is an indispensable one in social
theory, and his proposal is to use it in two senses (Giddens 1984, 193,
197, 373): that of “existential contradiction” and that of “structural
contradiction”. By existential contradiction he refers to an elemental
aspect of human existence in relation to nature or the material world
(cf. the famous Cartesian split). Structural contradiction refers to the
constitutive features of human societies where structural principles
operate in terms of each other, but yet also contravene each other
(e.g. the necessity to cooperate while competing). But in all kinds of
societies the suppression of existential questions and problems cannot
be wholly complete. Indeed, they are fundamental to the structural
contradictions of capitalism.
Giddens argues that the primary contradiction of the capitalist
(nation-)state is to be found in the mode in which a “private” (an
individual) sphere of “civil society” is created, but is separate from
and in tension with the “public” (a social) sphere of the state (Giddens
1984, 197). Contradictions tend to emerge because of divisions of
interests between different groupings or categories of people, but
there exists something more fundamental. For example the
sociologists Raymond Boudon (1982) and Jon Elster (as well as Giddens)
associate contradiction with the unintended consequences of action170.
Contadictory consequences ensue when every individual in an
aggregate of individuals acts in a way which, while producing the
intended effect if done in isolation, creates a perverse effect if done
by everyone171 (Giddens 1984, 311).
170 The unintended refers to the phenomenon that is partly but not fully anticipated in advance.
171 As a clarifying example can be seen the officers of the FNDC acting according to the “static
warrior premises”, the societal consequences being unintended and perverse ones –
unadaptability to the local and global culturally evolving conditions.
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Here it is argued that the key to understanding the roots of
“existential contradiction” lies in the conceptualization and
understanding of the human being. Does he have a relatively free will
and intentionality and to what extent are his actions determined by
social structures? Further on it seems to be essential whether his sphere
of interest is a narrow individualistic not considering the effects of his
actions on others or not (cf. Boudon 1982, 153–205).
It seems to be intrinsic to us as humans to be curious in order to
live. Because we are fundamentally social beings, the admission of
this prerequisite seems to be more appropriate than ever. Traditionally
we tend to see the extension of human conscious control over nature,
but it is a logical impossibility e.g. when remembering our unknown
unconsciousness and its coefficient consequences. A fundamental shift
of view seems to be needed and the main question is not what needs
to be changed in the public sphere but ultimately how to improve our
private sphere (ourselves) in order to act more responsibly in the public
sphere. If this curiosity emerges in the public sphere it is a proof of
human intentionality and need to act according to some collective
purpose. But even then the collective can not control the whole system
without most of us controlling ourselves. How do we personally
activate and solve our double binds while facing societal
contradictions? In this process the individual has a relationship with
the world and both actively generate each other (Engeström 1987,
163) while solving their existential contradiction.
It needs to be added that the individual double binds need to be
taken into account, but this has to be done in concert with
organizational contradictions. In a sense there is an intrinsic tension
between individual double binds and social contradictions. The
capability to solve one’s own double binds in the public sphere implies
an individual source of energy for the movement (i.e. development)
of the activity system. On the other hand contradictions cause172 some
social self-movement of the activity system. In other words, these
consequences emerge partly because of human intentionality but
partly because of “unintended” consequences in the public sphere.
Chris Argyris and Donald Schön give us an illuminating example
about the inner contradictions of a bureaucratic organization (Argyris
& Schön 1978, 120–123; in Engeström’s terms secondary contradictions).
172 In chapter 3 this argument was set against the question posed by Larry Cuban (1999): “How
to explain the identified stability in the midst of several contradictions?”  Here it seems to be
useful to be reminded of the set of alternatives possible for the individual human being in
question: nonlearning (presumption, nonconsideration, rejection), nonreflective learning
(preconscious learning, skills learning, memorization) and reflective learning (contemplation,
reflective skills learning and experimental learning) (Jarvis, 1987, 1992). But on a societal level
the causes of contradictions are fundamentally a matter of time and how we understand the
root causes of the societal change.
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According to them designers of organizations tend to think
hierarchically about the organizations, just as they think hierarchically
about complex problems in general. In order to minimize the
organization’s loss and maximize its gains, complex tasks (the mini-
max strategy) have to be broken down into relatively simple ones and
grouped for ease of recognition and control. The resulting
specialization of work, with its associated pyramid, appears to the
designers to make it easier to find people, educate them to the
requirements of the organization, and manage them.
The inner contradictions arise from the fact that the mini-max
strategy is used on individuals, forgetting their individual potentials.
The forgetting is even more lethal when understanding that both the
external environment and the internal environment of the
organization demand continual reflection and monitoring to meet
the various challenges (e.g. “chaos”; complexity; requisite variety;
information overflow)
As mentioned above, in order to have double-loop learning we
should make our undiscussable governing variables (beliefs, values;
root causes; principles and even basic premises) into discussable ones
and change them consciously (a shift from Model I theories-in-use to
Model II theories-in-use). Based on several decades of field studies Chris
Argyris and Donald Schön argue that all people tend to use the same
theory-in-use (actual rules in use) especially when facing
embarrassment or threat. On the other hand people have a wide scale
of espoused theories of action, but they are not necessarily governed
by them (cf. e.g. Griseri 1998).
The shared governing values (variables) of Model I theories-in-use
are: define goals and try to achieve them (define goal and purpose
alone; be a strong leader), maximize winning and minimize losing
(changing them would be a sign of weakness), minimize generating
or expressing negative feelings (permitting others to express their
feelings tends to be seen as a poor strategy) and be rational (the
counterpart to minimize feelings value) (Argyris & Schön 1974, 66-67,
1978, 61). These shared values will be challenged during this analysis
in the reverse order (cf. chapter 8): could it be possible that instead of
rational decision makers we are more or less arational or occasionally
even irrational actors? Is it possible that feelings play some role in our
decision making system? Is it possible that instead of “win-lose” games
we could have “win-win” games, finally understanding how dependent
our success is of the vitality of the whole network? How well defined
and shared goals do we as “rational” decision makers have?
Governed by the above mentioned values people tend to adopt
some general action strategies: design and manage the environment
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unilaterally, own and control the task, unilaterally protect yourself
and unilaterally protect others from being hurt (Argyris & Schön 1974,
1978). Carrying out these action strategies effectively leads to a
paradox. The paradox is that implementing these strategies requires
other people to act ineffectively by the very terms of Model I. But as
mentioned, by challenging the governing values and variables of the
dominant Model I theories-in-use we could cause some changes in our
habituated ways to act.
In the process of organizational learning the individuals should be
guided by the governing values of Model II theory-in-use: valid
information, informed choice, and responsibility to monitor how well
the choice is implemented (Argyris 1990, 104). In organizations,
conditions for error tend to exist but by corrective responses, guided
by Model II values, the solution of the paradoxical situation can be
found (cf. e.g. Argyris & Schön 1978, 59). Consequently, organizational
theories of action could be restructured.
In chapters 6 and 7 the intent was to take the governing variables
under discussion while tacit features were converted into an explicit
form with the aim of revising the current habituated sets of
alternatives at the FNDC. The revision can be done by other alternatives
progressively sought by social scientific research.
Interestingly, the question of contradictions allows us to see the
looming question of an appropriate sphere of interest. If
contradictions can be seen to play an essential role in our learning
processes, could the sphere of interest (or field of vision) restrict or
enable us to feel the double binds and contradictions? In a way the
widened sphere of interest increases the amount of potential
contradictions and double binds, consequently potentially accelerating
the research process and learning173. Hence, the crucial question seems
to be whether we continue to focus on trees instead of forests. This
question is especially important to the agents dealing with human
security issues. What kind of a role contradictions play and how we
otherwise conceptualize our perspective on the societal change, will
be clarified later.
The analysis suggests that the resolution of individual double binds
and social contradictions enables the transition towards qualitatively
higher levels of learning to happen. This potential transition is a
concrete phenomenon involving continuous movement from
operations to actions to activity – or vice versa (cf. Engeström 1987,
173 According to the Peter Senge, Otto Scharmer, Joseph Jaworski & Betty Sue Flowers (2005)
two types of learning can be identified. Both types of learning seem to be a real possibility and
the main difference between these types of learning is the depth of awareness and the
consequent source of action.
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154, 163; Leont’ev 1981) during learning activities (cf. chapter 4). At
this phase the Leont’evian three-level scheme can be linked to the
chosen learning theories and to the human dimension as presented in
figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2 Leont’evian three-level scheme linked to the chosen learning
theories
Source: Cf. Engeström 1987, 154.
In the Age of Innovations it is crucial to understand how these
innovations are made on all the Leont’evian levels. It is even more
interesting to recognize that above the Leont’evian levels there is a
“fourth level” playing an ever-increasing role also in innovations (cf.
Tuomi 2004; Hamel 1996174, 2000175).
The “fourth level” is justifiable when remembering that all activity
systems are mediated by both material and psychological tools (i.e.
concepts). Some special activities, for example the social scientific
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174 Hamel (1996) emphasizes radical innovations instead of incremental innovations, insisting
that in any industry there are the rule makers who occasionally rewrite the rules of the game
to others to follow. Hamel gives some principles of the industrial revolution and one of these
is the needed new perspective to look at the industry’s conventions and the revolutionary
ideas. Undoubtedly the meaningfulness of ideas has run through the social scientific thinking
since Plato with his realm of pure ideas separate from human knowledge (cf. e.g. Bereiter,
2002, appendix for a short introduction into the issue; for further readings see Russell, 1946;
James, 1890: 1950, vol 1 and 2).
175 For a figurative example see Tuomi (2002); von Hippel & von Krogh (2003); von Hippel
(2005) about the idea of open source software programming presenting a novel, successful
and transformative alternative to conventional innovation models. Cf. also Wood & Hamel
(2002); Rigby & Zook (2002) about the centrality of ideas in our current Age of Innovations.
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research, produce concepts (e.g. the Nonakaian knowledge assets or
Bereiterian conceptual artifacts) to be used in other activities as
mediators. This means that to some extent these activities (both the
initiator and end-user activities) are guided by these concepts, and
consequently we can say that the meaningful “fourth level” emerges
above the Leont’evian three level scheme.176 Consequently, continuous
movement between the four levels is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for transformational learning.
8.5. Expansive learning
According to Yrjö Engeström, the expansive learning cycle begins
with individual subjects questioning the accepted practice, and it
gradually expands into a collective movement or institution
(Engeström 1999a). The expansive cycle or spiral is achieved through
specific epistemic or learning actions as follows:
– The first action is that of questioning, criticizing, or rejecting some
aspects of the accepted practice and existing wisdom.
– The second action is that of analyzing the situation. One type of
analysis is historical-genetic, seeking to explain the situation by
tracing its origination and evolution. Another type of analysis is
actual-empirical, seeking to explain the situation by constructing a
picture of its inner systemic relations.
– The third action is that of modelling the newly found explanatory
relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable medium.
This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of the new
idea that explains and offers a solution to the problematic situation.
– The fourth action is that of examining the model, running,
operating, and experimenting on it in order to fully grasp its
dynamics, potentials, and limitations.
– The fifth action is that of implementing the model, concretizing it
by means of practical applications, enrichments, and conceptual
extensions.
– The sixth and seventh actions are those of reflecting on and
evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes into a new,
stable form of practice. (Engeström 1999a177; Tuomi 1999).
176 It needs to be recognized that also the other levels of the Leont’evian scheme are influenced
by the conceptual production on a third level. For example new kind of concepts may cause
some consequences on the level of actions (i.e. influencing individual human beings; giving
new kind of “mindsets”, “angles” and ways to see thinks).
177 In Engeström (1987) the expansive cycle is explained to have five epistemic actions:
questioning, analyzing, modeling, applying and consolidating-reflecting; cf.  Toiviainen
(2003).
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Now it is possible to put some flesh on the Engeströmian bones
when being reminded of the experiences gained through the
Development Laboratory meetings (cf. chapter 6). From the very first
meeting the intent of the researcher was to focus on the accepted
educational practices at the FNDC. The aim was to criticize the current
educational practices and enable the participants to do so, but not to
fix the unbroken. As presented, to some extent the societal questioning
and criticizing began in the meetings178 despite of the overall tendency
to throw the hands up and feel the overwhelming impossibility to
have some developmental influence on the FNDC as a whole.
When analyzing the situation of the FNDC, the researcher traced
the origins and evolution of the military educational system and
identified two key paradoxes – the university-scientific versus military
organization paradox or the USMO paradox, and the Soldier’s Basic
Paradox. It was argued that these paradoxes and the latent secondary
contradiction179 could cause different kinds of manifestations to
emerge in the FNDC, as was shown in chapter 7.
Thirdly a new kind of model of military innovativeness was shown
to the participants of the Development Laboratory meetings and also
to the interviewed managers of the FNDC. The example of an individual
teacher producing an educational innovation, the learning log, to the
FNDC was an exemplary one. The example was actually only one in a
long string of educational innovations already made in the departments
of the FNDC waiting to be distributed into the whole FMES.
One way out of the problematic situation was shown to be the
emphasis on shared authentic values. The espoused value of expertise
played and still plays a pivotal role in this process. If then the FNDC is
espousing how highly it values expertise, it has to develop some
methods to identify what will be labelled as “good” or “bad” expertise
and how it will be possible to help the expertise of the teachers and
researchers of the FNDC to flourish. The idea of valuing teachers’
expertise was concretized in the form of the Teacher’s Self-Evaluation
Sheet. In other words the sheet allows the teachers to explicitly grasp
their personal ideas about the good expertise of military training and
education.
It seems to be possible that at some phase in the future this kind of
potentially expansive process will turn into an authentically expansive
learning process180. While the history of the FNDC helps to uncover
the contradictions and potentials of the activity system of the FNDC,
178 Cf. The excerpts of chapter 6.
179 Between the subject (the individual teacher) and the community.
180 During the research process for example the Change Laboratory Method was included in
the written curriculum of the Cadet Courses.
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it does not tell us how these contradictions are to be resolved (cf.
Engeström 2004c, 156) – this duty has been left to the personnel of
the FNDC. In chapter 7 it was argued that these paradoxes and the
identified secondary contradiction seem to be made into a solvable
form along the identified key educational dimensions. But before that
we have to put our doubt on the productive use: Is the development
of our teachers’ “core competencies” (i.e. action competence)
necessary and if it is, how can it be done without individually and
socially reflecting on the current practices at the FNDC?
Back to the theoretical debate. Engeström’s expansive learning cycle
seems to be related to Dewey’s sequences of reflective thinking. Both
Dewey and Engeström see that in the beginning the learner starts to
question the habituated ways of doing things. This point implicitly
gives another relevant alternative for us: to not learn and stick
stubbornly to our habituated ways of acting despite of some changes
in the environment (i.e. the area of operations). From some justifiable
angle the normal course of actions can be potentially disturbed,
needing to be fixed. It is questionable to what extent a problem
emerges without any human awareness of the problem. As emphasized
above, a problem well put is half-solved and a problem needs to be
mentally elaborated and societally justified in order to get a status –
the authentic societal problem or the fundamental problem.
As the empirical research shows, social emergence is not any
automatic and self-evident happening. As Peter Jarvis (1987, 28–36,
1992, 70–78; cf. e.g. Schein 1993) has explained, types of responses to
an experience include also nonlearning (presumption,
nonconsideration, rejection) and nonreflective learning (e.g.
preconscious learning and memorization). Referring to Bateson, the
shift from unconscious Learning II to conscious Learning III is a crucial
one and the transition needs a human “touch” or otherwise it does
not happen. Referring to the studies made by Argyris and Schön, the
transition from single-loop learning to double-loop learning can be
done socially, making the governing variables discussable and taking
them under close scientific scrutiny. On the other hand, referring to
the studies made by Engeström, the dominant role of the quaternary
contradictions of our global knowledge society can be emphasized
emerging from the various kinds of consequences of our actions and
activities.
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8.6. The social theory of learning
The research made by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991; Wenger
1998) is included in the present scheme (cf. chapter 4) as a
representative of the fifth generation of CHAT. As explained above,
CHAT has been evolved by synthesizing the original individualistic
tendency of Vygotsky to the social tendency of Leont’ev. In his
foreword to Situated Learning (1991) by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger,
William F. Hanks argues that Lave and Wenger have “located learning
squarely in the processes of coparticipation, not in the heads of
individuals” (Lave & Wenger 1991, 13). But actually Lave and Wenger
do not mean that when focusing on learning we should forget heads
if analysing how whole persons learn while participating in the
activities of social communities. Lave and Wenger actually emphasize
that it is significant to shift the analytical focus from the individual as
a learner to learning as participation in the social world – but without
loosing sight of the head, or more hopefully of the whole participating
person in the world.
Lave and Wenger have developed the concept legitimate peripheral
participation (LPP) to serve as a conceptual bridge between processes
changing persons and changing communities of practice. By this they
mean to draw attention to the point that learners inevitably
participate in communities of practitioners and that the mastery of
knowledge and skill requires newcomers to move toward full
participation in the sociocultural practices of a community. Later when
extending the analysis, Etienne Wenger (1998, 12) gave the spotlight,
instead of LPP, to the identity and community of practice in his social
theory of learning. In a way the concept of communities of practice
developed by Lave and Wenger offers a balancing stick for us wavering
between individual and social structures; in other words it guides us
how to live in the middle (Wertsch 1998).
According to Wenger we do not have one but two dimensions to
waver between. In his analysis Wenger develops a social theory of
learning to be located at the intersection of intellectual traditions
along two main axes, as illustrated in figure 8.3 (Wenger 1998).
Wenger introduces several dualities as opposed of dichotomies because
both these aspects are always present to some degree (Wenger 1998,
66; cf. Giddens 1984, 30).
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Figure 8.3 The position of the social theory of learning in the field of social
sciences
Source: Wenger 1998, 12.
In the tradition of social theory, the vertical axis is a central one. It
reflects a tension between theories that give primacy to social structure
(social determinisms) and those giving primacy to action (interactionist
paradigm) (Wenger 1998; cf. Giddens 1979, 1984; Boudon 1982).
Obviously Wenger avoids “the normal lack of grounding in genuine
social theory” (Berends, Boersma & Weggeman 2003, 1038) but mere
sociological grounding is not an appropriate solution181 if the answer
is the mechanistic determinism of institutions over individuals and our
current situation in the world over ourselves as being socially
autopoietic (Luhmann 1995). In his theory of social learning Etienne
Wenger rejects the radical pessimism of some forms of postmodernism
(Wenger 1998, 297) by releasing an individual human being from “the
slavery”182 of existing structures, although giving to him a shared
responsibility of this all.
Giddens identifies four different mechanisms of social change
(Giddens 1990b, 304–305183; Mingers 2003): system reproduction – the
social theory of learning theories of identitytheories of practice
theories of social 
structure
theories of situated 
experience
181 In the field of pedagogically oriented research David Olson (2003) gives such an example in
his analysis of educational reform by locating his analysis strongly in the Durkheimian tradition.
182 In this context “the slavery” is rather strongly used as a metaconcept instead of non-
meaningfulness, misalignment et cetera.
183 Cf. Giddens (2001, 42-46) where he argues that we can identify three main factors that have
consistently influenced social change: the physical environment, the political organization
and cultural factors (i.e. effects of religion, communication systems, leadership and ideas/
ideals, and science (i.e. the emergence of “rational” or critical modes of thought). According
to Sennett (1998, 30) “change” tends to mean just “drifting” without any long term planning
in our contemporary societies where “corrosion of character” often seems to be the fact.
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incremental and unintended drift of social practices; system
contradiction – conflicts of interests within and between social systems;
reflexive appropriation – conscious shaping of social systems by often
radical interventions; and resource access – changes generated by
changing availabilities of resources. Individual actors play a dominant
role in these changes even to the extent that without human agency
human societies or social systems would plainly not exist. But actors
do not create social systems: instead they reproduce or transform
them, remaking what is already made in the continuity of praxis
(Giddens 1984, 171).
Naturally the FNDC can be seen to be under continuous system
reproduction by the unintended cultural drift of social practices184. At
the same time the FNDC is in the midst of conflicting interests between
military organizations and scientific universities. Hence the emergence
of the USMO paradox, as explained in chapter 7. The reflexive
appropriation is a real potentiality for the FNDC but when following
the Giddensian line of sociological thinking, as Wenger has done,
human active contribution to the improvement of social structures
cannot be taken for granted. According to Giddens (1984, 9), agency
refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their
capability of doing those things in the first place. Hence, an agent
could openly interact or lack interaction, being in every case the
perpetrator of the intended and unintended consequences of action.
But curiously the current state of organizational silence at the FNDC
can be caused by the otherwise knowledgeable teachers being unaware
of the unintended consequences of the lack of interaction on the
widening spheres between departments, between divisions of the
FNDC and between the national and international military educational
institutions.
Also the fourth Giddensian mechanism for social change needs to
be highlighted – changes generated by changing availabilities of
resources. In our age the expansion of available key resources seems
to be a fact, at least when considering the mere availability of the raw
substance for the resource of our age (i.e. knowledge), which
consequently accelerates the pace of the global change processes.
In the midst of the information overflow and turbulences of our
social landscape it needs to be recognized that according to Wenger
(1998), education, in its deepest sense and at whatever age it takes
place, concerns the opening of identities – exploring new ways of being
that lie beyond our current state. Issues of education should be
184 According to Senge (1990, 22) the greatest danger of all for us is the drifting caused by
gradual change, ourselves being unaware of it. To avoid these kinds of dangers the sphere of
interests, the question of time frames, possibilities for societal reflections and for example of
the overall purpose comes to the fore.
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addressed first and foremost in terms of identities and modes of
belonging and only secondarily in terms of skills and information.
Consequently, according to Wenger, learning is not a pure skill and an
information accumulation process but a continuous process of
becoming or “not becoming” and missing the “right” position on the
social landscape. For the personnel of the FNDC these ideas hopefully
mean for example continuous negotiations about identities185, showing
the formative or even transformative potential of the education for
those organizations seeking to sustain their vitality also in the future.
The main principles of the social perspective of learning may be
summarized by the following list (emerging questions have been
added),
– Learning is inherent in human nature: it is an ongoing and integral
part of our lives – how about social learning or organizational
learning?
– Learning is first and foremost the ability to negotiate new meanings
and it involves our whole person.
– Learning creates emergent structures (cf. communities of practice)
– does the lack of these emergent structures mean that the
potentialities have not turned into actualities, needing active agents
to set the system into motion?
– Learning is fundamentally experiential and fundamentally social;
learning can be defined as a realignment of experience and
competence, whichever pulls the other – learning could potentially
offer means to cure the misalignment currently identified at the
FNDC.
– Learning transforms our identities.
– Learning constitutes trajectories of participation in a process of
individual and collective becoming – but interestingly also non-
participation is needed.
– Learning means dealing with boundaries (between activity systems
and communities) – between the schooling and the workplace;
between the military and civilian spheres of interests; between the
military science and the social science; between the national and
international military educational institutions.
– Learning is a matter of social energy and power.
– Learning is a matter of engagement and imagination (a reflective
practice).
– Learning is a matter of imagination.
185 Some tentative topics to be discussed can be offered: “What does it mean to be a “good
teacher”?” “The national officer as an international collaborator in the human security activities
– maybe having Euro-Military Identity?” (cf. e.g. Royl 2002; 2004); “The officer as a teacher-as-
researcher at the FNDC?” (cf. e.g. Toiskallio ed. 2004, 112); “Is our ultimate aim to win the next
battle or war or instead of facing new kinds of security threats by configured means?” (cf. e.g.
Toiskallio 2002, 8)
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– Learning is a matter of alignment.
– Learning involves an interplay between the local and the global
(cf. Wenger 1998, 226–228).
For the personnel of the FNDC the notion of identity186 seems to
emphasize the needed multimembership and consequently brokering
across boundaries between practices. Interestingly Wenger sees the
multimembership as a critical source of learning. By these
multimemberships the personnel of the FNDC could potentially use
the world as a resource as well as to be a resource for others especially
in the same field of human security activities.
When focusing on the crucial boundaries of practices, the brokers187,
boundary encounters and boundary practices have to be taken to the
fore (Wenger 1998, 108-121; cf. Burt 1992). Human agency seems to
be needed for effective brokering and fruitful boundary encounters,
enabling ongoing mutual engagements to happen, and finally the
emergence of boundary practice. Consequently the essentiality of the
brokering done by individual actors is balanced by the collective
brokering practices (cf. Sverrison 2001188).
For the FNDC this means that it has to be aware of the current
individual brokers (or alternatively of bridge builders) in action, but
on the other hand it has to enable new kinds of boundary practices to
emerge. The FNDC needs to focus on the solving of the Soldier’s Basic
Paradox as well as the USMO paradox because the individually made
solutions to these paradoxes play an essential role in the processes of
constituting and sustaining the identities of the officers of the future.
On the other hand the continuous modifications of identities
happening between the civilian and the military security institutions
seem to be a potential source of learning for the FNDC.
186 Later when analyzing the progressive-inquiry learning model proposed by Hakkarainen,
Lonka, and Lipponen (2004) the notion of identity has been brought to the fore mainly
referring to the analysis made by Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, and Cain (1998) (cf. Hakkarainen
et al. 2004, 218). Holland with his disciples identify two approaches on identity: A culturalist
and an opposing constructivist interpretation. Their perspective puts these interpretations
together in a dialogic frame (Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner & Cain 1998, 9–15). Referring to
Wenger (1998, 151) Toiskallio (2002, 113) explains how identity is a way of being in the world
and who we are lies in the way we live from day to day, not just in what we think or say about
ourselves.
187 According to Peter Monge and Noshir Contractor (2003, 143) the social role of brokers was
first introduced into sociology by Georg Simmel (1955) with the concept of the tertius gaudens,
which translates literally as “the third who benefits”.
188 Sverrison distinguished three approaches to knowledge brokering: networking brokerage
(bridging otherwise separated people; cf. chapter 6), knowledge-oriented brokerage (bridging
and translating theoretical conceptions and approaches; cf. the present study) and brokerage
of organizational or technological novelties (cf. chapter 6). Cf. also Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola & Lehtinen (2004, 77); Tuomi-Gröhn & Engeström eds. (2003); Engeström, Engeström
& Kärkkäinen (1995).
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It needs to be recognized that boundary crossing is a difficult and
tension-laden action and activity (Wenger 1998). An example of the
military scientific researcher offers a useful clarification to the point.
Communities define themselves by contrast to others – military officers
versus civilians, practitioners versus researchers. To the military
scientific researcher this could mean being marginalized as an officer
and as a teacher while the big picture of the social landscape is
neglected due to lack of researchers and interests to do so. At the
moment the FNDC is modifying this kind of big picture and locating
itself in the social landscape of the globalizing world while answering
the crucial questions as follows: what do we attempt to know and
understand and what do we choose to ignore? With whom do we
seek connections when trying to understand these issues?
After the social landscape is simplified to an understandable form
to be collectively scanned, the personnel have to face the complexity
of the brokering and bridge building activities. This involves processes
of translation, coordination, and alignment between perspectives. The
bridge builders play a pivotal role in the process, being not just
intruders of the outer practices (cf. Wenger 1998) but accelerators of
the organizational learning processes.
The process of alignment bridges time and space to form broader
enterprises so that the participants become connected through the
coordination of their energies, actions, and practices. Through
alignment, we become part of something big because we do what it
takes to play our part in the identified social landscape (Wenger 1998,
179). By turning misalignment into alignment we can amplify our power
and our sense of the possibilities – in a way turning the impossible
towards possible.
In the field of educational studies John Biggs (2003) has famously
elaborated the meaning of alignment. According to him alignment,
or constructive alignment, means that the critical components to be
aligned and balanced are the curriculum, the teaching methods, the
assessment procedures, the climate with the students and the
institutional climate (the rules and procedures we have to follow) (Biggs
2003, 26; cf. Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 312; Lindblom-Ylänne & Nevgi
eds. 2003, 253–254).
8.6.1. Communities of practice as emergent social
properties for learning and alignment
The concept of communities of practice can be seen as a balancing
stick for us wavering between for example our individuality and social
structures, and in boundary areas between different kinds of activity
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systems. In the case of communities of practice it needs to be
recognized that although the concept has been developed among the
researchers of the cultural-historical activity theory, it has been cross-
appropriated189 (cf. Spinosa et al. 1997) to the field of knowledge
management. Hence, when focusing on the concept we could
recognize how the relationship with learning and knowledge creation
takes shape.
If and when we share the intent to understand both theoretical
and practical aspects of the communities of practice-concept we have
to be aware of its historical roots, because only this way the concept
can be understood (Engeström 2001a; Vygotsky 1978). This point
reminds us about the Vygotskyan core principles, namely, the example
of reliance on genetic, or developmental, analysis. Genetic-
developmental analysis in Vygotsky’s approach is motivated by the
assumption that it is possible to understand many aspects of mental
functioning only if one understands their origin and the transitions
they have undergone (Wertsch 1991, 19; Wertsch 1985, 14–15).
According to Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder (2002, x) the field
of knowledge management has gone through three waves190. The first
wave emphasized technology and codification strategy191. The second
wave focused on behaviour, culture, and tacit knowledge192. Now the
third wave has turned its attention to communities of practice193
providing a concrete organizational infrastructure for realizing the
dream of a learning organization. It can be asked whether it could be
realizing also the dream of a knowledge creating organization, and
what the relationship between communities of practice and Ba is (cf.
chapter 4).
Communities of practice are not a universal silver bullet to ever
lasting success, although in the field of knowledge management
theories and practices they are often understood as such. They are
not meant to replace teams or other organizational constellations as
structures for production and services. More than silver bullets they
could be seen as tools to bring the principles of organizational learning
into the social reality (Wenger 1998, 85; Wenger, McDermott & Snyder
2002, x, 14; Allee 2003, 123–124).
189 By cross-appropriation they mean bringing practices into contexts that could not generate
them, but in which they are useful; cf. also Engeström, Engeström & Kerosuo (2003); Engeström
(2004b). Cf. reflexive appropriation as a mechanism for social change (Giddens 1990b).
190 cf. Ahonen, Engeström & Virkkunen (2000); Tuomi (2002).
191 Hansen, Nohria & Tierney (1999); Edvinsson & Malone (1997); Stewart (1997); Sveiby (1997).
192 cf. Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995); Polanyi (1966) about tacit knowledge.
193 Lave & Wenger (1991); Wenger (1998); Allee (1997, 218–219); Allee (2003); Davenport &
Prusak (1998, 38–39). The concept of communities of practice has already been cross-
appropriated to the Armed Forces. Kilner (2002); Brown (2003). For more information, see
companycommand.com and squad-leader.com.
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Although communities of practice do not offer a straight road
towards everlasting success, they have been seen to offer potentially
some key benefits:
– Help people to do their jobs.
– Help people to better understand what others are doing in the
organization.
– Be an effective filtering mechanism to deal with “information
overflow” and need for continuous problem solving.
– Foster a learning-focused sense of identity.
– Speed response to the claims and feedback of customers.
– In the midst of continuous change offer an effective tool for
organizational adaptation, learning and innovations.
– Help people to build a common language, narratives, and models.
– Provide means to share power and influence with the formal parts
of the organization.
– Be representatives of communal memory and a “living knowledge
base” (i.e. embed expertise) allowing knowledge to “stick” in the
organization.
– Offer a required variety for the organization operating “in the midst
of a wide variety” (i.e. complexity, “chaos”).
– Be tools for recruiting.
– Be tools for boundary management and boundary crossing between
separately situated units.
– Improve business outcomes. (Wenger, McDermott & Snyder 2002;
Saint-Onge & Wallace 2003, 49–50; Allee 2003, 122; Brown & Duguid
2001; Millen, Fontaine & Muller 2002)
The concept of communities of practice challenges us to self-reflect
on the questions below and “climb” up to the metatheoretical and
philosophical level:
– Nature of change: temporal or a continuous process?
– Mechanistic (e.g. a hierarchy) versus organistic (e.g. a human
network) perspective?
– Centralized (hierarchic) versus decentralized structures?
– Top-down versus bottom-up approaches to organizational issues?
– Control versus social autopoiesis194?
– Conception of a human being: passive versus active, or “a master”
or “a marionette”?195
– Conception of knowledge: product versus process?
– Formal versus informal structures?
194 Maturana & Varela (1980).
195 Allee (2003, 41–43); Wenger, McDermott & Snyder (2002); Saint-Onge & Wallace (2003).
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The analysis made by Lave and Wenger (1991) is an example of the
current need to shift our thinking from “either-or” type to “both-
and” type of dialectical thinking196 because thinking in terms of
complex dualities rather than mere dichotomies is needed when
focusing on their theories and our practices.
The concept of community of practice was originally used to
characterize socialization practices in certain relatively stable cultures
(Ahonen, Engeström & Engeström 2000; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola
& Lehtinen 2004) as among Yacatec Mayan midwives in Mexico, among
Vai and Gola tailors in Liberia, in the work-learning settings of U.S.
navy quartermasters, among butchers in U.S. supermarkets and among
“nondrinking alcoholics” in Alcoholics Anonymous (Lave & Wenger
1991). To what extent these cultures are as stable as argued is
discussable, but nevertheless the concept has been seen as relevant to
the modern “dynamic” world (cf. e.g. Bereiter 2002; Brown & Duguid
1991, 2001; Dierkes, Berthoin Antal, Child & Nonaka 2001; Tuomi 1999,
2002; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004).
The idea of communities of practice challenges the traditional view
to see social practice as fundamentally stable, stressing that change is
a fundamental property of our social reality197. Because of this fact
the main point is not how to initiate change processes but how to
support these processes, and metaphorically speaking, how to use
human energies intentionally in order to achieve something socially
valued.
The main mechanism of change for the communities of practice
emerges when newcomers aiming to master significant knowledge
and skills are trying to move toward full participation in the
sociocultural practices of a community. Metaphorically speaking and
simplifying a little bit, novices could be seen as “moving” toward full
participation and the status of a master (an expert) while both they
and the practices involved change (Lave & Wenger 1991). The novices
are for the communities of practices a vital source of new knowledge
and experiences, facilitating the development of the community
(Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 78). The novices are
also sources for challenging questions, offering often fresh angles to
the old routines.
The duality of stability and change is applicable also to the trajectory
of learning in a community of practice. Both the masters and the
newcomers are passengers in a drifting boat, namely practice. To some
extent they are rowing and deciding where they are heading to but
196 Lave & Wenger (1991, 38, 102, 123); Wenger (1998, 66). Some cognitive trails to dialectical
thinking were shown in chapter 4.
197 Cf. an interesting analysis made by Tsoukas and Chia (2002).
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to some extent they are just carried by the stream. Consequently, a
real master or a real expert cannot rest on his laurels but has to keep
going and learning. And when a community always has several kinds
of tasks at hand and jobs to do, everyone can to some degree be
considered a newcomer to the future of a changing community (Lave
& Wenger 1991, 117198).
Communities of practice are more organic entities than “simple
mechanic” ones, resembling the difference between living and non-
living entities (Wenger, McDermott & Snyder 2002, 12–13). The use of
organic metaphors is justifiable because they seem to make more sense
when focusing on human issues. This fact does not mean that
communities of practice exist without any mechanical features (e.g.
habituated routines).
Practitioners have dual roles as both community practitioners
(informal) and operational team members (formal). This role duality
means a “double-knit” structure or even a “triple-knit structure” (a
hypertext organization) where the knowledge-base layer completes
the triple structure199. To the practitioner this variety of roles causes a
need for shifting dynamically between these contexts, and the ultimate
purpose is to reap benefits from all of these layers.
The most successful communities of practice thrive where the goals
and needs of the organization intersect with the passions and
aspirations of the participants (Wenger, McDermott & Snyder 2002,
32). Such a community of practice and its members stand at the
intersection of two dominant strands of social relations. One strand is
inside the organization (the value chain) but the other extends beyond
the organization along the network of practice (Brown & Duguid 2001,
206).
If then the communities of practice could be even consciously
cultivated, how to effectively help them flourish? The first skill of
community development seems to be a capability to “see” them
(Wenger, McDermott & Snyder 2002, 24) and so we have to define
what we are actually looking for. As a starting point it is useful to
define communities of practice:
Groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a
passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and
expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis. (Wenger,
198 According to Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola and Lehtinen (2004, 60) the border between a
student (a novice) and a full member (a master) of an expert community in peripheral
participation is not so well defined as it has been in traditional professional and academic
communities.
199 Wenger, McDermott & Snyder (2002, 32), a “double-knit” organization; Nonaka & Takeuchi
(1995, 160–196), a hypertext organization.
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McDermott & Snyder 2002, 4; cf. Saint-Onge & Wallace 2003, 33;
Allee 2003, 116)
Quite often communities of practice emerge in a bottom-up manner
when a group of experts have started to meet informally to explore
their common passion. Communities of practice can also be deliberately
created in a top-down manner but then there is a great danger of a
possibility to kill them by overemphasizing the control. (Wenger,
McDermott & Snyder 2002; Saint-Onge & Wallace 2003)
As noted above, communities of practice have quite often just
autopoietically emerged without any purposeful social control or
management activities. The concept of autopoiesis refers to the
research of two Chilean biologits (Humberto Maturana and Fransisco
Varela) who tried to understand how a living system comes into being.
Under some proper natural conditions biological (or even social200)
systems are generated spontaneously, making themselves by
themselves through interaction with their environment (Maturana &
Varela 1980, 95). But can social systems be autopoietic (cf. Mingers
2003; Bailey 1994, 309-322201, 1997) and what is the nature of social
change?
The system typology developed by John Mingers (1997) is a useful
tool for finding the way out of the ambiguous and continuous debate
over the issue. In his nine-level typology Mingers gives the levels one
to three to non-living systems and four to nine for living or
transcending systems (the God)202. For the purposes of this study the
nature of interaction between level 7 (observing systems, human
beings) and level 8 (social systems) is crucial to understand.
Social systems (level 8) are according to Mingers characterized by
relations of structural coupling between organisms of level 7 (e.g.
human beings). By structural coupling Maturana and Varela (Maturana
& Varela 1992, 75) mean the history of recurrent interactions leading
to structural congruence between two (or more) systems. The crucial
point is the question about the nature of the interactions - recurrent
or non-recurrent?203
200 cf. Luhmann (1995).
201 Cf. the questionable uncontrollability belief of the third paradigm of the systemic thought;
see figure 4.3.
202 Mingers (1997, 303–313). The crucial point is the fact that although these levels are
interconnected they are at the same time separate, seemingly resisting reductionist explanations.
Gilbert Ryle (1949, 16–17) spoke about the nowadays widely spread category mistake meaning
that “applying concepts to logical types to which they do not belong should be abandoned”.
A weaker version of this statement states that we should at least be aware of this cultural
tendency when making our judgements (cf. also Maturana & Varela 1980, 1992; cf. Tuomi
1999, 192-200; Polanyi 1966, 35-36, 85; Argyris & Schön 1996, 193).
203 According to Kenneth Bailey (1994, 113) social system analysis focuses on relationships
between units of analysis rather than on “separate” units (cf. e.g. individual human beings
and communities).
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As often mentioned, the first skill of community development is to
be able to “see” them, but they could be also enabled by following
some key principles such as the ones below:
– Invite different levels of participation (who is real expert/master
and who is not yet; different roles of the participants) to the shared
domain.
– Design for evolution: “design a little, implement a lot”.
– Open a dialogue between inside and outside perspectives.
– Develop both public and private community spaces.
– Focus on value.
– Combine familiarity and excitement (stability vs. excitement).
– Create a rhythm for the community. (Wenger, McDermott & Snyder
2002)
Developing domain, community, and practice together is a balancing
act; each element requires a distinct kind of developmental attention
and work. At the same time, the three elements interact, and it is
their interplay that makes a healthy community (Wenger, McDermott
& Snyder 2002, 46). If the domain of a community fails to inspire its
members, the community will flounder; or it does not even emerge in
the first place. Moreover, if the topic lacks strategic relevance to the
organization, the community will be marginalized and have limited
influence (Wenger, McDermott & Snyder 2002). The crucial question
for all kinds of communities of practice is how valued its expertise is
for the larger community and what the community can do in order to
get others to value its expertise.
If the community in question seems to be in need of cultivation,
defined roles seem to play a pivotal part in the process. The roles of
the communities of practice can be loosely grouped by three key
elements needing to be balanced: domain (area of expertise; what do
they know?), community (who are they? I.e. leader and sponsor roles)
and practice (what do they do? Knowledge intermediary and
supporting roles). (Wenger, McDermott & Snyder 2002; Allee 2003;
Fontaine 2001; cf. Saint-Onge & Wallace 2003)
The above analysis was made mainly from the perspective of a local
community of practice and when thinking dialectically, as Lave and
Wenger have done, we have to shift our view to the global perspective.
In this phase the analysis made by Engeström (2004b) is a relevant
one. According to him processes of learning may be differentiated
along two key dimensions, one representing the given versus newly
emerging nature of the object and activity to be mastered, the other
one representing the distinction between exploitation of existing
knowledge versus exploration for new knowledge (cf. March 1991:
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1996; Crossan, Lane & White 1999; Sutter 2002; Engeström 2004b;
Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 120)
If the concept of communities of practice enables us to understand
how the newcomers tend to be socialized and taught to embody the
given, it does not fully explain how novel ideas are developed cross-
appropriating204 them globally (Spinosa et al. 1997) - how else than
just dealing with practically and researching scientifically (i.e. inquiring
progressively) the current ill-defined problems of our natural and social
reality?
8.7. Progressive inquiry learning
Kai Hakkarainen and his colleagues have developed a pedagogical
model of progressive-inquiry learning. The model relies on cognitive
research on educational practices and is closely associated with the
knowledge building approach of Marlene Scardamalia and Carl Bereiter
(1993; Bereiter 2002) and Jaakko Hintikka’s interrogative model of
inquiry (Hintikka 1999).
The model is well aligned with Dewey’s social pragmatism, with
cultural-historical activity theories (e.g. Engeström, Wertsch, Lave,
Wenger) and with the other prominent thinkers of the Knowledge
Age (e.g. Nonaka) claiming that a new paradigm for investigating
human intelligent activity is emerging (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola
& Lehtinen 2004). In a way the progressive-inquiry model tries to be a
metatheoretical synthesizer of the current social scientific research in
the field of organizational learning and knowledge creation. The
explicit purpose is to outline an approach that makes it possible to
develop the modern educational system in a way that will help students
to develop skills and competencies that allow productive and
meaningful participation in the emerging knowledge society
(Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, x).
In order to answer to the challenges of the knowledge society, there
must be fundamental change in the whole pedagogical philosophy of
the educational system (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola, Lehtinen, 2004,
4; cf. e.g. the analysis of the Deweyan philosophies and also other
analyses made on the metatheoretical and philosophical level in this
study) towards constructive alignment, understanding, and a new kind
of activity – the knowledge creating activity.
The main strategy for creating the synthesis, used by Kai
Hakkarainen and his colleagues, is to re-interpret and combine social
204 Or reflexively appropriating (Giddens 1990b, 304).
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scientific research from three combinatorial perspectives (metaphors
of learning): the knowledge-acquisition, the participation and the
knowledge-creation perspectives (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola &
Lehtinen 2004; Hakkarainen et al. 2004). It appears to be advisable to
examine these perspectives simultaneously at several “ontological”
levels: individual (i.e. the acquisition metaphor), community (i.e. the
participation metaphor), and organization (i.e. the knowledge-creation
metaphor) (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 14)205.
The present study favours, instead of using multiple metaphors,
paying attention to the systemness of our reality. The identified
perspectives, or metaphors, are actually combinatorial, being
interconnected but at the same time resisting reductionist
explanations206. The main point is not to choose the “right” one but
have them all while making interpretations of complex social systems.
Although the progressive-inquiry model sheds light into the essence
of human nature, here the knowledge-acquisition perspective is
generally passed207, starting with the participation perspective and
firstly focusing on the concept of innovative knowledge communities
(IKCs). In the previous subchapter some criticism made by the
researchers of progressive-inquiry learning against the concept of
communities of practices was already shown in the analysis, and its
justifiableness needs to be tested once more.
Metatheoretically speaking, the dialectical thinking done by Lave
and Wenger needs to be remembered as disturbing the insisted stability
of the communities by the continuous change processes within them.
Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola and Lehtinen (2004, 139–147) explain
how IKCs emerge in our current knowledge societies. In a way they
are deliberately modifying the zone of proximal development for the
traditional communities of practice by explaining how the most capable
peers confront present problems208. When doing so the main focus is
205 Cf. also parallel arguments favoring multilevel analysis of organizational learning; Rauste-
von Wright, von Wright & Soini (2003, 34-38, 106); Kim (1993); Schein (1993); Crossan, Lane,
White & Djurfeldt (1995); Crossan, Lane & White (1999); Toiviainen (2003); Knight (2002);
Bereiter (2002). Cf. the idea about the epistemological infrastructure of the knowledge intensive
organization, Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen (2004, 209).
206 According to Sfard (1998) too great devotion to one particular metaphor (or an approach
or a perspective) can lend to theoretical distortions and to undesirable practices (cf. also Cobb
1994; Cobb & Yackel 1996). Even from the knowledge-acquisition perspective instead of
metaphors we should focus on the systemness of our human processes (Neisser 1994; Sternberg
1990; Damasio 1994). The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned into two
main families – traditionally called intuition (i.e. System 1) and reason (System 2) – is now
widely embraced under the general label of dual-process theories (Kahneman & Frederick
2002; Sloman 2002; Stanovich & West 2002).
207 Despite of this, some additional explanations especially from the knowledge-acquisition
perspective will be shown in the notes. See claimed dangers of neglecting the knowledge-
acquisition perspective, Sfard (1998); Anderson, Reder & Simon (1996, 1997); Gorodetsky &
Keiny (2002); Bereiter (1997, 2002).
208 Not well-defined routinized problems but ill-defined problems in our current reality.
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not on the actual but on the potential means to enable the needed
transformation. When comparing traditional communities of practice
(COPs) and innovative knowledge communities, some justified
differences will be sought.
When examining the relations between traditional COPs and IKCs
along the dimension “exploitation of old - exploration of new”, it can
be argued that the traditional COPs often do not tolerate very much
exploration of new ideas, tending to disapprove of participants who
cross the boundaries of their practices. Sometimes, apprentices are
prevented or even prohibited from developing novel ideas. In many
cases, new practices do not emerge until the old masters have passed
away, and the rate of change is never very high (Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 141). But the duality of stability and change
is applicable also to the practices of traditional COPs. Consequently
both the masters and the newcomers are passengers in a drifting boat,
namely in practice. Therefore, both COPs and IKCs can have a collective
responsibility for the cognitive growth (cf. Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 146) of the participants while exploring new
fields of the societal landscape.
By emphasizing exemplary IKCs it is possible to show, also to the
traditional COPs, that the mere exploitation of traditional knowledge
is not enough (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 142) if
aiming to manage in the midst of increasing complexity, information
overflow and deepening global interconnectedness. Thus, more
exploration is needed even if one aims to “stand still” or sustain stability
in the social reality.
The nature of the networks in the traditional COPs can be quite
different from what it should be in the IKCs. Traditionally, also in the
case of the FNDC, the importance of strong ties between participants
of the community has been recognized, causing an effect of general
neglectance of systematic external connections (Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 146). Strong ties, but also weak ties are crucial
success factors in the present global environment (Granovetter 1973;
cf. Hansen 1999; Monge & Contractor 2003, 147–149). To the
organizations aiming to be learning organizations the connections,
and expecially the nonredundant209 connections (Lin 2002, 68–69;
Monge & Contractor 2003, 148), need to be systematized and
deliberately extended.
209 Nonaka emphasises the centrality of redundant information but this could be understandable
when focusing on the  issue from the angle of the individual worker: redundancy of information
helps organizational members understand their position by letting them see themselves from
the outside (cf. chapter 4). On the other hand nonredundancy is essential when looking at the
environment from the organization. Hence “the inside redundancy” is comparable to “the
outer nonredundancy”.
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Resource heterogeneity is, however, only one criterion of better
information. According to the prestige principle210 (Laumann 1966 in
Lin 2002, 69), individuals prefer to associate with others of a somewhat
higher social status. In our knowledge intensive society this means
that experts are often selected following the prestige principle. In the
case of science the aim could be to get more explanatory power (cf.
chapter 2).
By IKCs Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola and Lehtinen (2004, 145)
highlight that in the present knowledge society there is an increasing
amount of such a communities whose main motive of collective activity
is knowledge creation. IKCs are deliberately advancing and developing
mediating conceptual artifacts and ultimately aiming at conceptual
changes and understanding of individuals, but also at social
advancement by locally accelerated cultural learning211 (Hakkarainen,
Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen, 2004, 145; Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 20,
252, 339).
IKCs, but also traditional COPs (Wenger, McDermott & Snyder 2002;
Saint-Onge & Wallace 2003), are often deliberately designed to
capitalize on cognitive diversity; new members are, in many cases,
intentionally picked to complement existing knowledge and expertise
(Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 144). By cognitive
diversity Hakkarainen et al. refer to a rather similar issue as the requisite
variety emphasized by Nonaka (cf. chapter 4), but interestingly with
concepts of psychology and social psychology212 instead of ones cross-
appropriated from the field of cybernetics or from natural sciences in
general.
Since the emergence of the Deweyan social pragmatism and
Meadian symbolic interactionism, the proper solutions to our current
problems have not been identified, but at least there has been a shared
210 For instance the Google search engine prioritizes the results of a search on the basis of the
network prestige score associated with each Web site. In order to identify other key principles
for emergence see Giddens (1984, 207-226); Monge & Contractor (2001, 2003); Sawyer (2001).
Monge and Contractor (2001, 487) claim that the time may come to explore a more eclectic,
multitheoretical approach to predict communication network behaviour and outcomes. While
seeking this, mutual self-interests or even mutual interests, of the knowledgeable actors come
to the fore while we are balancing our activities along the dimension between the exploitation
of the old and the exploration of the new.
211 Accelerated cultural learning refers to the metaphor of the ratchet coined by Tomasello
(1999, 39). The metaphor of the ratchet in this context is meant to capture the fact that
imitative learning (with or without active instruction) enables the kind of faithful transmission
that is necessary to hold the novel variant in place in the group so as to provide a platform for
further innovations. Cf. chapter 6 of the ratchet effect at the FNDC partly caused by the
learning log and other military pedagogical innovations put into practice.
212 Cf. chapter 4 where the importance of the link between knowledge management and
organizational sensemaking studies was stressed. Especially the cognitive trails made by Karl
Weick were shown (Weick 1995, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe 2001) to be valuable ones.
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awareness of the method of the solution. Ever since inquiry has been
emphasized as the “right” method for solving problems.
 Recently this idea has been modified in the form of progressive-
inquiry learning (figure 8.4) (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola &
Lehtinen 2004; Hakkarainen et al. 2004; Hakkarainen, Bollström-
Huttunen, Pyysalo & Lonka 2005).
Figure 8.4 The progressive-inquiry learning model
Source: Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 197.
According to Bereiter (2002), students learn from practical activities
only those things they practice213. The idea has been named Bereiter’s
Razor214 by Hakkarainen and his colleagues (Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 181). For the progressive inquirers this point
gives different kinds of meanings, depending on the focal point of
analysis215. The individual learner need not just learn but learn to learn.
CREATING THE 
CONTEXT
SETTING UP 
RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS
GENERATING WORKING 
THEORIES
CRITICAL EVALUATION
SEARCHING DEEPENING 
KNOWLEDGE
CREATING A NEW 
WORKING THEORY
DISTRIBUTED 
EXPERTISE
GENERATING 
SUBORDINATE 
QUESTIONS
213 It is sometimes argued that the progressive-inquirers neglect the importance of learning
“know-how” or skills so essential for the successfulness of the Armed Forces. But as a
counterargument the various cognitive trails of the learning of skills in the research of
progressive-inquirers need to be recognized (see Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen
2004). For further progressive inquiries see e.g. Sun, Merrill & Peterson (2001); Dienes & Perner
(1999); Anderson (1995). It could be reasonably hypothesized that the identifiable cognitive
trails play a significant role also in this phenomenon.
214 Cf. the famous Occam’s Razor meaning that “entities are not to be multiplied without
necessity”. According to Bertrand Russell William of Occam did not say this but something
which has much the same effect, namely that “it is vain to do with more what can be done
with fewer” (Russell 1946, 435).
215 Cf. the knowledge-acquisition, the participation, and knowledge-creation perspectives,
respectively.
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Often these kinds of skills are called metaskills or metacognitive skills,
for example the skills of critical self-reflection or epistemological
skills.216
Bereiter’s Razor means also to the individual student that if all his
resources are needed in the future in all kinds of workplaces at the
FDF and at the FBG he needs to learn to use them while learning.
The starting point for the process of inquiry is the joint creation of
a context for the project in question. Through creating a context, the
issues being investigated are connected with deep principles of the
knowledge domain in question, and anchored in authentic and
complex problems of the external world, or issues that the participants
genuinely wonder and care about. (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola &
Lehtinen 2004, 197)
For the disciplines of the FNDC this means reevaluation of the
relationship and dimension between the disciplines and the
organizations of the FDF and the FBG, because complex and authentic
problems are situated in the field, influenced by complex local features
(Brown, Collins & Duguid 1989; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola &
Lehtinen 2004, 199; Hakkarainen, Bollsröm-Huttunen, Pyysalo & Lonka
2005, 90) potentially already known by the students coming from the
field units.
An essential aspect of progressive inquiry is generating the
participants’ own sense of problems and questions to guide the inquiry
(Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 197). As already
recognized when analyzing the learning theories from Dewey to
Engeström and finally to this model, all the models emphasize the
centrality of problems in the learning process. In a way without
problems no deep learning but just superficial learning exists217.
Paradoxically those practices for which people should be educated
today do not exist yet (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004,
203). For the FNDC this means that it cannot solely focus on the present
problems in the field but has to pay attention also to problems of the
future. The FNDC is practically shaping the future of the FDF and the
216 According to Olson (2003) pedagogy is largely responsible for children’s epistemological
development and consequently their learning the normative practices of the disciplines. In
part this development consists learning to make systematic linguistic distinctions such as that
between theory and evidence and between causes and reasons (Olson 2003, 81) but also
rhetorical skills to persuade one’s community (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen
2004, 208–212; cf. Ceccarelli (2001) on how science can be seen partly shaped by rhetoric. Cf.
also Toulmin (1990, 187) about the rise of rhetorics in contemporary societies.)
217 For quantitative meta-analysis of the effects of problem-based learning see Dochy, Segers,
Bossche & Gijbels (2003). It can be hypothesized that potentially the effects of progressive-
inquiry learning will exceed the effects of the problem based learning (PBL) due to the
elaborated theory and metatheory (philosophical and logical reconsiderations on a practical
level; cf. Hintikka (1999).
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FBG, and the visionary future state of the FNDC has to guide its
educational activities218. The FNDC does not or at least should not just
receive the visionary end state from the Defence Staff but should
actively participate in the process of making a vision and a knowledge
vision.
When creating a context for the disciplinary progressive inquirers,
the FNDC has to systematize and extend its connections to national
and international expert cultures because the dynamic development
of expertise is fundamentally dependent on participation in an expert
culture219. Only through these kinds of connections can the FNDC get
an appropriately deep understanding of the deep principles of the
knowledge domain and spheres of life in question220. In our age of
deepening global interconnectedness, separateness of the “civilian”
and “military” worlds cannot be justified and the emerging
contradictions need to be faced rather than hidden under the carpet.
As explained in chapter 2, the relationships between scientific
researchers and teachers (or lay actors in general) need to be carefully
evaluated. The social scientist, double hermeneutically operating at
the intersection of two frames of meaning221 needs to balance the
participation in the social scientific and lay expert cultures during the
inquiry process. Similarly an individual teacher needs to balance his
participation in the sphere of research and the sphere of work (i.e.
teaching) and life.
The progressive inquiry process is driven by questions (especially
by fundamental questions) and also aimed at conceptual change, and
especially increased understanding of the participants. The question
about conceptual change brings to the fore the issue of different kinds
of perspectives and units of analysis. To what extent is it possible and
how justifiable is it  to re-interpret the research findings of the
knowledge acquisition perspective from situational or sociocultural
perspectives? The question is much more crucial than merely academic
because its answer strongly influences the availability of the researched
facts in the social sciences222.
218 In a parallel manner also the visionary end state of the FBG has to guide the educational
activities of the FNDC.
219 This does not mean solely military experts but also civilian experts as well.
220 Cf. chapter 2 about the deep principles of the scientific sphere of life, chapter 4 about the
deep principles of the chosen research programmes, and chapter 7 about the Soldier’s Basic
Paradox explaining some deep principles of the military sphere. Cf. also the issue of identity in
this chapter.
221 The social scientific worldview (i.e. research programmes and theories) and the lay actors’
worldview.
222 Cf. Lave (1988, 170-190); Hutchins (1995, 370–372); as a case example cf. Vosniadou (1991,
1994, 2002); Schoutltz, Säljö & Wyndhamm (2001); Ivarsson, Schoultz & Säljö (2002);
Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 97–98; Neisser 1994, 227.
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The analysis presented here favours the balancing emphasis of
changing mental models in the head (i.e. “mind”; how he perceives
things) of the individual on the deepening understanding of
understanding (Bereiter 2002), aiming to create a new form of practical
activity (Ahonen, Engeström & Virkkunen 2000, 291). At the FNDC
this kind of new kind of activity could be labeled as knowledge creating
activity (see chapter 9).
As mentioned in chapter 4, in institutionally situated activity, like
schooling, spontaneous and scientific concepts develop at the same
time – spontaneous concepts proceed from concrete to abstract and
abstract scientific concepts to the concrete level (cf. Vygotsky 1978).
In this process scientific concepts grow downward through
spontaneous concepts and vice versa in the process of interacting
conceptual systems223. Hence the system of scientific concepts is
needed to enable the gradual change of spontaneous concepts. For
the schooling activities this means for example mind-mapping activities
(cf. Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 165–168; Hakkarainen, Bollström-
Huttunen, Pyysalo & Lonka 2005, 138–154).
By posing questions the inquirer can convert his tacit knowledge
into an explicit form (e.g. working theories), allowing the student to
become aware of the possible dilemmas and incoherencies between
his interpretations and cultural knowledge. In this “phase”
collaborative discussions have a crucial role due to the fact that in the
explicit form the individual interpretations could be societally
elaborated, enabling sustainable conceptual changes to happen.
(Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 282; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola &
Lehtinen 2004, 198; Hakkarainen, Bollström-Huttunen, Pyysalo & Lonka
2005, 47)
The empirical research done at the FNDC (cf. chapters 6 and 7) shows
that it needs to be emphasized that the organizational silence or over-
individualistic practices are a real hindrance for fruitful progressive
inquiry learning processes, but it can be overcome for example by
contacts with other expert communities where open discussions are
traditionally experienced as an essential part of successful activities.
Other means are also needed and hence human means for social
change are needed – a new kind of leadership in the practices of the
FNDC224.
223 Cf. analysis in chapter 4 about the Engeströmian extension of this interpretation (i.e.
horixontal movement).
224 What is “good” or “not so good” leadership is a more fundamental question than the
difference between e.g. transformational and transactional leadership. In other words it is a
metatheoretical question. Practically this means that also the FNDC has to progressively and
continuously inquire into the depths of “goodness” of the leadership of its personnel while
aiming to solve the Soldier’s Basic Paradox.
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Instead of focusing solely on the problem of the conceptual change
the problem of understanding225 deserves more attention when seeking
a solution to the problem of the ultimate outcome of the schooling.
This point is not a new phenomenon; it has been an important
candidate for this position since John Dewey (Olson 2003, 145). It seems
reasonable to say that obviously to understand is something more
than just a subjective “ah-ha” feeling, but how do we socially justify
understanding and what kind of criteria do we need for that?
Understanding is often understood as a precondition of intelligent
action (Bereiter 2002, 112) just as an intelligent action is often an
indication of understanding. What about, then, a student who acts
“intelligently” but does not know why he does so? Obviously to act
intelligently and effectively is not the same as to understand.
At this phase it is necessary to have a closer look at the secrets of
understanding, and John Biggs provides an interesting tool for that
with his SOLO taxonomy (Structure of the Observed Learning
Outcome) (Biggs 2003, 38–41). Here the intent is not to focus on the
levels of preunderstanding but on real understanding in the academic
sense. According to the SOLO taxonomy this means focusing on the
levels of relational and extended abstract level. By the relational level,
Biggs means that in the case of understanding, “seeing the forest is
needed instead of just seeing the trees”. In other words, this idea
means that concepts have a systemic nature and in this phase the
systemic nature needs to be turned into a visible form (i.e. a concept
map). Here it is easy to recognize the parallel with the ideas of CHAT
(more precisely, e.g. with the Vygotskian line of thinking).
An extended abstract level means in practice that on that level the
student goes beyond what has already been given. In other words
this means that he invents something relatively new (e.g., a new
solution to an age-old problem). Seeing the reality from a fresh but
justifiable angle seems to be an effective method for new kinds of
solutions (Bruner 1996, 13, the perspectival tenet; Takeuchi & Nonaka
2004, 7). Collectively this means that in order to reach this level at all
one needs to become familiar with multiple perspectives, navigate
effectively socially and follow many cognitive trails.
Subjective understanding is not necessarily accompanied by the
ability to explain (Bereiter 2002, 110) but for objective societal
understanding, and justifiable explanations are necessities.
Traditionally the teacher has been the one who has to explain things
to the students, but if the aim is to deepen the students’ understanding,
225 E.g. in his dictionary for adult educators Peter Jarvis (1999, 190) explains that understanding
means to learn, know, and have the ability to provide an explanation of a phenomenon – it
is a form of deep learning.
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this has to be balanced by giving the students opportunities to teach
themselves reciprocally (cf. e.g. the reciprocal teaching; Palincsar &
Brown 1984; Brown & Palincsar 1989; Brown & Campione 1994; also
Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 317–339, 191–192, 133–134).
The dynamic nature of inquiry arises from the fact that the
generation of intuitive explanations and obtainment of new scientific
information makes new research questions accessible, a situation that
could not have been foreseen in the beginning of the inquiry
(Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 199). For example in
curriculum planning processes this means that instead of endless
details226, also big ideas and the core content should be described.
Searching for and working with explanatory scientific knowledge
is necessary for deepening one’s understanding (Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 198). The inquiry process is a mix of lots of
reading, writing, drawing, discussing, thinking, acting and so on.
Especially reading seems to be a rather neglected action due to the
“paradigmatic” barriers allowing researchers to solely focus on the
chosen “paradigm” and often ahistorically turning the blind eye to
the fact that also the researchers learn during their lifelong learning
processes227.
When the inquiry process is driven by fundamental questions, the
course of the inquiry goes rapidly beyond chosen research programmes
and for example from the military sciences to the overall field of social
sciences and occasionally even to natural sciences228. While
progressively inquiring the student learns to go beyond the predefined
set of alternatives (cf. Bateson’s Zen pupil; Model A learning229) aiming
to understand the principles (or strategic rules, Hintikka 1999, 2; Model
B learning) of the solutions to be made in the future. Ultimately the
pendulum of responsibility will swing from the teachers to the students
(Model C learning) and back to the middle (i.e. a shared responsibility)
in the process of collective knowledge creation. Consequently, the
226 Nowadays the European adaptation to the ECTS system demands all those participating in
the process to include the calculations of how credits can be got in the written curriculums.
Hopefully we never forget that the ultimate end of higher schooling is not just getting credits
(quantity) and consequently, balancing the quality needs to be remembered. Interestingly
the emphasis on quality cannot be solely replaced by paper but its effects have to be figured
out also in other aspects of our social and natural reality. For criticism for our current way of
living see e.g. cf. Toulmin (1990, 186) claiming how the “modern” focus on the written, the
universal, the general, and the timeless – which have been monopolizing the work of most
philosophers (also others as well) after 1630 (after Desctartes) – is being broadened to include
once again the oral, the particular, and the timely. See also Sennett (1998).
227 Sometimes this point can be seen in the form of differentiating the early and late thinking
of the chosen researcher but generally this point has been rather neglected by scholars and
practitioners alike.
228 Obviously this point has been made from the social scientific point of view.
229 Models A, B and C are modified of the analysis made by Pauliina Rainio (2003) (Hakkarainen,
Bollström-Huttunen, Pyysalo & Lonka 2005, 68-73).
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research process within a single “paradigm” or even research
programme is an unjustifiable alternative.
Currently we seem to be in a state of inability to distinguish between
learning and knowledge building, causing a dilemma to emerge to be
struggled with (Bereiter 2002, 21). One way out of this dilemma is to
distinguish between the three Popperian worlds230. Rather than being
fully separable and existing, the tripartite is seen as a useful conceptual
tool (cf. Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 258) to emphasize the pivotalness of
the conceptual artifacts.
According to the best of Bereiter’s knowledge Popper never went
so far as to characterize World 3 as a workspace, as a sphere of activity.
Bereiter has stretched the concept to give it that character although
already Popper himself anticipated this kind of possibility by
suggesting that one day we will have to revolutionize psychology by
looking at human mind as an organ for interacting with the objects of
the third world; for understanding them, contributing to them,
participating in them; and for bringing them to bear on the first world
(Popper 1972: 1979, 156 quoted in Bereiter 2002, 71–72). Obviously he
was anticipating the emergence of the explanation of how all these
worlds are interacting with each other (cf. Engeström 1987, 48). But
despite of this he or even Bereiter do not explain how World 3 objects
(i.e. conceptual artifacts) are created or what is the relation between
the conceptual artifacts we create and a putative real world. (Bereiter
2002, 483; Engeström 1987, 48)
The relationship between learning and knowledge seems to be
getting some shape but more philosophical analysis needs to be done.
It is highly recommendable to compare the analysis made by Polanyi
and Ryle to one’s own experiences when trying to get a deeper
understanding of the essence of knowledge and knowing.
8.8. Knowledge and knowing
8.8.1. Rylean and Polanyian philosophies
The debate concerning the exact nature of tacit knowledge seems
to be stacked on the level of appropriate understanding of Polanyi’s,
Ryle’s and Nonaka’s writings (cf. Tsoukas 2002; Li & Gao 2003; cf. chapter
4) but the way out of this impasse is not just reanalyzing these thinkers,
although it cannot totally be neglected while socializing into the
present social scientific field. After reanalyzing these philosophical
230 World 1 as the physical world; World 2 as the subjective or mental world; World 3 as the
world of ideas; Bereiter (2002, 64); cf. Popper (1972: 1979); Popper & Eccles (1977).
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thoughts one needs to go beyond the mystified abstract
conceptualizations of tacitness by following the scientific cognitive
trails of various disciplines.
The main reason for going beyond the uncritical acceptance of the
chosen philosophies becomes clearer when recognizing that although
both Polanyi and Ryle knew some of the most fundamental
questions231, they did not know the “exact” answers to those questions.
While seeking more reasonable and justifiable answers to the posed
fundamental questions, the possibility of scientific progress since the
times of Ryle (1900–1976) and Polanyi (1891–1976) cannot be totally
neglected.
Gilbert Ryle (1949, 29) criticized the intellectualist legend, claiming
that to do some thinking what one is doing is always two things;
namely, doing a bit of theory and then doing a bit of practice. According
to Ryle, acting intelligently does not embody two processes, one of
doing (knowing how) and another of theorizing (knowing that), but
just one. Interestingly, in the process of acting intelligently both types
of knowing are intertwined, as has been exemplified  by the following
Rylean persons.
According to Ryle a well-trained sailor boy can both tie complex
knots and discern whether someone else in tying them correctly or
not. But he is probably incapable of the difficult task of describing in
words how the knots should be tied. Here Ryle’s thinking goes parallel
with Michael Polanyi who has also emphasized that we can know more
than we can tell (cf. Ryle 1949, 56; Polanyi 1966, 4). It seems to be
possible to think that the “well-trained” sailor boy has acquired the
ability to tie knots only by imitating, being totally unaware of any
theories.
Also Ryle’s chess player could make permitted moves without
knowing anything about the rules of the game (Ryle 1949, 40–41). But
in order to develop as a chess player, a novice player cannot just imitate,
but needs some form of knowing that taught by master players or
maybe studying books by himself.
Ryle’s mountaineer is continuously learning while walking over ice-
covered rocks in a high wind in the dark, endlessly wondering what
might happen and how to survive in such a hostile environment. Also
to mountaineers just knowing how is not enough because all the time
they are searching for “new tricks” (i.e. knowing that) and ways to
improve their competence in practice (cf. Ryle 1949, 42). Similarly a
231 Cf. i.e. the Cartesian split and the mind-body problem (Ryle 1949, 32-33; Polanyi 1966, 29).
According to Polanyi (1966, 15) “man’s highest creative powers have bodily roots” needing to
be understood with the assistance of science and social sciences.
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soldier does not become a shrewd general merely by endorsing the
strategic principles of Clausewitz (just knowing that) but he must also
be competent to apply them (knowing how) (Ryle 1949, 31).
“A man knowing little or nothing of medical science could not be a
good surgeon, but excellence at surgery is not the same thing as
knowledge of medical science” said Ryle (Ryle 1949, 49).
Unparadoxically, someone could be bad at practicing when also good
at preaching (only knowing that), or on the other hand even worse at
practicing when also worse at preaching. Following Ryle we can ask
whether it is possible to achieve excellence (i.e. intelligence) in the
field of soldiering if the touch to theories (i.e. knowing that) has been
lost232.
Although an expert soldier will know more than he can tell by
adequate means (Polanyi 1962: 1966, 5), he can identify more what he
knows about excellence in soldiering. But he cannot, not even with
his peers and collaborators, identify it all because of the inaccessibility
paradox, turning assumed codification into an impossibility.
The notion of indwelling is a central one in Polanyi’s philosophies
and for those looking for adequate means to put tacit knowledge
into use. According to Polanyi, indwelling means that we make external
objects (probes, tools, teachers) as parts of our own existence and
extensions of our own body, simultaneously amplifying our
capabilities. During the indwelling process these things change their
appearance, and finally by indwelling in them we will understand their
joint meaning (Polanyi 1962, 59, 1966, 17–18, 30; Schön 1983, 52, 1987,
23). Polanyi’s argument about the essentiality of indwelling in the
knowing gets a more practical meaning when recognizing that e.g. a
theory (a tool) can be learned only by practicing its application for
some purpose. Thus indwelling can be seen to break the traditional
dichotomies between mind and body, reason and emotion, subject
and object, and knower and known. Therefore, scientific objectivity is
not the sole source of knowledge, but much of our knowledge is the
fruit of our own purposeful endeavours in dealing with the world233.
By emphasis on the indwelling proposed by Polanyi it is possible to
see the obvious connection between tacitness and cultural knowledge
resources available to be used for extensions of the cross-appropriated
knowledge base.
232 Nissinen (2001, 138; cf. Toiskallio 1998a, 9) explains the main idea of military pedagogy as
follows: Military pedagogy is a doctrine of training skills. It is a doctrine of setting goals,
guiding learning and assessing training activities and know-how. Curiously knowing how and
skills are emphasized, giving no room for elaboration of the possible usefulness of the knowing
that type of knowledge for the soldiers of the FDF.
233According to Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991, 14) experience and scientific understanding
are like two legs without which we cannot walk; cf. Knorr-Cetina (1999, 99-100) about scientists
with experienced body.
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The appropriation and cross-appropriation of Polanyi’s concept of
tacitness to various spheres of life gives a useful example of the issue
for e.g. management (Argyris 1999; Argyris 1990; Argyris & Schön 1996;
Nelson & Winter 1982), military command (Horvath, Forsythe, Bullis,
Williams, McNally, Wattendorf & Sternberg 1999), teaching (Torff 1999;
Minstrell 1999), science (Kuhn 1962: 1970, 191–198; Knorr-Cetina 1999;
Collins 2001) and sports (Berman, Down & Hill 2002). For learning
organizations, and also those aiming to be such in the future, emphasis
on tacitness means focusing on what the practitioners know and what
kind of problems they counter in the field activities. Instead of abstract
lists of “should know”, the focus needs to be on concrete practices in
the field, hopefully aiming to learn and create knowledge based on
their expertise. Curiously, also in the age of the Internet, face-to-face
contacts are needed maybe even more than ever, due to the
information overflow and constraints for societal sensemaking. This
topic will be discussed later in this analysis when focusing on the
claimed “social tacit” knowledge unknown to Polanyi himself.
When focusing on our bodily roots of tacitness and while trying to
solve the inaccessibility paradox it is necessary to recognize a close
parallelism between implicitness and tacitness. A distinction between
declarative and procedural knowledge is frequently made in
psychology (Anderson 1995, 308–309; Damasio 1994; Bransford, Brown
& Cocking eds. 2000, 124–126; Sun, Merrill & Peterson 2001). Declarative
knowledge is explicit knowledge that we can report and of which we
are consciously aware. Procedural knowledge is knowledge of how to
do things, and it is often implicit (Anderson 1995, 308–313). Similarly
the memory can be divided to procedural and declarative memories
(Bransford, Brown & Cocking eds. 2000, 124; Sun, Merrill & Peterson
2001; Dienes & Perner 1999). Therefore, the claimed difference between
tacitness and implicitness vanishes234 and the essence of these features
lies in the fact that they operate largely below our consciousness.
Taking a historical perspective to the development of modern market
economies, as for example Bell (1973, 20) has done, one can clearly see
the change in the character of knowledge over time. To simplify, the
modern society has come to mistrust intuition (also tacit knowledge
and its bodily roots), preferring the explicitly articulated, most often
in written form (cf. Tsoukas 2002, 2; Toulmin 1990, 186235). But as Bell
admits, we also have to take “deeper” questions of the knowledgeable
234 Cf. Spender (1998); Li & Gao (2003) about the “difference” between tacitness and implicitness.
235 Toulmin claims how the “modern” focus on the written, the universal, the general, and the
timeless – which have been monopolizing the work of most philosophers (also others as well)
after 1630 (after Descartes) – is being broadened to include once again the oral (i.e. two modes
of thought: the paradigmatic and narrative mode, Bruner (1986); literary mind, Turner (1996);
Fauconnier & Turner (2002), the particular, and the timely. Cf. also Brown & Duguid (2000)
about the current overemphasis on information or explicit knowledge.
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society into account – one of these encourages us to inquire into the
basis of the beliefs about man, nature and society (Bell 1973, 176
quoting Lane236 1966, 650). Rather surprisingly, when referring to tacit
knowledge we actually refer at the same time to human bodily roots,
needing to be understood also in contemporary knowledge societies.
As mentioned in chapter 4, according to Scribner (1985) the works
of Vygotsky may be read as an attempt to weave phylogenetic
(overgenerational), ontogenetic (life history of a individual human
being) and social level into one explanatory account of the formation
of specifically human aspects of human nature. The process of man’s
mental development is part of the general historic development of
mankind (a phylogenetic development), explaining for example our
instinctive behaviour (Vygotsky quoted in Scribner 1985, 123;
Maturana & Varela 1980, 24; Tuomi 1999, 341).
8.8.2. Phylogenetic explanation of the main aspects
of human nature237
The present analysis is not intended to be a “final answer” to the
fundamental question of human nature already discussed above. Now
the main aim is to show some direction for future progressive inquiries
into the basis of tacitness of knowledge but also beliefs about the
soldier (i.e. a human being) in the FDF and elsewhere. For decades we
have faced the challenge of reducing man to a Behavioristic animal238
or a closed cybernetic system. Since the Cognitive Revolution of the
1950s man and his functions have seemed to be fully explainable by
computer analogies. All these attempts to overreduce (thesis) human
beings and their countercriticisms (antithesis)239 have given us more
explanatory tools (synthesis) to understand the essence of ourselves
and avoid the dangers of overruling technological determinism.
Also the orthodox cognitive science seems to be deeply rooted in
the Cartesian tradition, meaning that while explaining intelligence and
mind the body has been forgotten. The end result has been biological
236 According to Bell (1973, 176) Robert Lane has put forth of the idea of “knowledge society”.
237 According to Hofstedes (2005, 4) human nature is what human beings have in common
despite of their cultures and personalities.
238 In case of behaviourism a difference between Behaviourism and behaviourism needs to be
made. Radical Behaviorism (with a capital B) has given way to a more moderate form of
behaviorism (with a lower case b) that presents the scientific rigor of using behavior as data,
but also allows hypotheses about internal “mental” states when these became necessary to
explain various phenomena (Bransford, Brown & Cocking eds. 2000, 8 referring to Hull (1943);
Spence (1942).
239 For criticism against artificial intelligence or artificial life see e.g. Schank (1980); Winograd &
Flores (1986); Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991); Brooks (1991, 2001); Dreyfus (1972: 1999);
Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986); Agre (1997); Wheeler (1997); Wilson (1998).
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neutrality (Wheeler 1997). Having such a view about the systemness240
of our reality the claimed biological neutrality raises doubts.
When facing the Cartesian split between mind and body the
Damasionian (1994) view offers a safe way to bridge the split. Rather
than “I think, therefore I am”241 actually “we are and then we think”.
According to Damasio (1994) one main reason for the continuity of
the Cartesian split is that it seems to be self-evident and in no need of
re-examination. Yet long before humanity, beings were beings. At some
point of evolution, an elementary consciousness began. Consciousness
is a necessity for the generation of sympathy, vicarious experience of
emotions, and those differences that make us humans (Leakey & Lewin
1993, 302). With that elementary consciousness came a simple mind;
with greater complexity of mind242 came the possibility of thinking
and of using language to communicate and organize thinking better
(Damasio 1994, 248).
According to Damasio (1994) human brains are complex enough to
generate not just motor responses (operations) but also mental
responses (images in the mind). The mental responses enhance the
survival of the organism by one or all of the following means:
– A greater appreciation of external circumstances.
– A refinement of motor responses.
– A prediction of future consequences by way of imagining scenarios
and planning actions conducive to achieving the best imagined
scenarios.
Based on innate goals and biological systems of “reward and
punishment” we have an array of so called “somatic markers”. We
have and experience bodily gut feelings of imagined or experienced
events. These feelings are either positive or negative, depending on
the match or the lack of a match between us and the circumstances.
An event is “bad” or “good” because of its possible impact on survival
and on the quality of survival (Damasio 1994, 125). This “somatic
marker’ forces attention on the negative outcome to which a given
action may lead, and functions as an automated alarm signal (cf. System
1) allowing us to choose from among fewer alternatives. After this
automated processing there is still room for willpower and using a
240 cf. e.g. the system typology of Mingers (1997); See Ryle (1949) about the category mistake.
241 Descartes, originally printed 1637-1641 (reprinted in 1988, 17). Descartes gives primacy to
the mind separating it from the body.
242 According to Damasio (1994) bodily feedback and persisting bodily imagery contribute
crucially to the human thought. The mind is embodied (cf. Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991)
and it has arisen out of an organism rather than out of a disembodied brain. About the origins
of the modern mind see Donald (1991, 2001). See Chalmers (1995, 1997) for “easy” and “hard”
problems of consciousness; how to actually explain our experience and what is the relationship
between matter and life, see e.g. Brooks (2001).
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cost/benefit analysis and proper deductive competence (cf. System 2).
(Damasio 1994, 173–175; cf. Wilson 1998, 112–115)
It can be even said that the social life has made us intelligent (Leakey
& Lewin 1993, 285). The traditional explanation has been that the
technology is the driving force behind human brain expansion. The
man is seen as a “toolmaker” (Oakley 1949 in Leakey & Lewin 1993,
249). Oakley was partly right if we recognize that not just physical
tools (cf. technology) made us humans but also psychological tools
(language) and the need for sophisticated communication.
Our evolutionary history has endowed our species with an inclination
to cooperate (Leakey & Lewin 1993). We can even say “sharing, not
hunting or gathering as such, is what made us human” (Leakey &
Lewin 1983 in Engeström 1987, 77). Sharing means also the need for
division of labor. While hunting the human bands recognized that
effective division of labor is needed if the hunting is supposed to be
successful. But on the other hand, although the needed labor is divided,
to the individual human beings the effects of these individual efforts
have to be recombined on the social level as Leont’ev explained in his
famous example (Leont’ev 1981, 210; cf. chapter 4).
So it is important to recognize that not the hunting or gathering
per se was the main point in our evolutionary history and that not
only sharing, but coordinating and recombining our individual efforts
and actions is the key to understand the difference between for
example apes and humans. In other words societal coordination and
recombination mean alignment. The recombination and “social
chess”243 was both an effective way to fulfill individual human needs
(hunger, safety, socialness etc.) but it also acted as an accelerator for
the development of our brains. We can see that the urge to know is a
defining feature of humanity – and that the thing most urgently needed
to know and understand was and is the most intellectually challenging
– the other individuals (Leakey & Lewin 1993, 286; cf. also Maturana &
Varela 1992, 174).
The two-million-year heritage of a hunting-gathering-sharing life
has left its mark on our minds just as much as on our bodies. On top of
the technical skills of planning, coordination, and technology there
was, equally important, the social skill of cooperation. A sense of
common goals and values, a desire to further the common good,
243 In the words of Hintikka (1999) we can figure out that maybe not just descriptive rules (how
to make moves in chess) but strategic rules of the game are needed if the aim is win for
example Kasparov in chess. The chess game theme is also familiar to those having heard the
latest news about the unbeatable computers winning humans in chess. Actually we as humans
are not just playing chess, and hence the complexity of the game (i.e. the life) cannot be fully
reduced to the chessboard but it has to be met and hopefully successfully on a daily basis. In
this kind of game it is not at all so sure who will win (machines or humans) or whether we are
actually playing a win-win game.
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cooperation was more than simply individuals working together. It
became a set of rules of conduct, of morals, an understanding of right
and wrong in a complex social system. Through evolution humans have
become the ethical animal. (Leakey & Lewin 1993, 304–305)
As social creatures, another main point to be recognized is the
extended childhood of humans. The extended childhood and our social
nature have helped us to establish “teacher-student” roles that remain
stable for a decade or more, allowing a great deal of learning, practice,
and modification of survival skills to occur. Humans become human
through intense social learning (Tomasello 1999) and not just of
survival in the practical world (Leakey & Lewin 1993, 145).
Tomasello explains that the basic fact seems to be that human beings
are able to pool their cognitive resources in ways that other animal
species are not. The process of cumulative cultural evolution requires
not only creative invention but also faithful social transmission that
can work as a ratchet to prevent a slippage backward (Tomasello 1999,
5).
8.8.3. Ontogenetically into human nature
Ontogenetically we grow in the midst of a natural and historically
constituted social reality (cf. chapter 2) and traditions enabling us to
benefit from the accumulated knowledge and skills of our social groups
(e.g. Tomasello 1999, 10). In other words we can stand “on the shoulders
of giants”, using their cognitive resources to deepen our understanding
or not – this is a matter of subjective and societal choice.
During the past decades the rationality of human beings has been
severely challenged. Consequently the pendulum has often shifted
from rationality to irrationality, loosing the difference between human
beings and other creatures. Instead of this alternative, arationality244
has been chosen in the present study.
244 According to Lave (1988) a common positivist epistemology assumes that rationality exists
as the ideal canon of thought. By his concept of bounded rationality Herbert Simon (1957)
challenged the “full” rationality implied by the rational choice model, claiming it to be an
unrealistic standard for human judgement (Gilovich & Griffin 2002, 2). Simon’s notion forms
the background for example to heuristics and bias literature (Stanovich 1999, 241), being on
the other hand criticized both inside (e.g. Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Clark 2001) and outside of
the artificial intelligence (AI) researchers (e.g. Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 38-39; Hutchins 1995).
When choosing instead of the notion of  bounded rationality (cf. Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 24; Bereiter 2002, 355) the notion of arationality (cf. Dreyfus &
Dreufus 1986, 36), the intent is to be aware of the criticism against AI and different forms of
reductionism – people are doing the most influential choices, not birds or pine trees or other
qualitatively “less” developed co-creatures in the games of live (cf. Dennett 1995, 456).
Arationality refers to all unconscious resources of human beings (i.e. intuition, know-how,
pattern matching) used in intelligent behaviour.
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Arationality refers to all unconscious resources of human beings as
for example intuition, instinct and pattern matching. To be able to
justify these proposals it is necessary to take a look at traditional dual-
process models of our consciousness (cf. also footnote 206). In these
models System 1 (below the consciousness) proposes intuitive answers
to judgment problems as they arise, and System 2 (consciousness)
monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct,
or override. The judgments that are eventually expressed are called
intuitive if they retain the hypothesized initial proposal without much
modification. Usually it is assumed that both these systems can be
active concurrently, that automatic and controlled cognitive
operations compete for the control of overt responses, and that
deliberate judgments are likely to remain anchored on initial
impressions.
But what features of System 1 create the error and why are errors
not always detected and corrected by System 2? In the late 1960s and
1970s, a series of papers by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman245
revolutionized academic research on human judgment. The central
idea of the “heuristics and biases” program is that judgment under
uncertainty often rests on a limited number of simplifying heuristics
rather than extensive algorithmic processing. (Gilovich & Griffin 2002,
1)
At the outset, some basic facts of heuristics are worth noticing.
Firstly, although heuristics are distinguished from normative reasoning
processes by a pattern of biased judgments, heuristics themselves are
sensible estimation procedures that are by no measure irrational but
arational (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986, 36). Secondly, although heuristics
yield “quick and dirty” solutions, they draw on underlying processes
that are highly sophisticated. Finally, the heuristic processes are not
exceptional responses to problems of excessive complexity or an
overload of information, but normal intuitive responses to even the
simplest questions about likelihood, frequency, and prediction
(Gilovich & Griffin 2002, 3).
Originally Tversky and Kahneman proposed four general-purpose
heuristics in 1974 – availability, representativeness, anchoring and
adjustment. Based on the analysis of Kahneman and Frederick (2002,
56) it is justifiable to replace the anchoring heuristic by affect heuristic.
The availability heuristic means that although System 2 monitors the
output of System 1, people are not accustomed to thinking hard, and
are often content to trust a plausible judgment that quickly comes to
245 Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel Price in Economics (The Bank of Sweden Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel) in 2002 for having integrated insights from
psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and
decision-making under uncertainty, see nobelprize.org.
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mind. Interestingly System 1 heuristics, and biases that arise from them,
are difficult to avoid even in the context of deliberate choice (Gilovich
& Griffin 2002, 17). These biases are especially difficult to avoid if
societal control mechanisms246 are scarce, malfunctioning or relatively
non-existent especially in the climate of organizational silence.
The representativeness heuristic means an assessment of the degree
of correspondence between a sample and a population, an instance
and a category, an act and an actor or, more generally, between an
outcome and a model (Tversky & Kahneman 2002, 22). The affect
heuristic means that images are and will be “marked” by positive or
negative feelings and these “marked images” influence our judgments
and decisions (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor 2002; cf. Damasio’s
“somatic markers”). But what kinds of images and experiences are
gained (i.e. perceived) and marked positive or negative on the basis
of what kinds of reasons during schooling247?
Following the Gibsonian extension of Polanyi’s idea “we can see
more than we can say” (Gibson 1979, 261), how we see and perceive
affects what we know248. In the field of visual perception there are
two competing approaches to perception (Norman 2002): the
traditional Helmholtzian constructivist-inferential approach (cf. e.g.
Marr 1982) and the Gibsonian ecological-direct approach (Gibson 1979;
Neisser 1994). The Gibsonian direct pick up of information (perception)
operates more or less below the consciousness (cf. Gibson 1979, 250),
being a feature of System 1. Perceiving is keeping touch with the world,
experiencing things rather than having experiences – resonating with
it (ibid, 239, 246) and consequently affecting the proposals made by
System 1.
The constructivists see perception as a conscious and multistage
process between stimulation and percept – perception is indirect. For
them memory, stored schemata and past experience play an important
role in perception, causing perception-perception causal chains to
emerge249. For the ecological theorists perception is a single stage
246 By societal control mechanism I refer to the societal processes where subjective biases are
corrected; Tetlock (2002); Weick (1995, 2001); cf. dangers of groupthink, Janis (1983); Amidon
(2005).
247 In a sense an affect pool is a collection of previous experiences labeled as “good” or “bad”
etc. According to Damasio an event is “bad” or “good” because of its possible impact on
survival and to the quality of survival (Damasio 1994, 125) suggesting a global sphere of
interests. Metaphorically speaking the affect pool is a subdivision of memory containing
memorized knowledge. Again the process of accumulation deserves attention.
248According to Ulrich Neisser (1976, 9) perceiving is the basic cognitive activity out of which all
others must emerge.
249 To recognize something is to note a congruence between the information available now
and information preserved from some earlier occasion (Neisser 1994, 235). According to
Gibson (1979, 246) we can perceive the world only if we already know what there is to be
perceived.
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process that is direct and immediate. For them there is no role for
memory in perception (Gibson 1979, 254; Norman 2002, 74–75).
According to Gibson the presence of stimulus information cannot be
said to cause perception. Perception is not a response to a stimulus
but an act of information picked up from the world, offering
affordances250 either for good or ill (Gibson 1979, 56–57, 127, 130).
In spite of the sharp contrast between the constructivist and
ecological approaches there have been attempts to reconcile the two
approaches (Norman 1983, 2002; Neisser 1994). According to Norman
(1983, 31),
To sum up, it is being suggested that both direct and indirect
perception occur, that they do not define a dichotomy but a
continuum, and that the location of a perceptual act on that
continuum is determined by some interaction of the difficulty of
the perceptual discrimination required and the richness of the
stimulus conditions…. The challenge facing the perceptual theorist
is not to choose between the theories, but to incorporate the two
approaches into a common framework with the aim of delineating
the conditions under which direct and indirect processes emerge.
Towards the end of his Ecological Approach Gibson (1979) proposes
“a redefinition of perception”,
Perveiving is an achievement of the individual, not an appearance
in the theatre of his consciousness. It is a keeping-in-touch with the
world (italics  added), an experiencing of things rather than a having
of experiences. It involves awareness-of instead of just awareness.
It may be awareness of something in the environment or something
in the observer or both at once, but there is no content of awareness
independent of that which is aware. (Gibson 1979, 239; quoted in
Norman 2002, 85)
This view contrasts with the constructivist perspective of a perceiver
who passively examines his conscious awareness of the stimulation
impinging on his senses. Instead of this the perceiver uses his resources
systematically251 and actively to perceive affordances of his
environment. In the case of humans we can argue that to some extent
250 According to Gibson (1979, 135) behavior affords behaviour (i.e. mutual affordances) and
all kinds of behavior depend on the perceiving of what other persons afford, or sometimes on
the misperceiving of it. Cf. Neisser (1994, 233).
251 According to Gibson (1979, 240) perception is neither a mental nor a bodily act. It is a
psychosomatic act, not of the mind or of the body but of a living observer.
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we actually seek affordances or dynamic affordances252 to be
appropriated and cross-appropriated.
Both the practitioners and critics of artificial intelligence think that
the human intelligence is strongly based on our abilities to do pattern
matching253, modelling, anticipating, and manipulating of our
environment254 (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland & Hinton 1986, 44).
But to what extent are these human intellectual accomplishments
shared by for example soldiers naturally needs to be studied.
Interestingly, just the lack of these accomplishments has been identified
to be one reason for military incompetence (Dixon 1976) or military
misfortunes (Cohen & Gooch 1990). Cohen and Gooch stress the
centralness of three types of failures for military failures: failure to
learn, to anticipate255 and to adapt. But instead of just blaming
individuals for incompetence (Dixon 1976), we must examine the
structures through which these claimed incompetencies emerge256.
When speaking about structures, our basic assumptions about man
come to the fore: to what extent do we expect and assume that agents
(human beings) can influence and develop the societal structures257?
After choosing our position in the issue are we ready to recognize the
consequences of our expectations (James 1890: 1950; Weick 1995, 146)?
252 According to the Gibsonial approach to perception every purposive action begins with
perceiving an (static) affordance (Neisser 1994, 231). According to Cook and Brown (1999, 390)
in a sense forms of affordances (i.e. dynamic affordances) emerge as part of the our interactions
with those objects. This kind of interpretation allows us to act actively seeking dynamic
affordances (i.e. knowledge) from our global environment.
253 Cf. the “holistic similarity recognition” emphasized by Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986, 28); Clark
(2001, 37-38).
254 According to Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland & Hinton (1986, 45-46; quoted also in
Wertsch 1998, 29) “especially important here is our ability to manipulate the environment so
that it comes to represent something. This is what sets human intellectual accomplishment
apart from other animals. Few of us are very good at multiplying 343 times 822 directly but
when this abstract problem is reduced, e.g. by pencil and paper, to a series of concrete operations
many of us can do the needed calculation”. For our educational arrangements, including also
assessment practices, this fact needs to be obviously reminded.
255 In the case of the FDF the dangers of this tendency seem to be avoided by the shared
practices to make a new vision (including “a knowledge vision”; emphasis on human security
matters) and collectively trying to anticipate and also make its future. Cf. chapter 7 and the
thematic interviews.
256 Field Marshall Joseph Joffre has been reported to have been “fond” of saying that “he did
not know whether he was responsible for the victory on the Marne in September 1914, but he
knew one thing – if the battle had been lost, it would have been he who lost it” (Cohen &
Gooch 1990, 3; Johnson, Wrangham & Rosen 2002, 258). But can it be so that the members of
an institution and an organization actually do share the responsibility both in times of victory
and defeat?
257 Compare for example the Durkheimian and Giddensian tradition.
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8.8.4. Human nature in the societal dimension
Instead of taking the Popperian philosophical stance, the extended
Leont’evian scheme presented in subchapter 8.4. deserves another
look. From this angle not artificial worlds but the epistemological
infrastructure of the knowledge intensive organization have to be
stressed. Figure 8.5 depicts the general idea of the organizational
epistemological infrastructure.
Figure 8.5 The organizational epistemic infrastructure
The central premises of the idea of the epistemological
infrastructure of the organization are multilevelness (i.e. invididual,
group or community, and organization etc.), linkedness (i.e. the levels
are linked by social and psychological processes), and cognitive agents’
affect actions (and vice versa) (cf. Crossan, Lane & White 1999, 523;
Tuomi 1999, 341; Giddens 1984; cf. Hakkarainen 2003).
Here the focus is on the proposals made by Crossan with his
colleagues and also by Tuomi. According to Crossan, Lane, and White
(1999, 524–525) intuiting and interpreting occur on the individual and
group level, while integrating and institutionalizing occur at the
organizational level. On the other hand, Tuomi (1999, 341–364) explains
how accumulation, anticipation, articulation, appropriation, and action
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happen at the individual and communal level and how growth,
innovation, and renewal occur at the organizational level. Also Tuomi
identifies the essential role organizational routines or institutionalizing
processes play at the organizational level.
Having identified the basic structure of the epistemological
infrastructure, let us return to knowledge. As it is both a product and
a process (i.e. a process of knowing; cf. chapter 4) we have to face the
challenge of explaining the procedural nature of knowledge: how can
knowledge be residing at the same time in the persons and also within
persons and how are the psychological and social processes mentioned
above intertwined in the epistemological infrastructure?
Each of these psychological and social processes needs to be
understood in its own right, but before this a synthesis can be made.
Obviously memory plays a crucial role in learning; it is not even possible
without some sort of memory258 and other past oriented actions and
activities (e.g. the accumulation, interpreting or sensemaking (Weick
1995, 2001) processes). Anticipating or intuiting, and appropriation
(see chapter 4), or even cross-appropriation259 (Spinosa et al. 1997) are
future oriented, either explorative or exploitative (March 1991: 1996;
Sutter 2002; Engeström 2004b) actions or even activities. At the
organizational level, systematizing, integrating, routinizing or
institutionalizing, but also occasional destabilizing processes play an
essential role. On all levels of analysis, communication260 can
complement social activities.
Not just new kind of epistemic infrastructure in the form of synthesis
needs to be done, but a more fundamental and transformational shift
of thinking is needed. Our habituated ways to see our current social
reality is challenged in figure 8.6.
258 Consequently, the phenomenon of memory comes to the fore as a useful phenomenon for
the progressive inquiry (see e.g. Anderson 1995; Becker & Morris 1999; Forde & Humphreys
2000; Cowan 2001; Schacter 2002; Bransford, Brown & Cocking eds. 2000; Hakkarainen et al.
2004). The memory seems to be reconstructive, partly limited (e.g. the magical number 7+-2 in
human processing; Miller 1956; cf. Cowan 2001) but interestingly these limitations could be
overcome to some extent by for example clustering (i.e. organizing disparate pieces of
information into meaningful units; seeing the forest instead of just the trees).
259 Cf. also the Giddensian reflexive appropriation (1990b, 304).
260 Cf. chapter 4 where the Shannonian unidirectional communication model was challenged
by Aula (1999; double function of communication), partly based on the ideas of Nonaka.
192
Figure 8.6 An alternative angle to organizational epistemic infrastructure
On the practical level, the embeddedness or holarchic nature of
life needs to be understood (Sahtouris 2000, 52; cf. Allee 2003).
Fundamentally life is a dialogue among relatively autonomous
embedded holons (or in our case, agents; actors; human beings), all of
which are critical to the function of the holarchy (i.e. the complex
social system). It was described earlier in this study how the
development of systemic thinking has been evolving, currently
emphasizing complex systems. The essential idea of complex systems
is that rule-governed (i.e. shared guiding principles) interaction among
a set of interconnected individuals can generate emergent structures
(Monge & Contractor 2003, 85; Jackson 2000, 88; Kupers 2001; Tsoukas
& Chia 2002; Anderson 1999; Cohen 1999; Wheatley 1999261)
intentionally and purposefully. Having said this, it is relatively easy to
figure out how fatal features organizational silence, over-
individualism, and misalignment can be for organizations and especially
for the FNDC.
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261 When we inquire into the depths of complexity theories we should not lose sight of the
basic differences (i.e. the difference between man and animal or material thing typologized
by e.g. Mingers 1997) between different kinds of systems.
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Dialectically speaking, in case of learning organizations, there are
also not-yet-learning organizations as well as there can be said to be
intelligent organizations and not-yet-intelligent organizations, and
also remembering and forgetting organizations. Surprisingly,
organizational stupidity (i.e. not-yet-intelligent) has received less
attention among researchers despite of the fact that it seems to be a
much more widely distributed phenomenon than organizational
intelligence (Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola & Lehtinen 2004, 96).
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that also organizational silence has
been a rarely explored issue262 (Morrison & Milliken 2000).
Before entering the studies on organizational silence, a brief
introduction to the reasons of communication failures is needed. It
can be assumed that these failures have been partly caused by
accepting uncritically the main premises of the classical model of a
communication event (A-> B = X) (Shannon & Weaver 1949: 1998;
Lasswell 1948 and Bavelas 1948, 1950 according to Taylor 1993, 256-
257). As already mentioned, the Shannonian classical model has been
challenged for example by Pekka Aula (1999) in his double function of
communication263.
In the classical communication model failures are attributed to either
encoding or decoding breakdowns, perhaps because the sender did
not express himself or herself correctly, or because the receiver was
inattentive or ill-disposed, or because of extraneous interference,
known as “noise” (Taylor 1993, 251). In this scheme the impossibility
of full encoding (tacit knowledge not fully in a explicit form) and
context specific features are neglected.
Referring to sociological theories of Luhmann (1995), Tuomi (1999)
argues that communication is based on active management of the
differences of understanding264, information, and utterance, the main
improbabilities of communication being accessibility (does it reach its
addressee), acceptability, and understandability. In what follows the
acceptability of communication plays a role.
262 Cf. chapter 4 and some unanswered questions of Nonakian theories such as: What are the
main obstacles to communication and how can these be avoided? There seems to be no
reason to take “emergence” of communication for granted.
263 Undoubtedly the Shannonian model has been widely criticized but here it is not elaborated
further. It suffices to say that already Polanyi (1966, 36-37, 206) was clearly aware of the
weaknesses of the Shannonian model. According to Polanyi (1966, 207) the words spoken
should be thought of from the point of view of the person spoken to. The tacit personal
coefficients of speech are transmitted by inarticulate communication and the power of speech
to convey communication depends on the effectiveness of this mimetic transmission (Polanyi
1966, 17). For additional criticism against unidirectional causal models of communication see
e.g. Contractor (1994, 46); Taylor (1993, 62-63).
264 Tuomi’s understanding of understanding differs from the one elaborated on and accepted
in this study.
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According to Tuomi, within Luhmann’s theory of communication
there is no easy way to describe what motivates acceptance or
rejection. In practical speech situations acceptability may depend on
issues like power and trust, and these can also be managed (Tuomi
1999, 190; italics added). According to Luhmann (1995, 129) trust is
the universal circumstance of action. Interestingly Luhmann’s
“subjectless” (Tuomi 1999, 256) sociological theory sees how society
remains dependent on sensors (human beings in the full sense of their
interpretation) that convey the environment (Luhmann 1995, 410; cf.
210–212), and the “sensors” expect trust as a context specific feature
to be uttered in the first place (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer 1998;
Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone 1998; Dirks & Ferrin 2001; Wicks, Berman &
Jones 1999; Williams 2001; Adler 2001; Heckscher 2001).
Let us now return to the situation where communication emerges
– or where occasionally open communication turns to organizational
silence. Before entering the issue of silence it needs to be highlighted
that the main question is the optimal level of silence (Saville-Troike
1985; Pinder & Harlos 2001, 362265) and the optimal “distance” between
discourse and practical activity. According to Engeström (1999d, 171),
most organizational activities fall in the middle where practical activity
is accompanied and complemented but not replaced or accomplished
solely by talk266.
According to Morrison and Milliken (2000, 708–710), organizational
silence is an outcome that owes its origins to managers’ fear of
feedback and a set of implicit beliefs often held by managers (i.e.
employees and subordinates are self-interested and untrustworthy267,
the management knows best, and unity is good268 and dissent is bad).
It is really noteworthy that when there is heavy strategic emphasis on
control, the managers may view negative feedback as more threatening
and dissent as more destructive (ibid, 711).
Presently at the FDF, under the umbrella of developing leadership
according to the principles of Deep Leadership (Nissinen 2001; cf. also
265 According to Saville-Troike (1985, 4) communicative behavior consists of both sounds and
silences, and the adequate description and interpretation of the process of communication
requires that we understand the structure, meaning, and functions of silence as well as sound.
266 The distance varies along the dimension of “divorce” and “merging” of discourse and
practice. Remember the preachers, auctioneers and talk show hosts as examples of those
whose practical activity and discourse seem to merge almost completely to talk as practice.
Remember cases when the discourse is not complemented and accompanied by talk. It needs
to be remembered that too little silence, or alternatively too little open discussions, can be
dysfunctional (Pinder & Harlos 2001, 362).
267 Possibilities to open discussions about cultural basic assumptions (i.e. man) are restricted
because of organizational silence and other cultural constraints. Argyris and Schön (1978)
refer to this very same issue when they talk about often undiscussable governing variables.
268 Cf. mentioned dangers of groupthinking; Janis (1983); Amidon (2005).
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the transformational leadership by Burns 1978, 2003; Bass 1998), the
widely shared fears of feedback269 are met. At the same time also the
parallel needs for self- and collective reflections on the other basic
cultural assumptions are increasing. This kind of development seems
to be highly recommendable also from the perspective of
organizational communication and silence studies.
The traditional tendency in all kinds of organizations, undoubtedly
including military organizations, has been to assume that the
management knows best about most issues of organizational
importance. This kind of assumption can be labeled as a centralized
knowledge view. In chapter 4 this centralized view was challenged by
the decentralized knowledge view270. Knowledge as a valuable resource
seems to reside inside human beings, within their activities, and also
as a cultural resource (i.e. knowledge assets; conceptual artifacts). For
managers this means in practice that instead of a single individual,
the community or the organization knows best.
It was also mentioned in chapter 4 that knowledge is a reality
viewed from a certain angle (Nonaka & Toyama 2003; Takeuchi &
Nonaka eds. 2004). Consequently, in knowledge creation (or in
knowledge management if preferred) one tries to see the entire social
reality by interacting with those who see it from other angles. For
managers this means that the angles of expert subordinates are
currently a highly valued success factor for our organizations (Boland
& Tenkasi 1995) and an unavoidable fact for the educational
institutions (Bruner 1996).
The above mentioned origins of organizational silence are often
fostered by specific organizational conditions. For example, the
assumption about the employees’ self-interest is likely to be common
because it appears to be rooted in the system of management
education currently entrenched in the United States (Morrison &
Milliken 2000, 710) and elsewhere (Ghoshal 2005). But what kinds of
assumptions about the human nature are shared in the FDF and do
we have some shared interests?
During the empirical part of the present research “an impossibility”
emerged (cf. chapter 6). On the other hand the teachers felt strongly
the superficiality of the continuous educational development processes.
They also seemed to believe that speaking up about problems in the
FNDC is not worth the effort, it is a sheer impossibility for the teachers
269 To be precise more feared than just feedback is other than confirmatory feedback (Swan &
Read 1981).
270Also researchers of organizational silence and voicing restrict their studies into situations
where and when the personnel have relevant ideas, information, and opinions about
improvements with relevance to their work and organization (Van Dyne, Ang & Botero 2003,
61).
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to make a contribution to the whole activity system of the FNDC (rules,
community, and division of labour should be excluded from the activity
system model in the case of the FNDC), and finally voicing one’s
opinions and concerns publicly is dangerous. Interestingly also
researchers of organizational silence (Morrison & Milliken 2000, 714;
Bowen & Blackmon 2003, 93; Pinder & Harlos 2001, 337) have identified
the very same phenomena influencing organizational silence.
On the other hand the managers strongly felt and believed271 in
the centrality of the teachers in the educational development
processes, but actually would they favor passive transmitters of old
knowledge or actively inquiring teacher-as-researchers? Indeed,
research indicates that individual expectations have consequences,
because expectations272 filter inputs (Weick 1995, 146). One way to
solve this kind of paradox is to make firstly the managers’ and then
the subordinates’ beliefs and assumptions as explicit and clear as
possible, giving room for collaborative readjustments of the beliefs.
The hypothesized saying of Pinder and Harlos (2001, 349) needs to be
focused on in the future: “once a few soldiers had spoken up, many
others followed quickly”.
While assuming such discussions to begin, it seems to be reasonable
to express clearly and explicitly that the general tendency of the
personnel serving in the FDF of favoring some sort of behaviorism
can be understood as a neglectance of the inner mental functioning
of the personnel. Additionally the emphasis on constructivism and
radical constructivism (“extreme individualism”; Hofstede & Hofstede
2005, 75–79 about the relative Finnish individualism) may, implicitly if
not explicitly, reinforce the dominant basic assumptions hindering
collectivism to flourish. Extreme individualism needs to be balanced
simply because the successfulness of individuals depends on the vitality
of the whole network distributed ultimately on a global scale273.
Another organizational condition favoring organizational silence
is the homogeneity of the top managers with functional training and
experience (Morrison & Milliken 2000, 711). The homogeneity tends
to sustain the cohesiveness of the managers, who are more threatened
by the idea of dissent, and consequently intensify the effects of
negative groupthink (Janis 1973; Amidon 2005). The professors of the
FNDC seem to represent potential heterogeneity among the managers
of the college.
271 Or at least they espoused these kinds of beliefs when asked in an open manner.
272 Schemata, schema, mental models, scripts or beliefs are examples of concepts referring to
rather similar phenomena. Quoting William James Weick (1995, 146) explains the issue as
follows: “Confident expectation of certain intensity or quality of impression will often make
us sensibly see or hear it in an object which really falls short of it”.
273 Allee (2003, 236–237), referring to the evolutionary biologist Elisabeth Sahtouris.
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According to Morrison and Milliken (2000, 711) the combination of
high power distance and collectivism among the top managers is
particularly likely to be associated with silence-fostering beliefs.
According to Hofstedes (2005, 43–44, 78–83), in Finland, as well in other
Nordic countries, the power distance and collectivism are on a low
level. As a conclusion, the Finnish cultural power distance and
collectivism do not seem to considerably reinforce organizational
silence at the FDF. But to what extent the relatively high power distance
in the Armed Forces and at the FNDC reinforces organizational silence
in fundamental issues274 needs to be considered.
Morrison and Milliken (2000, 712) predict that the belief structure
contributing to organizational silence will be more likely to dominate
management thought in more mature and stable industries than in
newer and/or volatile industries. This kind of prediction reveals the
general myth at large: companies and organizations that are big or
old cannot innovate in ways that transform industries. Whether this
is a fact needs to be reconsidered (cf. Hamel 2000, 211275). Of course
also big organizations can transform themselves and act innovatively,
but it often takes more time and collective efforts to act in an aligned
manner. Instead of the “impossibility or possibility” of deep
transformations, the main question to talk about is the exogenousness
or endogenousness of the transformation process. For the FDF this
means being ready to use all available resources to guarantee
successfulness also in the future when the pressures to collaborate
and compete will increase while its position on the Finnish-European
cultural map seems to be shifting. To this scheme the espoused intent
to become a “learning organization” fits relatively well, but only if it
is identifiable in the social reality of the FDF (i.e. not just on the level
of instruments or in a written form only) in the future.
Since the times of Dewey, to see that a situation requires inquiry
has been the initial step in progressive inquiry. In the words of
Engeström (1987, 1999a), the very first action in such an indeterminate
situation is that of questioning, criticizing, or rejecting some aspects
of the accepted practice and existing wisdom.  For Lave and Wenger
(1991; Wenger, 1998) learning is inherent in human nature, being an
274 Finns are often labelled “as people who are silent in two languages” (Finnish and Swedish
being the official languages of Finland) (Sajavaara & Lehtonen 1997, 264) but despite of these
kinds of cultural beliefs the general climate at the FNDC seems to favour for example informal
discussions on secondary issues and small talk but not fundamentals. Often the fundamentals
are labelled as “static” (i.e. static warrior premises) or paradoxically  “uncontrollable” (floating
on the Finnish cultural tides) being useless topics to talk about.
275 From the Finnish point of view Nokia’s case offers a powerful counterexample from the
“civilian world”. Even as big and “bureaucratic” organizations as the US Armed Forces are at
least espousing innovativeness (cf. Joint Vision 2020). For another example of a big “innovative”
military organization see the case of Imperial Russia (Schimmelpennick van der Oye & Menning
eds. 2004).
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ongoing and integral part of our lives. About the social and
organizational learning, Argyris and Schön (1978) might like to ask:
are we then ready to seek for problems and correct them? Are we
ready to reflect on our often undiscussable governing variables and
principles and even deliberately and collectively develop these?
Undoubtedly, occasionally we do not see the need for progressive
inquiry; do not even feel the need to start questioning or criticizing,
let alone rejecting some aspects of the unintelligent routines276, the
“core competencies”277, the “absorptive capacity”278 and existing
“wisdom”279 just espousing organizational learning and lacking
transformational “deep” or double loop learning.
According to Giddens (1984, 64) ordinary day-to-day social life, to
a greater or a lesser degree, involves an ontological security280 founded
on autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines and
encounters. But the routinized character of the daily life does not just
“happen”. It is “made to happen” by the modes of reflexive monitoring
of action which individuals sustain in circumstances of co-presence
(Giddens 1984, 64). In some sense this mode of reflexive monitoring is
a potentiality due to the fact that in reproducing structural properties
agents also reproduce the conditions (i.e. routines; e.g. organizational
silence or voicing etc) that make such action possible or not281.
But here lies the true possibility for organizations aiming to be
“learning organizations” – let us face our current social reality and
276 More or less metaphorically speaking but not so literally as has often been done (Dosi,
Nelson & Winter 2000, 5), knowledge resides also in organizational routines (cf. also Orr 1990;
Cook & Brown 1999; Nelson & Winter 1982; Hutchins 1995; Cohen & Bacdayan 1994; Feldman
2000; Pavitt 2002; Argyris 1990, 1992: 1999; Argyris & Schön 1996; Berman, Down & Hill, 2002;
routine knowledge assets of Nonaka (cf. chapter 4)). On the other hand see Giddens (1984) for
the strong emphasis of routines in social life and Adler and Byros (1996) about the enabling
and coercive types of formalization (routinization) in bureaucracies.
277 According to Hamel and Prahalad the core competencies are the collective learning in the
organization (1990, 82) or the bundle of skills (i.e. of coordination and integration) and
technologies (1994, 223). In the case of the FNDC it can be assumed that the leadership and the
pedagogical competencies (i.e. training; education) are the needed core competencies.
278 According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990) an organization’s collective abilities (prior related
knowledge including basic skills and shared language) constitute its absorptive capacity. Zahra
and George (2002, 186) have reconceptualized the absorptive capacity proposed by Cohen
and Levinthal. According to them the absorptive capacity is a set of organizational routines
and processes by which firms acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge to produce
a dynamic organizational capability. These kinds of conceptualizations seem to be rather
ambiguous and experience distant, being not necessarily so useful when making double-
hermeneutically interventions to real organizations such as educational institutions.
279 According to Polanyi, in this learning process the alert mind of the student generates, or
should be allowed to generate, heuristic tension between believed accessible range of
potentialities and strive to comprehend, where imaginative thrust plays an important role
(Polanyi 1966, 89).
280 Confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the
basic existential parameters of self and social identity (Giddens 1984, 375). Cf. also Pollack
(2003) how we are actually enveloped with uncertainty in all spheres of our lives.
281 Structure is dialectically always both enabling and constraining (Giddens 1984, 25), and in
some cases more constraining than in others, depending e.g. on the choices made by agents.
199
shift our thinking (cf. figure 8.7) and start questioning, criticizing
and being personally responsible for such an organizational climate
and for our emerging future282. Let us be aware that the future will be
shaped by ourselves despite of the fact that we can be unaware or
alternatively aware of it.
When taking a look at social knowledge and learning we have to
ask what the role played by organizational memorizing and forgetting
is. If we accept the view that memory plays a crucial role in individual
learning, how about then in the case of organizational learning? To
what extent can we use these kinds of metaphors as memorizing
organizations and what is the more literal meaning of these kinds of
features?
Walsh and Ungson (1991: 1997, 181-187) have built up their
organizational memory from five storage bins or retention facilities:
individuals, culture, transformations, structures, ecology, and external
archives. Walsh and Ungson seem not to be aware of the Scheinian
layered culture model presented in chapter 4 (cf. figure 4.1), because
for them organizational culture is defined as a learned way of
perceiving, thinking, and feeling about problems that is transmitted
to members in the organization (ibid, 183). According to Schein (1992,
17-27) the surface level of the culture is embedded in the physical
environment, its technology and products and to other material
objects which can be seen, heard and felt when encountered. A little
bit simplifying, Schein’s surface level of the culture is the same
phenomenon as the ecology or transformations283 proposed by Walsh
and Ungson.
Walsh and Ungson’s (1991: 1997, 185–186) analysis is deeply rooted
in the positional sociological tradition284 by seeing that organizational
structure is viewed as a pattern of relations among positions (i.e. roles).
On the other hand their analysis also seems to be rooted in the
relational (i.e. transformations) and the cultural tradition (i.e. culture),
showing the obvious need to reconsider the Walsh-Ungsonian
premises.
Moorman and Miner (1998) have continued the analysis of Walsh
and Ungson, identifying two different types of organizational memory
– procedural and declarative.285 To them procedural memory often
282 In the field of organizational silence, see e.g. Bowen & Blackmon (2003, 94); Dutton &
Ashford (1993); Dutton, Ashford, O-Neill & Lawrence (2001) for supportive research results.
283 Especially in the case of standard operating procedures, 185. Additionally we can ask how
transformations can be other routines of the organizations. Consequently the criticism against
mystified organizational routines can be turned also against the transformations favoured by
Walsh and Ungson.
284 Cf. Monge, Contractor (2003, 19-20); in other words the functionalist view (for criticism
against this kind of position see e.g. Giddens 1984; Luhmann 1995).
285 Cf. the short analysis of the memory of individuals done in this chapter, identifying the same
types of memories.
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represents tacit knowledge for individuals and organizations
(Moorman & Miner 1998, 708). Obviously Moorman and Miner are
doing a non-Polanyian analysis of tacit knowledge by emphasizing its
“socialness”. The main motive behind this kind of mystification is
difficult to identify, but it is obscure to what extent, if at all, these
social structures have some existence independent of the knowledge
that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day activity (cf.
Giddens 1984, 26).
Social structures are made by knowledgeable agents positioned or
“situated” in time-space to various kinds of contexts. According to
Middleton and Edwards (1990, 1) the predominant focus of enquiry in
the studies of human memory has been the study of memory as a
property of individuals, or at the very best extending beyond
individuals to include the influence of “context” on what people
remember. In the cases of Walsh and Ungson and also of Moorman
and Miner, the context is ambiguously conceptualized, making it
difficult to understand how the context may or may not influence
what people remember or forget.
According to the researchers of cultural-historical theory the
context can be conceptualized in the form of an activity system. Taking
this conceptualization into account, it is possible to see how
remembering and forgetting happen within activity systems and how
active individuals have a decisive role in these processes. On the other
hand, remembering can be seen as making connections between one’s
head (procedural and declarative memories) and external memory aids
(e.g. other people, writing things down, knotted handkerchiefs, alarm
clocks and other cultural resources etc.) (Engeström, Brown, Engeström
& Koistinen 1990, 140–143).
On the other hand, remembering (cf. Engeström, Brown, Engeström
& Koistinen 1990, 140–143) can be seen as making connections between
actions of primary and secondary remembering – between preserving
(e.g. storing information and explicit knowledge) and retrieving (e.g.
examining stored information or explicit knowledge and e.g. planning
based on it). Primary remembering focuses on the individual object of
the activity system in question, but secondary remembering takes the
activity system itself as the focal point of attention. In a way we can
say that the activity system remembers but it does not happen without
individuals remembering with external memory aids.
According to Engeström, Brown, Engeström, Koistinen (1990, 140–
143) forgetting is seen as breaches or ruptures in the connections
between the internal image of the people memorizing and external
memory aids and/or between primary and secondary actions of
remembering. So forgetting can be caused by organizational silence,
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over-individualism, interaction malfunctions and unsystematic acts of
preserving. Interestingly the traditional “product” (i.e. storage bins)
nature of organizational memory has been challenged by the “process”
nature of organizational remembering and forgetting.
For organizations, as for example the FNDC, where the personnel286
tends to be fairly frequently replaced, to remember organizationally
means routinely preserving (producing external memory aids of the
individual object but also of the whole activity system to be utilized
in the educational planning processes of the future) but also retrieving
(i.e. examining the stored information before and during the
subsequent planning processes). It is almost needless to say, but
preserving has to be done keeping the dangers of information overflow
in mind. Hence, big conclusions and generalizations should be done
but without loosing contact to the underlying information and data.
If we do, as most of the interviewees did (cf. chapter 7), accept the
idea of the layeredness of the curriculum, we have to remember to
encourage preserving acts on all levels of the curriculum. For the
teachers this means how they are and will be socialized to the teacher
and research community of the FNDC, how the tacit knowledge of
the more expert teachers can be utilized by the arriving teachers, and
how the collective progressive inquiries sustain the vitality of the
knowledge base of the FNDC.
The close relation between memorizing and sensemaking should
be noticed. According to Weick (1995, 17–62, 2001; Tuomi 1999, 240–
245) sensemaking is a social, ongoing and retrospective process driven
by plausibility where the organization enacts its identity. By
memorizing the organization can understand where they were, where
they are and who they are (identity).
The past oriented actions and activities need to be balanced by
future oriented ones. The reason to do so is simply the fact that in
every situation people produce part of the environment they face
(Weick 1995, 20, 30; Giddens 1984). Therefore, it is reasonable for the
organization to try to control the future emerging continuously within
the personnel of the organization in question (i.e. the FNDC). For these
kinds of purposes the organization needs a vision – a shared knowledge
vision (Senge 1990; Collins & Porras 1994, 219–228; Collins 2001, 108–
110; Wiig 2002; Nonaka & Toyama 2002; Nonaka, Toyama & Byosiere
2001) made within the organization. Not just the content of the
knowledge vision but also the method how it is elaborated and what
the ensuing actions of the knowledge vision are, are crucial and
fundamental questions for the FNDC and also for the whole FMES.
286 At the FNDC especially the officers.
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Chapter Nine
CONCLUSIONS
9.1. Research questions
The following research questions guided this research process:
– Who are the subjects of learning and knowledge activities?
– What do they learn?
– How do they learn and participate in the knowledge activities?
– How do we guide the transformation of the educational institution
or is it a totally autopoietic issue?
9.2. Theoretical contribution
This study favors fundamental questions followed by at least
tentative answers instead of exact answers to secondary questions.
The main reason for this is the assumption that the right answer to a
secondary question is also secondary, but the fundamental question,
even when insoluble in its exact form, can give us fruitful insights,
guiding us towards major discoveries and deep transformations.
The present study allows us to reflect on the shared beliefs of the
essence of social sciences and it joins the discussions concerning the
shared metatheoretical and philosophical foundations of the social
sciences and more precisely of the military sciences at the FDF. It allows
us to see the justifiability of the broad research program view instead
of the fashionable “paradigmatic pipeline thinking” in the age of
deepening systemness and increasing needs to get broader
understanding of our current challenges and ways to solve these
collaboratively. The study gives a useful example of a social scientific
bridge building over the gaps between different spheres of live and
competing “paradigms”.
Although future oriented, the present thesis does not neglect the
traditional premises of the social science; on the contrary it favors
“old fashioned” scientific ethos, including for example constructively
critical thinking based on careful analysis of the evolving facts that
are criticized. For military sciences and to military pedagogy the chosen
constructively critical stance means that the currently accepted
interpretations of the organizational learning theories at the FDF are
challenged. In other words some of the current cognitive trails are
destabilized while the knowledge base of the FDF is extended towards
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some of the most prominent research programmes in the field of
organizational learning and knowledge studies.
In the field of knowledge management studies the study focuses
on the first generation studies and especially on the interpretations
made by Ikujiro Nonaka. Instead of just narrow SECI orientdness, the
broad framework of Nonaka is carefully analyzed. The SECI model is
reinterpreted as a SECA model and the knowledge creation theories
are linked to the cultural-historical activity theories, to communication
studies and to system sciences.
In the analysis the chosen theories are linked to the current teaching
practices at the FNDC. This allows us to interpret more deeply the
practical meaning of the abstract theories while aiming to transform
Finnish military educational practices.
The constructively critical analysis has allowed the researcher to
synthetize a novel framework that can be used also elsewhere in
educational institutions (figure 9.1 in subchapter 9.6). With the help
of the framework it is easy to keep the fundamental questions in mind
while struggling with the transformation of the educational institution.
After the educational institution has identified its main
contradictions and paradoxes, they can be put into a solvable form
along the identified key educational dimensions. Later in this chapter
a practical example of the usefulness of dimensional thinking is
explained (figure 9.3 in subchapter 9.7). Also some strategic principles
for educational reformers are elaborated on (see below in this chapter).
For the organization aiming to be a learning and/or knowledge
creating organization, a robust epistemic infrastructure plays a pivotal
role in these kinds of desires. Two alternative angles to see such an
epistemic infrastructure are offered (figures 8.5 and 8.6). The study
shows how the levels (or alternatively the spheres of the infrastructure)
are potentially linked by the identified psycho-social processes of the
learning-knowledge creating organization.
The synthetized theories allow us to reflect deeply on the human
role in our contemporary societies and organizations; also in those
claiming to be “static and stable” sailing on the tides of cultural
evolution.
9.3. Practical contribution
The conducted Development Laboratory meetings and followed
thematic interviews of the managers of the FNDC allowed us to face
the current paradoxical and contradictive social reality at the FNDC.
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The analysis persuades us to focus on the basic assumptions and beliefs
of the soldiers at the FDF. The intent has been to make those serving
at the FNDC and at the FMES more aware of the shared beliefs of the
current managers and teachers of the FNDC. It is assumed that
awareness of the beliefs of others allows us to change our thinking of
e.g. static warrior premises, stability of the military bureaucracies,
alignment of the beliefs and deepness of the current military
educational “reforms”. Potentially these individual and hopefully
collective reflections have a fruitful influence on the ensuing learning
actions and activities.
It was shown that instead of being fully controlled in top-down
manner, the individual teachers play a pivotal role at the FNDC
presently. They are already making departmental pedagogical
innovations potentially diffused to the other departments of the FNDC
or elsewhere at the FMES.
The elaborated Teacher’s Self-evaluation Sheet and the developed
Military Teacher Education Course are the most practical contributions
of the present study. The sheet allows the teachers to explicitly grasp
and externalize their personal beliefs and ideas about “good” expertise
in military training and education, and can be used while socializing
“newcomers” to the FNDC or to the FMES in general.
At the moment the younger generations of students, who are
potential future teachers of the FNDC, are educated to use the Change
Laboratory method effectively as a developmental tool for the
purposes of the FDF and FBG. The gained experiences allow us to
develop this kind of education both on the practical and on the
theoretical levels.
9.4. Who are the subjects of learning and
knowledge activities?
Now it is time to answer the posed questions and give some general
guidance for the hopefully forthcoming teachers’ on-the-job education
at the FNDC287. Life-long teacher education is a necessary but not
sufficient prerequisite for the future aligned educational reforms and
transformations (cf. chapter 3). Therefore, the progressively inquiring
287 The very first step in such education are the teachers’ self-reflections assisted by the Teacher’s
Self-Evaluation Sheet. After the self-reflections’, collective reflections are a fruitful next step.
The double-hermeneutic processes are the key issue for the following steps of the teachers’
education. For “novice” teachers the Military Teacher Education Course should be a compulsory
one. Also the relative position of military pedagogy in the Senior Staff and General Staff
officer education needs to be reconsidered. The pedagogical expert status of the Department
of Education should be supported by all available means.
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teachers of the FMES are the subjects of learning and knowledge
activities (cf. figure 6.1). For the teachers of all disciplines at the
FNDC this means that to be a teacher is to be a researcher at the same
time.
Every teacher is also a leader, consciously solving his Soldier’s Basic
Paradox both individually and collectively. Therefore, the teachers’
management and leadership development are essential parts of the
teachers’ on-the-job-education. The core expertise of the peacetime288
military teachers at the FMES should be pedagogically, managerially
and also leadership oriented.
It seems to be appropriate to recognize that behaviour and actions
are understandable only when interpreted against the background of
the entire activity system (Engeström 2001a). The dimension of
impossibility and possibility emerged during the Development
Laboratory meetings, caused by a secondary contradiction between
the subjects and the community (cf. figure 6.3). The emergence of
this kind of contradiction is understandable partly due to the teachers’
unawareness of the managers’ shared expectations and beliefs.
According to the espoused beliefs of the managers the teachers play
a central role in educational transformations. Now it seems to be the
right time to turn these espoused expectations into systematic teachers’
on-the-job education, especially when the alignment in research-based
teaching seems to be the desired end at the FNDC.
In an organization wishing to be “a learning organization” in the
future, a robust epistemic infrastructure (cf. figures 8.5 and 8.6) is
an essential success factor. For the FNDC this means that it should
balance its over-individualistic cultural stance by some kind of Training
Portal-based expert or knowledge communities (cf. communities of
practices; innovative knowledge communities) within the research
community at the FNDC and at the FMES. Looking at the same
organizational phenomenon but using alternative perspectives (cf.
figure 8.5 and figure 8.6), a shift of mind was aimed at. Despite of
the chosen preferred perspective, the main idea intertwining the
perspectives together remained the same – the multilevel (i.e.
“multicircle”) organizational epistemic infrastructure can be linked
together by psychological and social processes extending systematically
to international communities and processes.
288 The peacetime activities of the Armed Forces should not be neglected, as competent (e.g.
also action competent) wartime units are trained and educated (i.e. produced) in peacetime
to be used in times of crisis or ultimately in war. Therefore, it is logical to focus on peacetime
activities first and on the basis of the “successfulness” of these, be prepared for wartime
activities.
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But although the subjects’ behaviour and actions are
understandable only when interpreted against the background of the
entire activity system (Engeström 2001a), there is no activity without
an object, and there is no object without an activity. In chapter 4 it
was explained how we should actually have activities in which we are
aware of their ultimate outcome289. The following subchapter will focus
on the question of the outcome, but here the centralness of the object
(i.e. the student) for the FNDC’s activity system is emphasized.
In chapters 6 (excerpt 6.7) and 7 the heterogeneity of the current
(2005) student population was shown by a study assisted by the Centre
for the Educational Assessment of the University of Helsinki290.
Naturally each student has to be met as he or she is, although our
beliefs and expectations have tangible consequences (James 1890: 1950;
Weick 1995, 146) as explained in chapter 8. Instead of focusing solely
on the questions of “how has this kind of student been admitted to
the FNDC” and “what kind of student is he or she actually”, we should
remember the most important question: “what is he not yet” (cf.
chapter 4). Consequently, the teachers of the FNDC should take a close
look at the potential of the students.
When facing the real nature of the operational environment of
the soldiers, having always been a dynamic entity demanding
extremely active agents, the words of colonel Douglas MacGregor
(2003, 208), speaking of the US Armed Forces, clarifies the point: “It is
unrealistic to expect that military leaders will demonstrate the requisite
physical energy, mental agility, and moral courage in war to inspire
subordinates to exercise initiative, to innovate, and to take risks if
they have been discouraged from doing so throughout their military
careers.” For the teachers of the FNDC this means that despite of the
heterogeneity of the students, each individual student has to be
responsible for his learning, and this means that he has to put all his
resources to the full use while participating in the knowledge creating
activities.
But the students are not learning in a vacuum, nor are the teachers
individualistic hermits. They act in the context of the FNDC and
collectively their actions are understandable only when interpreted
against the background of the entire activity system. Hence, the
students and the teachers are co-learners and co-inquirers in the
research community, each participant helping others to reach their
“best” and shaping the culture of the FNDC at the same time.
289 In chapter 7 the current outcome, in the form of key result objectives, of the FNDC was
questioned and criticized.
290 The report is not publicly available at the moment.
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9.5. What do they learn?
In brief, students at educational institutions learn “knowledge” and
participate in “the knowing processes” while they should be creating
knowledge (i.e. conceptual and systemic knowledge assets; conceptual
artifacts). Ultimately, while participating in these kinds of knowledge
activities they should be aiming at creating a new form of practical
activity (Ahonen, Engeström & Virkkunen 2000, 291). At the FNDC
this new kind of activity could be labeled as knowledge creating activity
(cf. figure 9.2 in subchapter 9.7).
The meaning of knowledge has evolved culturally since the Platonian
times of “knowledge as justified true belief”. Already the analysis of
the first generation knowledge management researchers (cf. chapter
4) showed that nowadays knowledge can be seen as both a product
and a process. In other words, when talking about knowledge, it is
said to reside inside human beings, within their activities, being also a
cultural resource (i.e. knowledge assets; conceptual artifacts). To some
extent, and especially by adequate means, knowledge is really
convertible but the main issue is not its convertibility, but its
disctinctiveness and coequality when thinking about knowledge in a
more systemic manner. In brief, each form of knowledge does work
that the others cannot (Cook & Brown 1999; Tuomi 1999, 2002) and
the complexity of these forms of knowledge is high, causing
unmeasurability of knowledge at least by current methodologies.
Although knowledge seems to play an essential role in our
successfulness, the processes of knowing are even more crucial for us,
due to the fact that distinctive forms of knowledge have to be kept
resonating within themselves. The resonation seems to be a rather
abstract concept but by it several psychological and social processes
can be referred to. Instead of some “generative dance” (Cook & Brown
1999) forms of knowledge resonate within themselves by the processes
of
– Intuiting, anticipating, perceiving, believing; putting the doubt into
productive use.
– Appropriating and cross-appropriating.
– Socializing novices into the practices by the experts of the
community (not necessarily only by “old-timers” or “experienced
nonexperts” (Bereiter & Scardamalia 1993; Bereiter 2002).
– Articulating, writing, drawing (i.e. externalizing) and effectively
communicating.
– Memorizing (e.g. accumulating; sensemaking) or alternatively
forgetting.
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– Systematizing, integrating, routinizing (i.e. institutionalizing) but
often also destabilizing.
– Learning, understanding and developing action competence.
One of the main challenges in the field of knowledge management
studies is to develop means and methods to enable these kinds of
positive resonation processes to flourish also in all kinds of not-yet-
intelligent/learning/memorizing organizations.
One main aspect of knowledge needs to be highlighted. Knowledge
is said to be a reality viewed from a certain angle (Nonaka & Toyama
2003; Takeuchi & Nonaka eds. 2004). Consequently, in knowledge
creation (or in knowledge management if so preferred) one tries to
see the entire social reality by interacting with those who see it from
other angles. For the disciplines of the FNDC this means that the
students have to get a contact with the main “paradigms” or research
programmes of the discipline during their studies. But obviously they
have to inquire “beyond” the “old” research programmes while
progressively inquiring into the “new”.
When focusing on such cultural and public resources as knowledge
in the form of knowledge assets (e.g. conceptual and systemic) and
conceptual artifacts, the certification practices play a pivotal role. By
the certification processes (i.e. peer review processes) the legitimacy
of the scientific certified knowledge (“savoir” in French) (Foray 2004,
6; cf. Foucault 1972, 16) can be a posteriori guaranteed. Not just outer
scientific communities have the responsibility of the quality of the
certified knowledge but the responsibility is shared by each, hopefully
normatively (e.g. scientific ethos) guided, social scientist.
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9.6. How do they learn and participate in
the knowledge activities?
A condensed and synthetized answer to this question is presented
in figure 9.1 (Mäkinen 2005).
Figure 9.1 Synthetized framework for organizational learning and
knowledge creation
The framework has been synthetized by using thesis (figure 4.2)
and antithesis (figure 4.4) as combinatorial tools. The framework has
been kept as simple as possible due to the bounded arationality of
human beings. Despite of its simplicity, the framework allows us to
keep the fundamental educational questions in mind during the
transformational processes of the educational institutions.
The learning and knowledge creating activities are always
contextually situated and hence the cultural features play an important
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role in the organizational learning and knowledge creation activities.
Surprisingly, “cultural barriers” slowed down the Development
Laboratory process at the FNDC, and the teacher-researcher turned
to thematic interviews of the managers of the FNDC. The layered
Scheinian cultural structure (cf. figure 4.1) showed its relevancy and
assisted in focusing below the espoused value statements all the way
to culturally evolving basic premises and assumptions of the warriors
in machinelike bureaucracy – or alternatively soldiers in human (i.e.
organic) organizations.
The present study shows in practice how crucial it is to be reminded
of the dialectics of effective communication and communication
failures. It was stressed that the main question is not total avoidance
of silence but the optimal level of silence and the optimal “distance”
between discourse and practical activity. It was believed that also at
the FNDC the teaching and researching practices should be
accompanied and complemented, but not replaced or accomplished
solely by talk. But the complementarity of the discourse is only a
potentiality, and missing this point can sustain the organizational
silence on the fundamentals,  as in the case of the FNDC.
The “static warrior premises” were reinterpreted to be under
continuous reconsideration. The case of obedience clarified the point.
Of course also in the future soldiers and officers are expected to obey
orders but this does not tell the “whole truth” of the case. The
metatheoretical problem or paradox to be solved can be named as
the Soldier’s Basic Paradox291. Nowadays “obedience” needs to be
reinterpreted, because every soldier is a leader (Brownlee &
Schoomaker 2004) and the transactional leadership dimension needs
to be balanced by the transformational leadership dimension (Nissinen
2001).
In chapter 8 the roots of progressive-inquiry learning were
reinterpreted. The learning journey took us through Deweyn and
Meadian insights to Batesonian, Argyris-Schönian, and Engeströmian
“constructivist” theories. Along the journey some practical meanings
of the analyzed theories were explained but by no means to a full
extent. One reason for doing so was to destabilize the Kolbian and
“constructivist” interpretations made in the FDF, and justifiably extend
the knowledge base of the FNDC to be used in its pedagogical activities.
The misaligned consequences of habits need to be faced; not denied.
Learning can be seen as potentially expansive action and activity, but
often the beginning of the learning process is the most difficult in
291 On the theoretical level this metatheoretical problem is akin to the Leader-Follower Paradox
(cf. the Burns Paradox; the theoretical problem; Burns 2003, 171) emerging in the field of
transformational leadership (Burns 1978, 2003; Bass 1998).
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practice. Sometimes instead of reflective learning, nonlearning (i.e.
presumption, nonconsideration, and rejection) or nonreflective
learning (i.e. unconsiciously) seem to be the typical response to
everyday experience (Jarvis 1987, 1992). The experiences gained from
the FNDC (cf. chapters 6 and 7) clearly confirm the Jarvisian
interpretation by showing how difficult the acts of questioning,
criticizing, or rejecting some fundamental aspects of the accepted
practice and existing “wisdom” on the social domain (i.e. publicly)
can be.
According to Dewey “a problem well put is half solved”. This makes
sense when understanding that research programmes offer us theories
to see and solve problems in our reality and social reality. Figures 6.1
and 6.3 suggest or even propose some ill-defined problems at the
FNDC. Not only Deweyan melioristic faith is needed to solve these
problems, although we cannot fall into the optimistic passivity.
Consequently, intelligent action and human effort292 of each individual
serving at the FNDC and at the FMES are needed also in the future.
Following the insights of Mead, Dewey and the developers of the
progressive-inquiry learning it suffices to say that “we do not know
what the solution will be, but we do know the method of the solution”.
For the teaching and practices of the FNDC this means progressive
inquiries in all disciplines, but also a need for the recontextualization
and avoiding discontinuities-turn (cf. Brown, Collins & Duguid 1989;
Resnick 1987; Biggs 2003). Instead of being guided by the feedback of
the military units and other profit centres of the FDF and the FBG, the
FMES should be aware of how powerful an impact their activities have
on the key resources (i.e. knowledge) of their “military consumers”293.
In chapter 7 it was shown how the managers of the FNDC have
identified the right formula mentioned in the footnote 293 below,
due to the fact that the need of the students to learn to solve problems
was emphasized. Obviously the problems of the FDF and FBG are often
outside the FMES and the students have to learn to solve these already
at the educational institution.
The recontextualization turn means also something else294. Quite
often the knowledge taught in an educational institution is “inert”
(Whitehead 1929) and not conditionalized (recontextualized) to show
in what kinds of situations and how the theories may be useful. If
then we hope and wish that in the future the officers will know the
practical meaning of the theories, they will have to inquire into the
292 Alternatively Finnish “sisu”.
293 In abstract terms this means a shift from A-> B to A<-> B.
294 It means also much more as for example recontextualizing the assessment practices (cf. e.g.
Biggs 2003, 184-191; Bransford, Brown & Cocking eds. 2000; see also the Learning Log mentioned
in chapters 6 and 7).
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practical meaning of the “abstract” theories, avoiding the inertness
of the learned knowledge systematically. In each and every turn we
have to understand the practical (cf. concrete) meaning of the abstract
theories.
At an educational institution, such as the FNDC, the students and
teachers learn while they create and build knowledge within the
research community of the FMES. In some way the progressive-inquirers
follow cognitive trails in the cultural environment. They go beyond a
predefined set of alternatives rather easily. The transition from single-
loop learning (cf. Learning II) to double-loop learning (cf. Learning III)
can be done consciously by seeking progressively more and more well
certified theories to be critically cross-appropriated and appropriated
into the practice.
For the above kinds of inquiries, artificial borders between military
and civilian sciences are often just an unnecessary hindrance. In the
future some challenging questions will come to the fore: to what extent
are international security organizations restricting or not the research
domain of the Finnish military scientists and to what extent can the
military scientific domain be reconsidered both conceptually and “non-
conceptually” (cf. chapter 2) by the Finnish military scientists?
As figure 9.1 proposes, our progressive inquiries can be guided
by the knowledge vision. The exact meaning of the knowledge vision
was elaborated on in chapter 8, and especially the “governing ideas”
and value systems were stressed. Also the usefulness of public and
cultural knowledge for the knowledge vision making activities was
highlighted. The current experiences of the FNDC give some flesh on
the bones of the idea. The FNDC has added the concept of “human
security”295 to its strategy (to the “knowledge vision”), presumably
being followed by collective progressive inquiries into the
phenomenon determining how the knowledge base of the FNDC and
the FDF will be evolving in the long term. It seems to be obvious that
the human security will be guaranteed by the collective effort of several
administrative branches and non-governmental organizations. But
what this kind of knowledge vision means to the FNDC and for the
education of officers, needs to be elaborated on, because it will not
emerge out of the blue.
To start the reconsiderations concerning the development of the
military sciences further on, it will be useful to see both phase I and
phase II type of research questions. In phase I the FDF trains and
educates its war-time units during peace-time. The knowledge needs
of phase I activities have to be filled partly by the knowledge creation
295 In a parallel manner the FDF and also the FNDC have added the learning organization to
their “knowledge vision”.
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activities of the FDF. In these knowledge creation activities cultural
knowledge resources play a fundamental role, and the main task of
the FDF is to make double hermeneutic processes and combinatorial
innovations to be used for the purposes of the FDF and the FBG. This
type of research activities resonate well with the Gibbonsian Mode 2
type of research (cf. chapter 2).
Phase I type of research has to be combined with phase II type of
research. In a way the research of type II is made on the basis of the
knowledge and understanding gained in type I research. “Non-
conceptually” thinking it can be suggested that the domain of military
sciences lies partly on actions and activities in the war-time operational
environment. Conceptually thinking for example concentration on
human phenomena can be justified as being a Finnish area of expertise
also in times of deepening European security integration.
In chapter 7 it was said that pedagogical misalignment is a fact at
the FNDC, but fortunately the needed alignment is a true possibility
for the FNDC and for the whole FMES. The alignment can be achieved
by learning; by deep learning. The key challenge of the FNDC is to
allow systemic destabilization of its knowledge base on three essential
levels – on the metatheoretical and philosophical, on the theoretical
and paradigmatic, and on the practical level. On the practical level it
needs to be understood that also the curriculum can be seen to have
a multilayered structure (cf. chapter 7).
In practical terms this means for the FNDC that it has to clarify its
social scientific foundations and not take the chosen “paradigms” for
granted (e.g. military pedagogy; Deep Leadership) – the progressive
inquiries play an essential role also in these cases. Hence, the above
mentioned teachers’ on-the-job education and other research activities
play a pivotal role in the processes of turning misalignment into
alignment.
According to Etienne Wenger (1998, 179), through alignment we
become part of something big (e.g. the whole FNDC and the FMES)
because we do what it takes to play our part in the identified social
landscape. But who are we and can we renegotiate our identity as
well as our cultural basic assumptions, “warrior premises” and
authentic values (not only espoused ones)? Are we warriors, soldiers,
boundary crossers or maybe even bridge builders between the distant
cultural spheres of life participating in the activities of the human
security?
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9.7. How do we guide the transformation
of the educational institution or is it a
totally autopoietic issue?
Actually, when answering the other research questions, it was shown
how the transformation of the educational system seems to be a real
possibility. But something else needs to be emphasized about the
controllability of social change. In this study the Giddensian angle to
social change was identified as a solution for the need to understand
what kind of a role human agents could be playing in the game of life.
Seeing the social change from the Giddensian angle stresses the need
to understand the intertwinedness of the disciplines of leadership and
pedagogy, especially in an organization aiming to be a “learning
organization”. When continuing this multidisciplinary analysis,
multilevelness comes again to the fore.
During this study the focus has been multilevelly on the present
question of educational transformations. On the most simplifying level
the endeavoured transformation can be described as a movement from
A (the current state) to B (the endstate) by the use of Cs (e.g. by
strategic means). The self-assessment tools of the TQM are to some
extent useful in this kind of purposes but after the analysis has been
done it has to be generalized in a condensed form due to our bounded
arationality296. During the thematic interviews this kind of method
was used both discursively297 and also on paper298.
“Below” the most simplifying level lies the level of the networked
activity systems. The activity systemic analyses made during this process
have been already introduced, (cf. figures 6.1 and 6.3) but an
additional case can be introduced. In the autumn of 2005 the researcher
arranged a military educational course for the senior staff officer
course. Figure 9.2 shows the recontextualized knowledge-creating
idea of officer education.
296 If our cognitive capacity is bounded (i.e. the famous 7+-2 rule of Miller (1956)) on all levels
of our “epistemic infrastructure” we should use this limited capacity to big/main/the most
fundamental issues guiding our ensuing activities. After a while self- and collective reflections
play a pivotal role and then we can check how well the emerged reality fits or not to the
shared big/main/the most fundamental principles and values. If the conclusion is the misfit,
then we should do correcting actions and activities.
297 The researcher also asked the respondents to take in the first place a perspective not restricted
to the departmental or even to divisional level.
298 Each of the respondents got a suggestion to describe somehow on paper how he personally
sees the present state at the FNDC (position A) and the desired future state (position B).
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Figure 9.2 An example of the knowledge creating activity at the FNDC
During the course the students were progressive inquirers acting
within the research community. In their field studies they followed
how the research-based competence development strategy worked
as a boundary object299 between the activity systems. Somehow the
boundary object in question moves through the chain of command,
reinterpreted by the personnel and potentially influencing the
organizations. In figure 9.2 the new kind of practical activity (i.e.
the knowledge creating activity) has got its shape, offering a seed or
a germ cell for others struggling with same kinds of challenges of the
needed recontextualized turn.
But still another level of analysis has showed its relevancy – the
level of dimensions300. The example below (figure 9.3) shows the
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299 According to Star (cf. 1989, 37; cf. also Bowker & Star 1999) boundary objects are those
objects that are plastic enough to be adaptable across several communities of practices, activity
systems and multiple viewpoints, yet maintaining some sort of constant identity.
300 The dimensions are: practice versus theory; old (“the given”) versus new (“the produced
and created”); individual versus community; local versus global; school versus work.
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practical meaning of the dimensions in the case of Finnish web-based
blended301 courses.
Figure 9.3 The meaning of the key educational dimensions in the case of
web-based blended education
With figure 9.3 the researcher participated in discussions about
the “answers to our pressing educational challenges”. It was proposed
that if the web-based blended courses are the answer to the pressing
educational challenges, we will have to take a close look at the original
and fundamental “pedagogical” questions asked. In other words the
aim of this whole study is to identify fundamental questions rather
than secondary ones. Not only questions have been posed but also
some guidance for forthcoming progressive inquiries has been given.
Making good ethical decisions is such a complex task that although
some general and strategic principles can be applied, we cannot reduce
ethical action in the form of a “rule following behaviour”. But this
301 Web-based blending means a combined use of face-to-face, distance and self-learning
(Kalliomaa 2003).
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does not mean that we should forget the need to have some shared
strategic principles offering guidance for the activities of the FNDC.
In chapter 8 it was mentioned that the relative importance of the
“fourth level” above the Leont’evian three-level scheme seems to be
increasing (cf. figure 8.2). To some extent the activity systems can be
seen as guided by the “products” on the “fourth level”. The strategic
principles can be also situated on the “fourth level” and the main
issue is the continuous and aligned processes between the four levels
in the activity system of the FNDC.
The strategic principles can be put in the form of the following
list302:
– The sphere of interests needs to be global, and ultimately the self-
interests should be negotiated on a global level303.
– Progressive inquiries are guided by the knowledge vision (i.e.
guiding principles and shared values, visionary endstate).
– Multiperspectiveness and double hermeneutic, and in our case even
triple hermeneutic processes towards “bridge building”
transformations are needed.
– Despite of the sphere of interest we all are collectively responsible
for this all and what is currently emerging among ourselves; it is
our duty to turn misalignment into alignment, not just on paper
but in practice.
– There is a real possibility of influencing social change collectively
and making the needed transformations but they do not emerge
out of the blue. Also in the future the “human touch” plays a pivotal
role on the social change and also in the Armed Forces.
9.8. Reflection on the research process
This research process started from the practices of the FNDC, turned
towards social scientific theories and then back to practices. Being
ordered in 2000 to serve at the FNDC, the researcher concluded that
his part-time teaching would be supported by social scientific PhD
studies. Already from the beginning of the research process the
paradox of the FDF and the FNDC alike espousing their learning
302 The present list is by no means fully elaborated but despite of that, the fact of needed global
progressive-inquiries and bridge building activities also in the field of military sciences deserves
being highlighted.
303 Allee (2003, 236-237) referring to the evolutionary biologist Elisabeth Sahtouris. Cf. the
general principles of the integrative social contracts theory coined by Donaldson and Dunfee
(1994, 1999). It is a generally accepted fact that self-interests and mutual self-interests or
maybe even globally negotiated self-interests play an essential role in explaining the emergence
and evolution of communication networks (i.e. links between us and others). For further
reading see Monge & Contractor (2001, 2003).
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organization likeness, being at a same time an undivided part of the
culturally evolving Finnish Knowledge Society caught the attention
of the researcher. The teacher-researcher felt a strong need to solve
his Soldier’s Basic Paradox by visionarily seeking to synthesize these
perspectives together.
For the educational transformers this means a universal need to
synthetize perspectives and build bridges across different research
programmes. The gained experiences show how useful, and actually
necessary, this way of acting is. One future challenge for the “distant”
perspectives needs to be highlighted in the case of the educational
institution.
Also at the FNDC administratively and instructional-pedagogically
oriented collectives (cf. Bereiter 2002; Cuban 2004) coexist and will
continue to do so also in the future. The administratively thinking
people believed that the production of a new written curriculum would
be the main issue of the educational transformation processes. They
emphasized the need to count credits by the ECTS-system, also favoring
the process-based view of the TQM.
On the other hand, the more instructionally oriented people
believed that also other levels would be needed. They insisted that
educational reforms should not be accretions around the cultural core
(Tyack & Cuban 1995), but they seemed to believe in the passivity of
“the prisoners of the culture”, neglecting the possibility to seek some
synthetized solution to the challenge. But if then instead of
“rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic” the administratively
thinking persons could turn their attention to the “Titanic”, namely
to the matrix organization of the FNDC is a question worth asking.
When looking from the instructional perspective, even the imagined
reformulation of the organization of the FNDC will not solve the
instructional-pedagogical problems at the FNDC. This case highlights
the point that even administratively oriented officers cannot totally
reject the other main perspectives, or vice versa, in our social reality
at the FNDC. Due to the fact that the perspectives may not even be
understandable to everyone, the key challenge also in the future at
the FNDC is to convince the others of the relevancy of the instructional-
pedagogical perspective at the educational institution. If an
instructional-pedagogical perspective is not needed at military
educational institutions does it have any place in the FDF and should
the FDF forget the espoused manifestations about the “learning
organization-likeness”? This point clearly shows that “what way is up
and who is the best” is always ultimately locally negotiated, although
the ensuing actions and activities have at least global unintended
consequences.
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But obviously the teacher-researcher did not have any other
possibility than to accept the felt and later identified misalignment
currently at the FNDC. One way towards alignment went through the
studies of the essence of social sciences, also allowing reconsiderations
of the position of the military sciences on the social landscape.
The paradoxical situation (a learning organization in the Knowledge
Society) did not let him to “just choose one paradigm”; he needed to
choose several “paradigms”, ultimately going beyond these towards
research programmes and metatheoretical self-reflections304.
Consequently, the researcher felt the strong need to act on the
dimension of local and global while making sense of it. Hence, the
researcher offers a broad view beyond “paradigms” towards research
programmes and transdisciplinarity.
The double hermeneutic stance used in this study shows its
meaningfulness because the collaboration, but also the resistance of
the practitioners affected the theoretical and philosophical
interpretations shown in this study. The dimension between
impossibility and possibility emerged during the Development
Laboratory meetings. On the other hand the researcher had to focus
on the “warrior premises” and to the “organizational silence” studies
to be able to explain the data collected during the Development
Laboratory meetings.
Especially for the practitioners the talks about metatheorical and
philosophical levels could sound rather abstract ones. The example of
philosophical dialectical thinking clarifies the point. After the
researcher started to understand the meaningfulness of dialectical
thinking he could compare some “thesis” to some “antithesis” (i.e.
counterargumentative thought position) while making a bridge
building action by his “synthesis”. Examples of this are the discussions
about intelligent organizations and not-yet-intelligent organizations.
Another practical example of the importance of the metatheoretical
level is the critical and metatheoretical stance towards the theories
potentially cross-appropriated.
The analyses in chapters 4 and 8 clearly show that the chosen
research programmes in the field of organizational learning and
knowledge creation (cf. building) are not incommensurable. The
identified perspectives are actually more or less combinatorial, allowing
us to make sense of a wider systemic epistemic infrastructure. No
uncorrectable communication problems existed in the chosen field.
The research programmes discussed within themselves and they shared
304 Later the researcher learned to conceptualize his experiences in the form of following
cognitive trails by i.e. socially navigating with the prestigeful social scientists.
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a common language. The often critically oriented discussions were
put into a productive use in this study.
This study does not tell the “whole truth” of the case. It may not
even have identified all the fundamental questions to be asked and
answered. But it offers a “truth” when looking into the phenomena
by the synthesized perspectives chosen for this study305. “The
synthesized truth” in this case is connected to our social reality by
several kinds of cognitive trails306, e.g. sociological and system scientific
research can be mentioned. For example the theoretical analysis of
contradictions was connected to sociological studies, leading to taking
a close look at the nature of social change307. Another example is the
link to system sciences. Claiming that also systemic thinking is culturally
evolving (cf. figure 4.3), the basics of the main ideas behind the
paradigms of systemic thinking were introduced. After following such
cognitive trails it came possible to focus on the essence of societal
change and to the role played by us in it. Consequently, the
uncontrollability assumption was justifiably challenged.
Following Mertonian scientific ethos, the researcher has moved
along the dimension of the local and global, being constructively
critical. During the research process the researcher acted as an active
co-participant in the emerging research community at the FNDC. A
lot needs to be done in the future also in this case but by “human
effort”, deepening double hermeneutic processes and bridge building
activities between the disciplines, inside and outside the FNDC, a
fruitful development can be guaranteed in the future.
305 Cf. the Kuhnian “consistency” explained in chapter 2.
306 Cf. the Kuhnian “accuracy” explained in chapter 2.
307 Cf. the Kuhnian “broad scope” in a sense of potentially having consequences far outside of
the FNDC; cf. chapter 2. The Kuhnian “simplicity by bringing order” was partly done by the
synthetized figures (cf. e.g. figure 9.1). To what extent this study is fruitful in the Kuhnian
sense is left to be judged by the readers.
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APPENDIX 1
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THEMATIC INTERVIEWS
The theme of this interview is the development of the teaching
practices at the FNDC.
I ask you to firstly to take a wider perspective not restricted to the
departmental or even to the divisional level but to the FNDC as a whole,
having connections to the Defence Staff and the Ministries (especially
the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Education). In the end there
are some questions concerning your department or division. But for a
start let us have a more systemic angle.
1. How does the administrative position of the FNDC affect the
development of the educational practices at the FNDC; does the
position of the FNDC cause some challenges; how about
opportunities?
a. How would you express the leading idea of the FNDC (cf.
chapter 3 etc; the idea of guiding principles)?
b. Is/should be?
2. How do you see the consequences to the educational
transformations of the FNDC as it is a university controlled by the
Ministry of Education but is not led by the Ministry of Education?
a. How essential are the FINHEEC’s evaluations of the FNDC in
your opinion? (cf. the USMO paradox: a military organization
but on the other hand a scientific institution)
3. What are the main reforms in officer education caused by the so
called Bologna process?
a. Do you see that some means and methods to renew the
teaching practices at the FNDC have been neglected in the
process – does the FNDC transform as it should and what could
be done otherwise or even better next time? (cf. the claimed
learning organization likeness)
b. How would you comment on the layeredness of the curriculum
(written, taught, learned) and its meaning to the educational
transformations? (cf. chapter 3, 7 and 8)
c. How do you see the role of the teachers in the Bologna process?
(cf. e.g. chapter 3)
4. How would you describe the unique characteristics of the FNDC
and how do these characteristics influence the Bologna-process
at the FNDC?
a. What are the unique characteristics of the Finnish officer
education worth sustaining and why? (cf. e.g. the identity
questions dealt in chapter 8)
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b. Have we lost or going to lose the connection to our unique
characteristics and if so, why?
5. Let us assume that the core idea of the developmental activities is
to develop the present state (A) to the desired future state (B):
how do you describe the A and the B?
a. Please answer on the separate sheet of paper (aiming to
explicitly reveal the current beliefs of the managers of the
FNDC)
6. How would you crystallize the guiding vision and its meaning for
the FNDC? (cf. e.g. chapter 4)
7. In the White Paper (2004) it is claimed that the FDF operating
culture is being developed on “learning organization” principles.
How do you see the meaningfulness of such a claim? (cf. e.g. chapter
4)
8. What do you estimate the effects of the deepening internalization
to be on the teaching practices of the FNDC in the future? (an
interplay between the local and the global of the social theory of
learning; cf. subchapter 8.6)
a. Cooperative relationship with the US Armed Forces?
b. With the European security structures?
c. With the Nordic Armed Forces? (cf. chapter 8: “communities
of practices could be also deliberately created in a top-down
manner”)
9. How do you describe the main outcomes of the education at the
FNDC? (cf. Engeström’s activity system model; figure 4.4)
a. Teaching the teaching objectives?
b. The officer 2010/2020 competencies?
c. How do you see the meaningfulness of the so called ethical
dimension? (cf. the concept of action competence of the
military pedagogy; chapter 7)
10. How would you compare the present and future officer candidates
(e.g. a cadet)? (cf. Engeström’s activity system model; the object;
figure 4.4)
a. How will these features affect the educational transformations?
b. It is often said that students are active and the duty of the
officer is to be an active; what does this mean to you and what
could it mean to the officer education in general?
11. What are the main objectives of officer education? (cf. Engeström’s
activity system model; the outcome; figure 4.4)
a. How about the main result objectives?
i. The amount of graduated students and the level of the
feedback?
b. Are the objectives appropriate and central in your opinion?
c. The quality of teaching is being discussed: what does this mean
to you?
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12. What are the core principles currently used in the controlling of
the decentralized FMES? (cf. the content of the vision and the
knowledge vision; e.g. chapter 4)
a. What is your view on the idea of values guiding our actions?
b. What are the core principles that should be used in the above
issue?
c. Do some administrative norms (SOPs, laws, decrees, rules)
restrict the possibilities to offer good education and training?
13. How do you see the role of the FNDC in guiding the branch and
service schools in educational matters? (cf. the content of the vision
and the knowledge vision; e.g. chapter 4)
a. Should the guiding role of the FNDC be developed further
and if so, how?
b. Could you see that so called communities of practices could
intensify this guidance? (cf. chapter 8)
14. How would you describe the collaboration between the FNDC and
the military units concerning educational activities?
a. Can we take the competence needs of the military units
sufficiently into consideration? (cf. the generations of the
CHAT; networked activity systems; chapter 4)
15. How do you analyze the interaction between scientificness and
professionalism?
a. Is one or the other emphasized over the other? (cf. how to
deal with the identified USMO paradox?)
16. If we separate what is studied from how it is studied, what are the
most important principles in order to (cf. chapters 4 and 8)
a. Enhance learning?
b. What is the meaning of “learning”?
c. Students will learn to learn and develop their competencies in
the workplaces?
d. What is the role of web-based blended education for the
transformation of officer education?
17. What are the principles of choosing the taught content? (cf.
chapter 2)
a. What are the principles of choosing e.g. the books to be read?
18. How do you define the possible needs to develop students’
assessment practices? (cf. chapter 8)
The rest of the questions concern your department or division. (A
proposal for those serving on a divisional or a departmental level)
19. How would you crystallize the main pedagogical principles of your
department/division/the FNDC? (cf. e.g. chapters 3 and 4)
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20. Could you give some examples of how the teachers of your
department/division/the FNDC have developed their teaching
during the past years? (cf. chapter 3)
21. How would you crystallize the way the teachers of your
department/division/the FNDC have developed their competencies
during the past years? (cf. chapter 3)
22. How has your department/division/the FNDC utilized research to
develop the teaching practices during the past years? (cf. e.g.
chapter 1)
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Teacher’s Self-Evaluation Sheet APPENDIX 2
TEACHER’S SELF-EVALUATION SHEET
For self-evaluation and peer/superior-evaluation.
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